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A notion that lectures on legal ethics conjure ethics into the listener
is childish, in almost the exact measure in which the listener is he
whom it is wished to cure.
K.N. Llewellyn, The Bar Specializes-With What Results?1
I.

INTRODUCTION

The rule of law constrains lawgivers. It requires, at a minimum,
that the government be one of laws, and not of men. 2 Those
constraints on lawgivers are both internal and external. Internal
constraints such as humility, selflessness, and civic virtue have all
been posited as necessary to limit the exercise of power by
lawgivers. Because men are not angels, 3 external constraints also
exist to limit their exercise of power. One of the external
constraints is a watchful eye from those in the daily law business1. K.N. Llewellyn, The Bar Specializes-With What Results?, 39 COM. L.J. 336, 340
(1934). This is a reprint of Llewellyn's article published in the May 1933 issue of Annals of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science. K.N. Llewellyn, The Bar
Specializes-With What Results?, 167 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCi. 177 (1933).
2. See MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXX (1780), reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAW OF THE

UNITED STATES 956, 960 (Ben Perley Poore ed., 2d ed. Washington, Gov't Printing Office
1878) ("In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never
exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never
exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never
exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them; to the end it may be a
government of laws and not of men."); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 163 (1803) ("The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a
government of laws, and not of men.").
3. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men,
neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.").
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lawyers. 4 As stated by Professor Brian Tamanaha, "[t]he legal
profession, then, is located at the crux of the rule of law."' 5 But if
lawyers are at the crux of the rule of law, as its guardians, "[w]ho
will guard the guards?" 6 One check on the conduct of lawyers is
the command that they adhere to a code of ethics. A code of
ethics is designed to constrain the self-interested exercise of power
by lawyers while providing them with the authority to maintain a
watchful eye over the exercise of authority by lawgivers. But the
authority given lawyers in American society is tenuous, and it has
often been challenged and even rejected in different eras of
American history. The subject of this article focuses on the
development of American legal ethics as a defense and response to
challenges to the authority and power exercised by lawyers. The
thesis of this article is that internal professional debates about
codes of ethics largely have occurred during times of professional
anxiety concerning the role of lawyers in a democratic society.
Section II discusses the development of the self-policing
limitations on the behavior of American lawyers, beginning in
1836 with David Hoffman's "Resolutions in Regard to
Professional Deportment" in his book A Course of Legal Study7
and continuing through 1908, when the American Bar Association
(ABA) adopted its Canons of Ethics.8 A study of Hoffman's
Resolutions indicates they were offered as a measure to re-attain
honor and status for a profession perceived by Hoffman to be
under attack and in decline. In the two decades between the
4. Cf BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY

58 (2004) ("[A]II liberal accounts of the rule of law presuppose the presence of a robust
legal tradition.").
5. Id. at 59.
6. The Latin phrase is "Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?" and is attributed to Juvenal.
JUVENAL, SATIRES VI, act 1, 1.347 (Niall Rudd trans., Clarendon Press 1991); JUVENAL,
THE SATIRES OF JUVENAL 78 (Rolfe Humphries trans., Ind. Univ. Press 1958).
7. DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 752-77 (2d ed. Philadelphia,

Thomas, Cowperthwait & Co. 1846) (reprinting the 1836 edition); see M.H. Hoeflich,
Legal Ethics in the Nineteenth Century: The "Other Tradition," 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 793,
793-99 (1999) (offering statements of lawyers other than Hoffman concerning legal
ethics); cf Norman W. Spaulding, The Myth of Civic Republicanism: Interrogating the
Ideology of Antebellum Legal Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1397, 1415-16 (2003) ("[I]t is
far from clear that [Hoffman's Resolutions] are representative either of practice at the
time or the consensus of republican legal elites on the specific legal duties entailed by their
self-appointed role as the 'governing class."').
8. See Transactions of the Thirty-first Annual Meeting of the American Bar
Association, 33 A.B.A. REP. 3, 55, 86 (1908) (adopting the Canons of Ethics).
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publication of Hoffman's Resolutions and the publication of Judge
and Dean George Sharswood's October 2, 1854 Introductory
Lecture to students at the University of Pennsylvania Department
of Law, published as A Compend of Lectures on the Aims and
Duties of the Profession of the Law: Delivered Before the Law
Class of the University of Pennsylvania,9 a crisis of legal
professionalism, including a crisis over the extent of the lawyer's
duty to defend a guilty client, led Sharswood to modify substantially the standards of conduct embraced by Hoffman. Shortly
after the end of the Civil War, the actions of preeminent lawyer
David Dudley Field (and members of his law firm) in representing
the speculators Jay Gould and Jim Fisk created another crisis of
professionalism. Section II closes by discussing the adoption of the
Canons of Ethics by the ABA in 1908, which are based on the 1887
Alabama Code of Ethics. 10 The adoption of the Canons was the
culmination of the effort by elite lawyers to provide protection
against attacks that lawyers were solely interested in protecting
their own and their clients' interests.
Section III analyzes why the heavily criticized Canons were not
modified in the sixty years before the ABA's adoption of the Code
of Professional Responsibility in 1969. The 1908 Canons of Ethics
were thirty-two in number. In 1928, the ABA added thirteen
Canons,1 1 and in the 1930s, it adopted the two final Canons.1 2
9. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND DUTIES

OF THE PROFESSION OF THE LAW (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1854). The same
work was subsequently titled An Essay on ProfessionalEthics. I will cite both to the A
Compend edition of 1854, and the fifth edition of An Essay on Professional Ethics
reprinted in 32 A.B.A. REP. 1 (1907).
10. Transactionsof the Thirty-first Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association,
33 A.B.A. REP. 3, 55, 86 (1908) (documenting adoption of the Canons of Ethics). The

committee noted that its work "was based upon Sharswood's Legal Ethics." Id. at 56; see
James M. Altman, Consideringthe A.B.A. 's 1908 Canons of Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV.

2395, 2400 (2003) ("In terms of the language and content of the Canons, the most
influential of these sources was the code of ethics adopted by the Alabama State Bar
Association....").
11. See Report of the Special Committee on Supplements to the Canonsof Professional
Ethics, 53 A.B.A. REP. 495, 495 (1928) (recommending approval of the supplemental
Canons of Ethics); see also Proceedingsof the Fifty-first Annual Meeting of American Bar
Association, 53 A.B.A. REP. 29, 129-30 (1928) (discussing and approving all but one

recommended supplemental Canon).
12. See Proceedings of the Fifty-sixth Annual Meeting of American Bar Association,

58 A.B.A. REP. 41, 155-78 (1933) (reporting debate and vote on amendments and
adoption of Canon 46); Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 62 A.B.A. REP. 216, 352

(1937) (adopting Canon 47 as "Recommendation (k)" and other amendments from the
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Although a revision of the Canons was suggested from the late
1920s through the mid-1930s, and again in the mid-1950s, it was
not until 1964 that the ABA, through President Lewis F. Powell,
Jr., appointed a special committee (the Wright Committee) to
draft rules intended to replace the Canons.13
Section III
concludes that while lawyers who attacked unethical conduct in
the profession initially focused on modifying the Canons, the legal
profession -remedied this perceived lack of ethics through a
concerted effort to restrict entry into the profession instead of
replacing the Canons. In particular, the ABA's effort to increase
the admissions standards of law schools came to fruition, as did the
efforts by state bar associations to lower the percentage of
successful bar examination applicants. A substantial reduction in
the annual number of newly admitted lawyers during the 1930s
allowed the profession to claim its ethical luster had been restored
by the early 1940s.
Section IV begins with a discussion of the "golden age" of the
legal profession in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It offers a
history of the Report of the Joint Conference on Professional
Responsibility, 4

a

landmark

work

of the

ABA

and

the

Association of American Law Schools (AALS). The Joint
Conference Report, written by Harvard Law School Professor Lon
L. Fuller, offered an explanation as to why lawyers were entrusted
with the power to check the lawgiver. But it also cautioned the
legal profession by reminding it that "a letter-bound observance of
the Canons is not equivalent to the practice of professional
responsibility.' 1 5
The Joi~it Conference Report avoided a
declaration of rules and instead focused on the "central moral
tradition within which American lawyers ought to live and
Supplementary Report of the Standing Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances);

Report of the Special Committee on Canons of Ethics, 58 A.B.A. REP. 428, 428-29 (1933)
(recommending adoption of Canon 46); Supplementary Report of the Standing Committee
on ProfessionalEthics and Grievances, 62 A.B.A. REP. 761, 761-67 (1937) (recommending
adoption of Canon 47).
13. See Proceedingsof the House of Delegates at the 1964 Annual Meeting, 89 A.B.A.
REP. 365, 383 (1964) (noting appointment of the Special Committee on Evaluation of
Ethical Standards).
14. Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, ProfessionalResponsibility:Report of the Joint

Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159 (1958). It was also published as Lon L. Fuller & John D.
Randall, ProfessionalResponsibility:A Statement, 11 S.C. L.Q. 306 (1959).
15. Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility:Report of the Joint

Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1159 (1958).
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dwell."' 16 Similarly, Fuller noted that a necessary yet insufficient
condition of a code of ethics was a "sense of mission."' 1 7 Although
the Joint Conference Report influenced the drafting by the Wright
Committee of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Code
was in many respects unable to achieve the promise found in the
Joint Conference Report.

Finally, Section IV examines the reasons for the missed
opportunity in the creation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which was approved by the ABA in 1969.18
Although the American legal profession was, historically speaking,
at the peak of its power and influence, many lawyers saw the
drafting of the Code as an opportunity to engage in rent-seeking
rather than as a statement of lawyers pledging fidelity to service to
the public-having a "sense of mission." Although more advanced
than the Canons, the provisions of the Code too often were unable
to go beyond lawyer economic self-interest. Nonetheless, most
states adopted the Code by 1972.19 Despite its overwhelming
success, the ABA appointed a commission in 1977 to evaluate "'all
facets of legal ethics."' 2 0 The commission, chaired by Nebraska
lawyer Robert Kutak, fashioned the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, approved by the ABA in 1983.21 Fourteen years after
16. Robert P. Lawry, The Central Moral Tradition of Lawyering, 19 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 311, 311 (1990).
17. L.L. Fuller, The Philosophy of Codes of Ethics, 74 ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING

916, 917 (1955).
18. See Report of the Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, 94
A.B.A. REP. 728, 728 (1969) (recommending adoption of the Code of Professional

Responsibility). The Code of Professional Responsibility was made effective January 1,
1970. See id. (recommending that the Code of Professional Responsibility be adopted
effective January 1, 1970); Proceedings of the 1969 Annual Meeting of the House of
Delegates, 94 A.B.A. REP. 378, 392 (1969) ("[T]he House went on to adopt the code as
written by the Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards.").
19. See Report of the Special Committee to Secure Adoption of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, 97 A.B.A. REP. 740, 741 (1972) (noting that "[forty-three]
states and the District of Columbia have adopted" all or part of the Code).
20. Ted Schneyer, ProfessionalismAs Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 677, 677 (1989) (quoting William B.
Spann, Jr., The Legal Profession Needs a New Code of Ethics, B. LEADER, Nov.-Dec.
1977, at 2, 3).
21. See Proceedings of the 1983 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 108
A.B.A. REP. 763, 778 (1983) (noting the adoption of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct); Ted Schneyer, Professionalism As Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 677, 677-78 (1989) (indicating that
ABA President William B. Spann, Jr. "asked Omaha lawyer Robert Kutak to chair a
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the adoption of the Model Rules, the ABA created an "Ethics
2000" Commission to determine whether to modify the Model
Rules. 2 The last subsection in Section IV notes the anxiety within
the legal profession during the debate on the Model Rules and
continuing through the Ethics 2000 Commission, and suggests the
influence this anxiety played in the adoption of the Rules. The
transition of legal ethics from a morality-infused view of the
lawyer's duty within a public profession to a law-based standard
focusing largely on compliance with rules (contrary to Fuller's
injunction) was completed in the Model Rules. This did not ease
the anxiety found in the legal profession; instead, its organizational
leaders trilled louder and louder about the lawyer's duty to
maintain the rule of law. Section V offers a brief conclusion.
II.

AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS FROM HOFFMAN TO THE CANONS

The ethical principles [Sharswood] establishes are eternal and

therefore just as pertinent today as they were more than a century
ago.
23
Walter P. Armstrong, Jr., A Century of Legal Ethics
Compliance with several of Hoffman's resolutions might be grounds
for disbarment in 2001.
Michael I. Krauss, The Lawyer As Limo:
24
A BriefHistory of the Hired Gun

A. Introduction
When the ABA adopted its Canons of Ethics in 1908, it
helpfully included an "Index and Synopsis of Canons. "25 This
special committee" that ultimately led to the formation of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct).
22. Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
Summary of the Work of Ethics 2000, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 441, 441 (2002); E.

Norman Veasey, Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
("Ethics 2000"): Chair's Introduction (Aug. 2002), http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/e2kchairintro.html.
23. Walter P. Armstrong, Jr., A Century of Legal Ethics, 64 A.B.A. J. 1063, 1063
(1978). Armstrong was a former president of the ABA and a member of the Wright
Committee. Id.; see also Past and Present Officers, 89 A.B.A. REP. 108 app. at 109 (1964)
(listing Walter P. Armstrong as the sixty-fifth president of the ABA).
24. Michael I. Krauss, The Lawyer As Limo: A Brief History of the Hired Gun, 8 U.
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 325, 332 (2001).

25. Index and Synopsis of Canons, 33 A.B.A. REP. 586, 586 (1908).

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40:343

"Index and Synopsis" listed the titles of the thirty-two Canons of
Ethics.2 6 Following the titles were parentheticals listing the
corresponding provisions to David Hoffman's 1836 "Resolutions
in Regard to Professional Deportment" contained in A Course of
Legal Study2 7 and the Code of Ethics adopted by the Alabama

State Bar Association in 1887 and later by other states' bar
associations. 2 8 Alabama's Code of Ethics, in turn, was based on
Judge George Sharswood's 1854 A Compend of Lectures. 9
Additionally, section III of the Canons included a lawyer's oath of
admission traceable to David Dudley Field's 3" 1850 Code of Civil
26. Id.
27. Id.; 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 752-75 (2d ed. Baltimore,
Joseph Neal 1836).
28. Index and Synopsis of Canons, 33 A.B.A. REP. 586, 586 (1908); Thomas Goode
Jones, Code of Ethics, in GILDED AGE LEGAL ETHICS: ESSAYS ON THOMAS GOODE
JONES' 1887 CODE 45, 45-59 (Carol Rice Andrews et al. eds., 2003). In 1907, compilations
of the Alabama Code of Ethics, supplemented by additions made by ten other statesColorado, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, Virginia,
West Virginia and Wisconsin-were reproduced. Appendix B, 32 A.B.A. REP. 685, 685
(1907). The Alabama Code consisted of fifty-seven provisions. Thomas Goode Jones,
Code of Ethics, in GILDED AGE LEGAL ETHICS: ESSAYS ON THOMAS GOODE JONES'
1887 CODE 45, 45-59 (Carol Rice Andrews et al. eds., 2003). The reproduction consisted
of seventy numbered provisions. Appendix B, 32 A.B.A. REP. 685, 688-713 (1907).
29. CompareThomas Goode Jones, Code of Ethics, in GILDED AGE LEGAL ETHICS:
ESSAYS ON THOMAS GOODE JONES' 1887 CODE 45, 45-59 (Carol Rice Andrews et al.
eds., 2003) (containing many similarities to Sharswood's A Compend of Lectures), with
GEORGE SHARSWOOD, A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND DUTIES OF THE
PROFESSION OF THE LAW (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1854) (containing many of the
ideas captured in the 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics). The title of Sharswood's lectures
was changed to Essay on Professional Ethics in the second edition published in 1860. See
Allison Marston, Guiding the Profession: The 1887 Code of Ethics of the Alabama State
Bar Association, 49 ALA. L. REV. 471, 472 (1998) (noting that George Sharswood's Essay
on ProfessionalEthics influenced the formation of Alabama's 1887 Code of Ethics). On
the influence of Sharswood's Essay on the Alabama Code, see also David I. Durham, A
Call for Regulation of the Profession, in GILDED AGE LEGAL ETHICS: ESSAYS ON
THOMAS GOODE JONES' 1887 CODE 1, 3-4 (Carol Rice Andrews et al. eds., 2003), where
the author states that "it is likely that Jones borrowed more heavily from the work of
George Sharswood than any other single source," and Allison Marston, Guiding the
Profession: The 1887 Code of Ethics of the Alabama State Bar Association, 49 ALA. L.
REV. 471, 472 n.3 (1998), which lists sources that support the proposition that the 1887
Alabama Code of Ethics was based upon Sharswood's Essay on ProfessionalEthics.
30. On the life of David Dudley Field, see generally DAUN VAN EE, DAVID DUDLEY
FIELD AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE LAW (1986), HENRY M. FIELD, THE LIFE OF
DAVID DUDLEY FIELD (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons 1898), Frederick C. Hicks,
Field, David Dudley, in 6 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 361 (Allen Johnson &
Dumas Malone eds., 1931), and Helen K. Hoy, David Dudley Field, in 5 GREAT
AMERICAN LAWYERS 123 (William Draper Lewis ed., 1908).
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Procedure for the State of New York. 3 '
The "Index and Synopsis" indicates the extent to which the
ABA's Canons of Ethics simply acknowledged the breadth of
32 Of
settled territory in the field of the ethical duties of lawyers.
Hoffman's fifty Resolutions (the last of which directed the lawyer
to read the foregoing forty-nine twice yearly), only Resolutions 22,
39, 45, and 46 were not cross-referenced in the Canons.3 3 Of the
seventy provisions found in the Alabama and other state codes of
ethics, the index referenced fifty-six provisions in the Canons.3 4
One reason why the 1908 Canons relied heavily on Hoffman,
Field, Sharswood, and the 1887 Code is that much of what was
written resonated then, as it does today. Hoffman urged lawyers
to avoid commingling their property with that of the client (26),
return client funds as soon as possible (25), represent the client
with zeal (18), never represent both sides in a matter (8), withdraw
when lacking competence in the matter (20), treat all cases in the
same conscientious fashion (23), respect the judge presiding in
court (3), charge reasonable fees (27), refund any retained fees for
services not rendered (29), avoid testifying in a case in which he
represented a client (35), and communicate with the opposing
party only with the consent and in the presence of the attorney for
the opposing party (33).35 The 1887 Alabama Code barred
lawyers from using personal ties to influence the court (3),
31. See DAUN VAN EE, DAVID DUDLEY FIELD AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE
LAW 39 (1986) (noting that Field "labored far into the last night of 1849" in order to
complete the 1850 civil and criminal codes of procedure); see also COMM'RS ON PRACTICE
& PLEADINGS, THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 205

(Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co. 1850) (including in section 511 an oath of admission
"prescribed to advocates by the law of Geneva"). As noted by the ABA, this oath of
attorneys was further traced back to the Swiss canton of Geneva. Report of the Committee
on Code of ProfessionalEthics, 32 A.B.A. REP. 676, 676 (1907).
32. Cf Carol Rice Andrews, Standards of Conduct for Lawyers: An 800-Year
Evolution, 57 SMU L. REV. 1385, 1442 (2004) ("The striking similarity between the ABA
Canons and the 1887 Alabama Code suggests that the ABA Canons did not make a
dramatic shift in either substance or form of existing standards of conduct."). Andrews
argues that the ABA merely sought to clarify current rules of ethics. Id.
33. Compare 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 752-75 (2d ed.

Baltimore, Joseph Neal 1836) (containing fifty Resolutions), with Canons of Ethics, 33
A.B.A. REP. 575, 575-84 (1908) (containing thirty-two Canons).
34. See Index and Synopsis of Canons, 33 A.B.A. REP. 586, 586 n.1 (1908) (noting the
cross-references to the compilation of canons from Alabama and other states, which
number fifty-six throughout the thirty-two Canons).
35. 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 752-67 (2d ed. Baltimore,
Joseph Neal 1836).
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required speaking to the court and opposing counsel with candor
and fairness (and prohibited a lawyer from citing overruled cases
and repealed statutes) (5), and barred a lawyer from making a
false claim (10), pursuing a claim intended merely to harass or vex
the opposing party (14), and representing conflicting interests in
the same matter (25).36 Further, the lawyer had the duty under
the Alabama Code to maintain client confidences and secrets after
the representation was completed (and even after the death of the
client) (21), even if that meant later declining a matter from a
prospective client (22). 3 7
As noted above, a few Resolutions were not referenced by the
Canons of Ethics, and several Canons contained no comparable
counterpart in the Resolutions. 38 Those Resolutions suggested:
cases involving a client's reputation should not be settled, and that
the highborn shall not use their status to force the attorney to
compromise his client's case; the lawyer accept a jury verdict
without impugning the jury's or the court's integrity; and the
lawyer neither use rhetorical skills to fool listeners nor assume a
pose of false modesty.3 9 Just seven Canons failed to reference one
or more of the Resolutions: two Canons (2 and 3) concerned the
duty of the bar to avoid letting political considerations trump
fitness for judicial office and the duty of a lawyer to avoid exerting
personal influence on a judge regarding the merits of a matter; two
Canons concerned newspapers, the first noting that statements by
lawyers in the newspapers could prejudice the administration of
justice (20) and the second banning advertising (27); one Canon
banned barratry (28); one Canon demanded the lawyer use his
36. Thomas Goode Jones, Code of Ethics, in GILDED AGE LEGAL ETHICS: ESSAYS
ON THOMAS GOODE JONES' 1887 CODE 45,48-53 (Carol Rice Andrews et al. eds., 2003).
37. Id. at 52. The 1908 Canons did not include a provision on keeping client
confidences. See generally Canons of Ethics, 33 A.B.A. REP. 575, 575-84 (1908). The
lawyers' oath adopted with the Canons did include an oath respecting the keeping of client
confidences. See id. at 584-85 ("I will maintain the confidence and preserve inviolate the
secrets of my client .).
The ABA adopted Confidences of a Client as Canon 37 in
1928. See Proceedings of the American Bar Association, 53 A.B.A. REP. 29, 130 (1928)
(adopting the Special Committee's recommended additions to the Canons); Report of the
Special Committee on Supplements to the Canons of ProfessionalEthics, 53 A.B.A. REP.
495, 497 (1928) (recommending adoption of a Canon on client confidentiality).
38. Compare 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 752-75 (2d ed.
Baltimore, Joseph Neal 1836) (containing fifty Resolutions), with Canons of Ethics, 33
A.B.A. REP. 575, 575-84 (1908) (containing thirty-two Canons).
39. 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 759-75 (2d ed. Baltimore,
Joseph Neal 1836).
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best efforts to restrain a client from doing anything a lawyer would
not do (16); and one Canon discussed the lawyer's duties when
advocating for a client outside of the courts (26).4 0 Even though
these Canons did not cross-reference any of Hoffman's
Resolutions, their tone was consonant with the tenor of the
Resolutions. Both Hoffman's Resolutions and the ABA's Canons
were written in part to claim the law was an honorable profession
despite attacks from within and without.
Despite the similarities from Hoffman through the 1908 Canons,
a shift in the understanding of the role of the lawyer before the
court and in relation to the client changed dramatically during this
time. This shift is found most strongly in the understanding of
"zeal" exerted by the lawyer in representing a client. Shifts
occurred in the eighteen years between Hoffman's 1836
Resolutions and Sharswood's 1854 A Compend of Lectures and in
the years between Sharswood's work and the 1871 attacks on the
professional conduct of David Dudley Field in representing robber
barons Jay Gould and Jim Fisk in the late 1860s and early 1870s.
B. David Hoffman's Legal Ethics
One reason for the similarity in tone (though not always the
substance) between the Resolutions and the Canons of Ethics was
a similar anxiety about the direction of the profession in the 1830s
and in the early twentieth century. Hoffman's A Course of Legal
Study was originally published in 1817, when Hoffman turned
thirty-three years old.4 1 In 1810, when Hoffman began the
practice of law in Baltimore, there were a relatively modest fortythree lawyers in the city.42 Apprentices studied law for three
40. Canons of Ethics, 33 A.B.A. REP. 575, 576-83 (1908); Index and Synopsis of
Canons, 33 A.B.A. REP. 586, 586 (1908). Although not referenced in the "Index and
Synopsis of Canons," Hoffman's twenty-fourth Resolution stated in part: "I will never be
tempted ... to purchase, in whole, or in part, my client's cause." 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A
COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 760 (2d ed. Baltimore, Joseph Neal 1836).
41. DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY (Baltimore, Coale & Maxwell

1817); cf Maxwell Bloomfield, David Hoffman and the Shaping of a Republican Legal
Culture, 38 MD. L. REV. 673, 674 (1979) (noting that Hoffman was born in 1784).
42. See Maxwell Bloomfield, David Hofftnan and the Shaping of a Republican Legal
Culture, 38 MD. L. REV. 673, 677 (1979) (describing the character of the Baltimore legal
community and noting forty-three attorneys practiced there in 1810). Philadelphia lawyer
David Paul Brown wrote a two volume memoir/guidebook/history of the Philadelphia bar
from 1810 to 1856. Brown noted that in Philadelphia there were approximately 100
lawyers in the 1810s. 2 DAVID PAUL BROWN, THE FORUM; OR, FORTY YEARS FULL
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years before becoming eligible to practice law, making it difficult
for anyone but the sons of the wealthy and prosperous to become
lawyers. 4 3 Because such a small, tight-knit, socially homogenous
community already possessed of wealth had the ability to police
itself, the listing of rules of professional deportment was
superfluous. It makes sense, then, that the 1817 edition of A
Course of Legal Study did not include any rules on professional
deportment in the main content.44 Hoffman included the subject
of professional deportment as the last "Auxiliary Subject" (Title
IV), and he listed eleven readings to which he added brief notes
summarizing their content. 45 Hoffman introduced the subject of
professional deportment with a short essay, notable for its
optimistic tone.4 6 The lawyer understood how to engage in proper
conduct once he was learned, for Hoffman equated the acquisition
of "liberal knowledge" with "honourable views."'4 7
When
Hoffman published his Syllabus of a Course of Lectures in 1821, he
left to the 301st and last lecture the topic of professional
deportment. 48 By 1836, when the second edition of A Course of
PRACTICE AT THE PHILADELPHIA BAR 58 (Philadelphia, Robert H. Small 1856); see also

Gary B. Nash, The PhiladelphiaBench and Bar, 1800-1861, 7 COMP. STUD. SoC'Y & HIST.
203, 214 (1965) (noting that 101 lawyers were "admitted to the Philadelphia bar from
1800-1805"). In 1810, Philadelphia was the second-largest city in the United States with a
population of 53,722, while Baltimore was the third-largest city with a population of
46,555. U.S. Census Bureau, 1810 Fast Facts, http://www.census.gov/history/www/1810/
010907.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2008).
43. See Maxwell Bloomfield, David Hoffman and the Shaping of a Republican Legal
Culture, 38 MD. L. REV. 673, 677 (1979) (indicating that prospective attorneys in
Baltimore could apply for a license only after at least three years of study). In 1810,
"[m]ost of the new practitioners [in Baltimore] were the sons of merchants or gentry." Id.
44. See generally DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY (Baltimore, Coale
& Maxwell 1817).
45. Id. at 324-34.
46. Id. at 324-28.
47. Id. at 327.
48. DAVID HOFFMAN, SYLLABUS OF A COURSE OF LECTURES ON LAW (1821),
reprinted in 1 THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 250, 277

(Steve Sheppard ed., 1999). The lecture on professional deportment was in Title XI of the
Syllabus. Id. Although appointed professor of law in 1814, Hoffman, who had a
profitable law practice, did not begin giving lectures at the University of Maryland until
1822. Maxwell Bloomfield, David Hoffman and the Shaping of a Republican Legal
Culture, 38 MD. L. REV. 673, 678-83 (1979). He continued there until 1832, when he left
the school on bad terms. Id. at 683. Nonetheless, Hoffman made a lasting impression on
the university and legal scholarship. See generally ALFRED ZANTZINGER REED,
TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW 123-26 (1921) (explaining
Hoffman's contributions to the University of Maryland); Thomas L. Shaffer, David
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Legal Study was published, much had changed. Not only did
Hoffman add to his list of readings, the second edition included a
Note 18, titled "Observations on Professional Deportment," and
49
the fifty "Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment."
Hoffman's "Observations on Professional Deportment" in Note 18
was a largely melancholy statement regarding the legal profession.
Note 18 reflected on the many "evil enticements" besetting the
lawyer, who was to reject those enticements and follow only "those
principles emphatically denominated honourable.' ' 50 Within the
eight printed pages of Note 18, Hoffman uses "honourable" and
"honour" twelve times, and the manner in which he returned to
the topic suggests Hoffman saw professional honor slipping
away. 5 The Resolutions, which appear at the conclusion of the
section on professional deportment, were an attempted antidote to
"the debasement of professional mores that he perceived in the
52
Jacksonian era."
53
Baltimore was ruled by a small elite when Hoffman grew up,
and as the youngest son of a successful merchant family, Hoffman
Hoffman's Law School Lectures, 1822-1833, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 127 (1982) (detailing
Hoffman's contributions to legal scholarship).
49. 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 744, 752-75 (2d ed.
Baltimore, Joseph Neal 1836).
50. Id. at 746-47; DAVID HOFFMAN, HINTS ON THE PROFESSIONAL DEPORTMENT

OF LAWYERS 32 (Philadelphia, Thomas, Cowperthwait & Co. 1846).
51. 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 744-51 (2d ed. Baltimore,
Joseph Neal 1836).
52. Maxwell Bloomfield, David Hoffman and the Shaping of a Republican Legal
Culture, 38 MD. L. REV. 673, 684 (1979); see also 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF
LEGAL STUDY 720-75 (2d ed. Baltimore, Joseph Neal 1836) (including the Resolutions at
the end of the "Professional Deportment" section). The addition of "Professional
Deportment" struck some type of chord within the legal profession beyond Baltimore.
The second edition of A Course of Legal Study was reviewed in the Boston-based
American Jurist and Law Magazine by F.J.T. of the Philadelphia Bar. In the last
paragraph of the review, the author praised Hoffman's material on professional
deportment in remarking that "[ulpon a future occasion we design to make this division
the text for a separate article." F.J.T., Hoffman's Course of Legal Study, 15 AM. JURIST &
L. MAG. 321, 341 (1836). I have not found any subsequent article by the American Jurist
and Law Magazine discussing Hoffman's "Professional Deportment."
53. See Maxwell Bloomfield, David Hoffman and the Shaping of a Republican Legal
Culture, 38 MD. L. REV. 673, 674 (1979) ("[Baltimore] was governed by an interlocking
elite of merchants and landed gentry whose authority extended over all areas of municipal
life."). Baltimore's population was 46,555 in 1810 and 62,738 in 1820. U.S. Census
Bureau, 1810 Fast Facts, http://www.census.gov/history/www/1810/010907.html (last visited
Nov. 10, 2008); U.S. Census Bureau, 1820 Fast Facts, http://www.census.gov/history/www/
1820/010916.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2008).
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was part of that elite.54 By 1836, that era was gone.
A
Federalist and later a Whig, Hoffman "was the voice for educated
elites who feared that the potential greatness of the [n]ation was
being undercut by the common ways and broad democratic
participation of the 1830s. ''56 The social stratification that was
part of Hoffman's youth had been displaced by a mania for
equality.57 The bar, Hoffman believed, was the last redoubt of the
gentleman. 58 Attacks on the legal profession by the "lower
orders," Hoffman wrote in 1837, was an indirect tribute to the

54. See Maxwell Bloomfield, David Hoffman and the Shaping of a Republican Legal
Culture, 38 MD. L. REV. 673, 674 (1979) (noting that Hoffman, the youngest child, was
"[blorn in 1784 into a prosperous mercantile family").
55. Cf Bill Sleeman, Law and Letters: A Detailed Examination of David Hoffman's
Life and Career 18 (Univ. of Md. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research, Working Paper No.
2005-29, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=680668 (noting that the "broad
democratic participation of the 1830s" led to fear among the educated elites of rule "by
the common ways").
56. Id. But see MICHAEL F. HOLT, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN WHIG
PARTY 951 (1999) (rejecting the notion that people were attracted to the American Whig
Party only because they had "a sense of social and moral superiority"). Hoffman was an
exception to Holt's rule. Cf Bill Sleeman, Law and Letters: A Detailed Examination of
David Hoffman's Life and Career 15 (Univ. of Md. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research,
Working Paper No. 2005-29, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=680668 (noting
that Hoffman was "an active participant in both Baltimore and national politics, first as a
Federalist and later as a member of the Whig party").
57. See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM
PREMODERNISM TO POSTMODERNISM 68-70 (2000) (concluding that after the election of

1800, a "widespread anti-elitism" surfaced such that the "intellectual elites never again"
could "predominate among the nation's political leaders"); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE
MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835, at 20-27 (abr. paper ed.

Oxford Univ. Press 1991) (1988) (noting social stratification, observing challenges to
elitism in the form of growth in public education and suffrage reform, and concluding that
the "equality principle, then, appears as both an energizing and a threatening force in
early-nineteenth-century
America");
GORDON
S. WOOD,
REVOLUTIONARY
CHARACTERS: WHAT MADE THE FOUNDERS DIFFERENT 259-60 (2006) ("[Tlhe
revolutionary gentry soon came to realize that the people in America were beyond public
criticism; they could not, as in the past, refer to them as the common 'herd."'). See
generally ALEXIS DE TOCoUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Henry Reeve trans.,
Legal Classics Library 1988) (1838) (noting generally the possibly deleterious quest for
equality). "Democratic institutions awaken and foster a passion for equality which they
can never entirely satisfy. This complete equality eludes the grasp of the people at the
very moment which it thinks to hold it fast, and 'flies,' as Pascal says, 'with eternal flight
at
.Id.
181.
58. See ANTHONY GRUMBLER [DAVID HOFFMAN], MISCELLANEOUS THOUGHTS
ON MEN, MANNERS, AND THINGS 323-24 (2d ed. Baltimore, Plaskitt & Gugle 1841)

(1837) ("[I]f there be still remaining among us any elements that can be called aristocratic,
they will be found no where so certainly, as among gentlemen of the legal profession.").
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knowledge and virtue held by most lawyers. 59 The rise of public
opinion 60 and the decline of rule by elites had created an
individualism in the early 1830s in which, as Tocqueville noted,
"nobody's position is quite stable."' 61 These changes seemed to be
accompanied by a decline in respect for the law, personified not
only by the actions of President Andrew Jackson 62 but also in the
rise of riots in the United States in the mid-1830s-numbering at
least fifty-three in 1835, including one in Baltimore in August.6 3
In 1836, when the second edition of A Course of Legal Study
was published, Hoffman was fifty-two years old. By this time, he
had largely turned away from the legal profession and from the
United States,6 4 possibly because he foresaw a future dominated
by a despised Jacksonian democracy. 65 Hoffman did not teach
law at the University of Maryland after 1832, and officially
resigned his position in 1836.66 His legal practice was largely
59. Id.; see also DAVID HOFFMAN, HINTS ON THE PROFESSIONAL DEPORTMENT OF
LAWYERS 60-61 (Philadelphia, Thomas, Cowperthwait & Co. 1846) (reprinting the same
statement also found in Miscellaneous Thoughts on Men, Manners, and Things).
60. See GORDON S. WOOD, REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTERS: WHAT MADE THE

FOUNDERS DIFFERENT 245-74 (2006) (discussing the ways in which individual opinions,
in the aggregate, resulted in public opinion and became the substitute for the elitist
leadership).
61. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 507 (J.P. Mayer ed.,
George Lawrence trans., Perennial Classics 2000) (1835). Tocqueville was one of the first
to use the term "individualism."
62. See DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA, 1815-1848, at 411 (2007) ("[Jackson] did not manifest a
general respect for the authority of the law when it got in the way of the policies he chose
to pursue."). Howe offers numerous examples of Jackson's "impatience with legal
restraints," including his removal of federal deposits from the Bank of the United States.
Id.
63. See id. at 431, 434 (listing the number of riots, though not all were recorded,
reported in Niles' Register, which ranged from one in 1830 to fifty-three in 1835, and
describing a riot in Baltimore in August of 1835).
64. See Bill Sleeman, Law and Letters: A Detailed Examination of David Hoffman's
Life and Career 11-14 (Univ. of Md. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research, Working Paper
No. 2005-29, 2005), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=680668 (noting that Hoffman's
legal representation in reported cases ended in the early 1830s, followed shortly by his
battle with the University of Maryland from 1832 to 1833, and subsequent departure for
England). Hoffman began a literary career in the mid-1830s. Id. at 18-19.
65. Cf. DAVID

WALKER

HOWE,

WHAT

HATH

GOD

WROUGHT:

THE

TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA, 1815-1848, at 485 (2007) ("Party itself became a
partisan issue in the presidential election of 1836.").

The Democratic Party, which

Jackson controlled, held its national convention in Baltimore in 1835. Id.
66. Maxwell Bloomfield, David Hoffman and the Shaping of a Republican Legal
Culture, 38 MD. L. REV. 673, 683 (1979).
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moribund by then as well. 6 7 Baltimore itself had changed
dramatically: its population increased by 120% between 1810 and
1840, and it was the second-largest city in the United States by
1830.68
The democratizing tendencies of the Jacksonian era
included democratizing the legal profession, which some, including
Hoffman, saw as portending its debasement. 69 As Hoffman wrote
in 1837, he desired lawyers be "the most entrusted, . ' .7 0 honoured,
and withal, the most efficient and useful body of men.
67. See id. at 685 n.47 ("Hoffman did not give up his law practice completely until
1847.
). But see Bill Sleeman, Law and Letters: A Detailed Examination of David
Hoffman's Life and Career 13-14 (Univ. of Md. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research,
Working Paper No. 2005-29, 2005), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=680668 (indicating
that the last reported case in which Hoffman is listed as counsel was in 1830, and asserting
that although he represented the owners of the wharves in Barron v. Baltimore at the state
level, Hoffman did not represent them in 1833 when the case was heard and decided by
the United States Supreme Court).
68. See U.S. Census Bureau, 1810 Fast Facts, http://www.census.gov
/history/www/1810/010907.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2008) (listing the population of
Baltimore as 46,555 in 1810); U.S. Census Bureau, 1840 Fast Facts, http://www.census.gov/
history/www/1840/010951.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2008) (listing the population of
Baltimore as 102,313 in 1840); U.S. Census Bureau, 1830 Fast Facts, http://www.census.
gov/history/www/1830/010950.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2008) (listing Baltimore as the
second-largest city in the United States). By 1840, Philadelphia slipped to the fourthlargest city, with a population of 93,665. New Orleans was the third-largest city. U.S.
Census Bureau, 1840 Fast Facts, http://www.census.gov/history/www/1840/010951.html
(last visited Nov. 10, 2008).
69. See Norman W. Spaulding, The Luxury of the Law: The Codification Movement
and the Right to Counsel, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 989 n.24 (2004) (noting the
democratic attacks on the bar in the 1830s); see also Emory Washburn, On the Legal
Profession in New England, 19 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 49, 52 (1838) (presenting the issue
of democratizing the legal profession as whether it will consist of "an enlightened,
educated, independent body of men, or a host of self-constituted, noisy and narrowminded pettifoggers"). Washburn also railed against the charge that the bar was a
monopoly and part of a problematic aristocracy. Emory Washburn, On the Legal
Profession in New England, 19 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 49, 69-70 (1838). On Washburn,
see Robert M. Spector, Emory Washburn: Conservator of the New England Legal
Heritage, 22 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 118 (1978), honoring Washburn as a principled
scholar.
70. ANTHONY GRUMBLER [DAVID HOFFMAN], MISCELLANEOUS THOUGHTS ON

MEN, MANNERS, AND THINGS 323 (2d ed. Baltimore, Plaskitt & Gugle 1841) (1837); see
DAVID HOFFMAN, HINTS ON THE PROFESSIONAL DEPORTMENT OF LAWYERS 60

(Philadelphia, Thomas, Cowperthwait & Co. 1846) (including the same language from
Miscellaneous Thoughts on Men, Manners, and Things); see also PERRY MILLER, THE
LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA 105 (1965) (acknowledging that lawyers were the objects

of ridicule in the Jackson era and quoting Hoffman without specific attribution); cf
BRUCE A. KIMBALL, THE "TRUE PROFESSIONAL IDEAL" IN AMERICA 179 (Rowman &

Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 1995) (1992) (concluding that lawyers possessed "the highest
status among the 'learned professions' in the first half of the nineteenth century").
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The ease with which aspiring attorneys were admitted to the
profession of law by 1840, when just one-third of the states
required any definite period of preparation before entering the
bar,7 1 allowed "pettifoggers ' '7 2 to bring the profession into
disrepute.7 3 Hoffman, a believer in rule by the elite, viewed the
mass of lawyers as unworthy of membership in the small group he
believed possessed the right and duty to govern.7 4
The
Resolutions were a call for a return to an earlier era and 75a
plaintive wail that the "honour" of the profession might be lost.
71. ALFRED ZANTZINGER REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE

LAW 86 (1921); see also ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN
AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980s, at 8 (1983) ("By 1840, there were apparently
only nine university-affiliated law schools with a total of 345 students.").
72. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1032 (5th ed. 1979) ("A lawyer who is employed in a
small or mean business, or who carries on a disreputable business by unprincipled or
dishonorable means.").
73. See PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA 135-36 (1965) (noting

"the lax requirements of most Western states" that allowed poorly educated pettifoggers
to draw contempt on the profession through their avarice and incompetence); ROSCOE
POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 238 (1953) (commenting

that the uneducated pettifoggers of John Adams's time could rely on procedure in "taking
advantage of a defendant or stalling a plaintiff"); GEORGE SHARSWOOD, A COMPEND OF
LECTURES

ON THE

AIMS

AND DUTIES OF THE

PROFESSION

OF THE LAW

80

(Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1854) ("A horde of pettifogging, barratrous, customseeking, money-making lawyers, is one of the greatest curses, with which any state or
community can be visited."); Emory Washburn, On the Legal Profession in New England,
19 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 49, 52 (1838) (asking whether the legal profession would have
"an enlightened, educated, independent body of men, or a host of self-constituted, noisy
and narrow-minded pettifoggers").
74. See, e.g., Stephen E. Kalish, David Hoffman's Essay on ProfessionalDeportment
and the Current Legal Ethics Debate, 61 NEB. L. REV. 54, 62 (1982) (noting Hoffman's
support of codification, but only if "'entrusted to scholars in the law"' and not to "'[m]ere
common lawyers' (quoting 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 679, 686
(2d ed. Baltimore, Joseph Neal 1836))).
75. The concept of honor was central to Hoffman's understanding of the profession
of law and became more important between the first and second editions of A Course of
Legal Study. There also are a number of references to honor in the Resolutions. See
DAVID HOFFMAN,

HINTS ON THE

PROFESSIONAL DEPORTMENT OF LAWYERS

8

(Philadelphia, Thomas, Cowperthwait & Co. 1846) ("The most extensive legal
acquirements, moreover, gained by the most methodical course of reading, will not make
an accomplished and efficient lawyer. The knowledge of and strict adherence to
professional deportment, are altogether essential to his honourable and permanent
success."). Hoffman also noted that "professional eminence, and even the highest
distinctions of state are open to all who prove themselves meritorious of them, and that
virtue and honour, and industry are the only effectual means of surmounting the
difficulties of life, and of reaping the benefits of wealth and of distinction." Id. at 25.
Hoffman further stressed "honourable" obligations and principles of lawyers and the legal
profession and demanded "honourable" deportment. Id. at 32-33. Indeed, Hoffman
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The optimistic tone found in the introduction to "Professional
Deportment" in the first edition of A Course of Legal Study was
replaced by pessimism in the second edition.7 6 The legal
profession "brings its ministers into a too intimate and dangerous
acquaintance with man's depravity; it places them in the midst of
temptations; and whilst engaged in rescuing others, they
sometimes fall the only lamented victims."7 7
That Hoffman's fifty Resolutions in the second edition of A
Course of Legal Study were more a call for regeneration than a
representation of the ethical standards of a legal profession in the
late 1830s and following may best be understood by assessing the
response to the publication of the second edition of Hoffman's A
Course of Legal Study. The 1817 edition of A Course of Legal
Study was greatly praised in an extensive (thirty-three page)
review by Justice Joseph Story in the Whig-oriented North
American Review. 78 The second edition, now two volumes and
double the length of the first edition-including the fifty
"Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment"-received
no review but merely a notice of its publication in the North
American Review.7 9

Not unexpectedly,

the

United States

repeated "honour" or "honourable" twelve times alone in Note 18, the note in which his
observations on professional deportment were addressed. Id. at 31-36. Despite this sense
of honor espoused by Hoffman, the legal profession was under attack in the 1830s. See
ROBERT A. FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE 201 (1984) (arguing

that "egalitarian tendencies of the 1830s exacerbated hostility" of the public toward the
lawyer elite); SAMUEL HABER, THE QUEST FOR AUTHORITY AND HONOR IN THE
AMERICAN PROFESSIONS,

1750-1900, at xii (1991) (noting that despite the honor

accorded to professions in the late colonial period, professions "came under a withering
attack" between 1830 and 1880).
76. See 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 744-45 (2d ed. Baltimore,
Joseph Neal 1836) ("It is, however, an undeniable truth, that culpable ambition, false
pride, the love of lucre, and even dishonesty, sometimes make silent, insidious, and almost
imperceptible, inroads on the morals, and the virtuous resolutions of young practitioners
77. Id. at 745.
78. See Joseph Story, A Course of Legal Study Respectfully Addressed to the Students
of Law in the United States, 6 N. AM. REV. 45, 45-77 (1817) (reviewing DAVID HOFFMAN,
A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY (1817)); see also Joseph Neal, Recommendations of the First
Edition to 1 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 1-2 (2d ed. Baltimore,
Joseph Neal 1836) (listing favorable reviews of the first edition by United States Supreme
Court Chief Justice John Marshall, Justice Gabriel Duvall, Justice Joseph Story,
Chancellor James Kent, and others in order to persuade readers to purchase the second
edition).
79. See Quarterly List of New Publications,43 N. AM. REV. 283, 285 (1836) (listing
the 1836 second edition of Hoffman's A Courseof Legal Study as a new publication).
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Magazine and Democratic Review did not review the work either.

The only lengthy review of the 1836 second edition of A Course of
Legal Study is found in the Boston-based American Juristand Law

Magazine.8" In a twenty-page review, only the last paragraph
discussed Hoffman's material on professional deportment.8 1 The
author praised the fifty Resolutions and indicated that "[u]pon a
future occasion we design to make this division the text for a
separate article." 82 I have not found any such article. One year

later, Hoffman published a book titled Miscellaneous Thoughts on
Men, Manners, and Things under the pseudonym Anthony
Grumbler.8 3 Miscellaneous Thoughts was reviewed in the North

American Review, although the review largely consists of belated
praise for Hoffman's A Course of Legal Study.8 4 The critic noted:
[W]e cannot omit the present opportunity,--having a momentary
jurisdiction over the learned author,-to express our continued
sense of the distinguished merits of this work, upon which, time and
the approving sanction of foreign jurists have fixed a seal. If we
were called upon to designate any single work, which had exercised
a greater influence over the profession of the law in this country
than all others, . . . and, in fine, most contributed to elevate the

standard of professional learning and morals, we
85 should
unhesitatingly select Hoffman's "Course of Legal Study.",
This praise appears to be offered in part because some of the
Miscellaneous Thoughts of Anthony Grumbler had led the

reviewer "to fear that this work [A Course of Legal Study] had not
received that notice or patronage from the profession at home,...
which we know it richly deserves." 8 6 Hoffman himself was
80. See F.J.T., Hoffman's Course of Legal Study, 15 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 321,
321-41 (1836) (reviewing DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY (2d ed.
Baltimore, Joseph Neal 1836)).
81. Id. at 341.
82. Id.
83. ANTHONY GRUMBLER [DAVID HOFFMAN], MISCELLANEOUS THOUGHTS ON

MEN, MANNERS, AND THINGS (2d ed. Baltimore, Plaskitt & Gugle 1841) (1837); see also
Grumbler's Miscellaneous Thoughts, 45 N. AM. REV. 482, 482 (1837) (book review)
("[W]e may, without even the credit of a shrewd guess, venture to pronounce the name of
the author; to lift the vizor of Anthony Grumbler, Esq.,... [w]ho else can he be ...[w]e
venture to say, David Hoffman, Esq., of the Baltimore Bar....").
84. Grumbler's Miscellaneous Thoughts, 45 N. AM. REV. 482, 482-84 (1837) (book
review).
85. Id. at 482.
86. Id. at 483.
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apparently dismayed at the reception of the second edition, noting
in August 1846 that "[t]his work, in its second edition, has not been
extensively circulated, though largely called for, owing to some
difficulties with publishers."8 7
In 1846, Hoffman was living in Philadelphia and teaching at his
Law Institution.8 8 That year, the second edition of A Course of
Legal Study was reprinted, and the same Philadelphia publisher
offered a "new" book for sale from Hoffman, Hints on the
Professional Deportment of Lawyers, with Some Counsel to Law

Students.8 9 One justification Hoffman gave for reprinting the
second edition of A Course of Legal Study was the Baltimore
publisher's poor circulation of the 1836 edition.9 0 The reason for
the publication of Hints was Hoffman's "deep conviction that the
high tone of the Bar has suffered some impairment" since the
publication in 1836 of the second edition. 9 1 Consequently,
Hoffman believed a work dedicated to professional deportment
"might often prove useful" to young would-be lawyers. 92
Although packaged as a new book, Hints largely reprinted the
material on professional deportment found in the second edition
of A Course of Legal Study. 9 3
87. DAVID HOFFMAN, HINTS ON THE PROFESSIONAL DEPORTMENT OF LAWYERS 3

(Philadelphia, Thomas, Cowperthwait & Co. 1846); see also DAVID HOFFMAN, A
COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY, at iii (2d ed. Philadelphia, Thomas, Cowperthwait & Co.
1846) (stating that the 1836 second edition "was only very partially published").
88. See

DAVID HOFFMAN,

HINTS

ON THE

PROFESSIONAL

DEPORTMENT

OF

LAWYERS 3 (Philadelphia, Thomas, Cowperthwait & Co. 1846) (including notice that
"[t]he Author's Law Institution commences every year on the first of October"); see also

Thomas L. Shaffer, David Hoffman's Law School Lectures, 1822-1833, 32 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 127, 138 (1982) (noting that Hoffman taught at his Philadelphia-based Law
Institution from 1844 to 1847); Bill Sleeman, Law and Letters: A Detailed Examination of
David Hoffman's Life and Career 27 (Univ. of Md. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research,

Working Paper No. 2005-29, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=680668 (indicating
that Hoffman conducted a "private law school in Philadelphia" from 1844 to 1847).
89. DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY (2d ed. Philadelphia, Thomas,
Cowperthwait & Co. 1846); DAVID HOFFMAN, HINTS ON THE PROFESSIONAL

DEPORTMENT OF LAWYERS (Philadelphia, Thomas, Cowperthwait & Co.1846).
90. DAVID HOFFMAN, HINTS ON THE PROFESSIONAL DEPORTMENT OF LAWYERS 3

(Philadelphia, Thomas, Cowperthwait & Co. 1846) (acknowledging "some difficulties with
publishers" as a reason why the second edition of A Course of Legal Study was not widely
circulated).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 60-62 (reprinting the fifty Resolutions and Note 18 from A Course of
Legal Study and a portion of Miscellaneous Thoughts to respond to vituperative attacks on
the legal profession).
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In 1846, the American Jurist and Law Magazine, the most
jurisprudentially-inclined law review, no longer existed.94 The
Philadelphia-based American Law Magazine, edited by George
Sharswood, ceased publication in January 1846. 9 1 The Bostonbased Monthly Law Reporter,the Philadelphia-based Pennsylvania
Law Journal,the New York Legal Observer, the Cincinnati-based
Western Law Journal, and the Philadelphia-based Legal
Intelligencer were the existing law journals in 1846.96 These
journals were written to aid practicing lawyers by giving them
practical information, opinions most recently issued, and
summaries of practice books. They also printed obituaries and
short articles on legal topics. Neither the reprinted second edition
of A Course of Legal Study nor Hoffman's Hints was reviewed in
any of these publications. Neither the North American Review nor
the American Whig Review (which began publishing in January
1845) noted the publication of Hints or the reprinting of the
second edition of A Course of Legal Study, and, as expected, no
notice was taken by the United States Magazine and Democratic
Review.
Although Bill Sleeman suggests that Hints "was
enthusiastically received by the legal community," 97 I have found
no evidence that it made any impression whatsoever. It simply
disappeared.9 8 The next year Hoffman did likewise, leaving the
United States for England, from where he did not return until
1854, the year he died.9 9

94. See FREDERICK C. HICKS, MATERIALS AND METHODS OF LEGAL RESEARCH
204 (3d ed. 1942) (listing 1829 to 1843 as the years in which the American Jurist and Law
Magazine was published).
95. See id. (noting that the American Law Magazine was published only from 1843 to
1846).
96. See id. at 204-05 (listing the years during which early nineteenth century legal
periodicals were published).

97. Bill Sleeman, Law and Letters: A Detailed Examination of David Hoffman's Life

and Career 10 (Univ. of Md. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research, Working Paper No.
2005-29, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=680668.
98. I have not found any reference to Hoffman's Hints in my research of secondary
materials. All references are to the second edition of A Course of Legal Study.
99. See Bill Sleeman, Law and Letters: A Detailed Examination of David Hoffnan's

Life and Career27 (Univ. of Md. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research, Working Paper No.
2005-29, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=680668 (giving a timetable of
Hoffman's life and work and indicating that Hoffman left for England in 1847, returned in
1854, and passed away the same year).
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C. Lawyerly Zeal in the Mid-19th Century
The legal profession's understanding of the extent of the duty to
represent a client shifted between the 1836 Resolutions and
Sharswood's 1854 A Compend of Lectures. Hoffman argued the
lawyer was the "sole judge" of when or whether to argue that a
claim was time-barred or that his client was a minor. 1 ° ° He also
cautioned lawyers from identifying too strongly with their clients:
"In point of interest, also, as well as of feeling, the lawyer is
occasionally too intimately connected with his client not to feel the
force of those passions which lessen the ardour of virtue." 10 1 For
Hoffman, the lawyer's honor required him to keep his own
conscience and avoid adopting the client's. Other elite lawyers of
the era echoed Hoffman. David Paul Brown, a Philadelphia
lawyer born in 1795 and admitted to the Philadelphia bar in 1816,
urged in his 1856 memoir that a lawyer decline handling a matter
that required pleading the statute of limitations if the lawyer
"actually knows that the note is due."' 10 2 In addition, Brown
concluded that although "[a] lawyer is not morally responsible for
the act or motive of a party, in maintaining an unjust cause,... he
is morally responsible, if he does it knowingly, however he may
'plate sin with gold.'5 1 0 3
Harvard Law Professor Simon
Greenleaf, in his 1834 inaugural address, said: "I look with pity on
the man, who regards himself a mere machine of the law;-whose

100. 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 755 (2d ed. Baltimore,
Joseph Neal 1836); see Report of the Committee on Code of Professional Ethics, 31 A.B.A.
REP. 676 app. H, at 719-20 (1907) (reprinting Hoffman's Resolutions, which include a
lawyer's duty not to assert the statute of limitations as a defense if a client is "conscious"
of his debt, as well as a lawyer's duty not to plead "[i]nfancy against an honest demand" as
Resolutions 12 and 13, respectively); see also 2 DAVID PAUL BROWN, THE FORUM; OR,
FORTY YEARS FULL PRACTICE AT THE PHILADELPHIA BAR 71-72 (Philadelphia, Robert
H. Small 1856) (concluding that if a lawyer "actually knows that the note is due, unless
there be some statute against conscience, he had better not undertake the case"). See
generally M.H. Hoeflich, Legal Ethics in the Nineteenth Century: The "Other Tradition," 47
U. KAN. L. REV. 793, 808 (1999) (noting that David Paul Brown agreed with Hoffman that
an attorney should not assert the statute of limitations to avoid a valid and unpaid debt).
101. 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 746 (2d ed. Baltimore,

Joseph Neal 1836). Hoffman also warned that "[t]he success of the client is always that of
the counsel: the interests and feelings of the latter become ... identified with those of the
former, and be they meritorious or the reverse, the tie is often of such a nature as to
generate the seeds of moral evil." Id. at 745.
102. 2 DAVID PAUL BROWN, THE FORUM; OR, FORTY YEARS FULL PRACTICE AT
THE PHILADELPHIA BAR 71-72 (Philadelphia, Robert H. Small 1856).
103. Id. at 30.
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conceptions of moral and social duty are all absorbed in ...
supposed obligation to his client, and this of so low a nature as to
render him a very tool and slave ...."4 David Dudley Field, in
an 1844 essay, wrote that one false assumption about the legal
profession was that a client "may rightfully avail himself of every
defect in an adversary's proof which the rules of evidence, or
accident, or time, may have caused." 10 5 The 1850 Code of Civil
Procedure drafted for the State of New York (the Field Code)
includes an oath for attorneys in section 511.106 Appended as a
note to this oath of attorneys is a condensed and edited version of
Field's 1844 essay that continued to urge a limited duty of loyalty
owed by a lawyer to a client. 10 7 Rejecting as "unsound in theory,
and most pernicious in practice" the claim that a client is entitled
to "whatever the law can give him," Field's note concludes that a
lawyer may not "overlook the moral aspects of the claim" made by
his client in determining what course of action to take."0 8
But Hoffman's view of the lawyer as judge of the client's cause
was rejected beginning shortly after he expressed it. Timothy
Walker studied law under Samuel Howe from 1827 to 1828 and,
after Howe's death, under Joseph Story at Harvard from 1829 to
1830.109 Walker moved to Ohio, helped found the Cincinnati Law
104. Simon Greenleaf, A Discourse Pronounced at the Inauguration of the Author as
Royall Professor of Law in Harvard University (1834), in THE GLADSOME LIGHT OF
JURISPRUDENCE 134, 140 (Michael H. Hoeflich ed., 1988).
105. The Study and Practiceof the Law, 14 U.S. MAG. & DEMOCRATIC REV. 345, 348
(1844). Field's essay is reprinted in part in David Dudley Field, The Index of Civilization,
reprinted in THE GOLDEN AGE OF AMERICAN LAW 30 (Charles M. Haar ed., 1965).
106. COMM'RS ON PRACTICE & PLEADINGS, THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF
THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 205 (Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co. 1850) (including in section
511 an oath of admission). The 1850 Code was never adopted by the State of New York.
DAUN VAN EE, DAVID DUDLEY FIELD AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE LAW 44

(1986); Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A HistoricalAnalysis
of an EarlierProceduralVision, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311, 317 (1988). On the importance
of oaths at this time, see generally M.H. Hoeflich, Legal Ethics in the Nineteenth Century:
The "Other Tradition," 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 793, 798 n.27 (1999), indicating the plethora of
literature on oaths for attorneys in the mid-1800s, and Carol Rice Andrews, The Oath of
Lawyers, "Both Ancient and Modern," 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS (forthcoming 20082009), tracing the history of lawyer oaths from medieval Europe to modern America.
107. COMM'RS ON PRACTICE & PLEADINGS, THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF
THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 205-09 (Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co. 1850).

108. Id. at 207-08; see also The Study and Practice of the Law, 14 U.S. MAG. &
DEMOCRATIC REV. 345, 348 (1844) (providing additional insight into Field's opinion on a
lawyer's duty of loyalty toward a client).
109. See WALTER THEODORE HITCHCOCK, TIMOTHY WALKER: ANTEBELLUM
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School in 1833, and was the editor of the Western Law Journal
from 1843 to 1853.10 His book, Introduction to American Law,
was first published in 1837 and contained the subtitle: Designed As
a First Book for Students.1 1 1 A popular work, it went through
eleven editions, the last published in 1905. The first edition
consisted of forty lectures. The introductory lecture of the 1837

edition included a section (section 7) on the "Dignity of the
'
Profession." 112
Although Walker was aware of Hoffman's Course
of Legal Study, this section spoke only glancingly of professional
deportment, focusing instead on the distinction between the
"successful pettifogger" and the "high-minded jurist"-only the

latter of whom possessed the honor given those "[s]urrounded by
the 'gladsome light of jurisprudence."" 13 Two years later, Walker
gave a valedictory address "to the [g]raduates of the Law Class, in
the Cincinnati College" that was published in 1844 in the Walkeredited Western Law Journal. 1 4 The third ingredient Walker
listed for professional success was integrity, necessary in part
because the profession was "not reputed to have a very high
standard of professional ethics." ' 5 A most difficult question was:
"When a client has a bad cause, shall we prosecute it for him?" 1 6

LAWYER 13-18 (1990) (detailing the relationship between Howe and Walker).
110. See id. at 56-77 (detailing Walker's influence on the Cincinnati Law School);
Amos H. Tuttle, Walker, Timothy, in 19 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 363,
363 (Dumas Malone ed., 1943) (indicating that Walker organized a private law school in
Cincinnati in 1833 and served as editor for the Western Law Journalstarting in 1843).
111. TIMOTHY WALKER, INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. Cincinnati,
Derby, Bradley & Co. 1846) (1837). Both Walker's Introduction to American Law and
Hoffman's A Course of Legal Study were dedicated to Joseph Story. Id. at iii; 1 DAVID
HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY, at iii-iv (2d ed. Baltimore, Joseph Neal 1836).
112. TIMOTHY WALKER, INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN LAW 17 (Philadelphia,
P.H. Nicklin & T. Johnson 1837).
113. Id. at 17-18. In section 9, "Plan of These Lectures," Walker recommended that
students interested in legal bibliography refer to A Courseof Legal Study. Id. at 20. In his
review of Introduction to American Law, George S. Hilliard quoted section 7 in its entirety
as inculcating "those rules of professional conduct and deportment, which flow from selfrespect, and the constant sense of what is due to truth and the community, as well as to
one's clients." G.S.H., Walker's Introduction to American Law, 18 AM. JURIST & L. MAG.
375, 388-89 (1838) (reviewing TIMOTHY WALKER, INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN LAW
(Philadelphia, P.H. Nicklin & T. Johnson 1837)).
114. See Timothy Walker, Ways and Means of Professional Success: Being the
Substance of a Valedictory Address to the Graduates of the Law Class, in the Cincinnati
College, 1 W. L.J. 542, 542-49 (1844) (printing the text of Walker's speech).
115. Id. at 546.
116. Id. at 547.
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The answer was yes, for "a lawyer is not accountable for the moral
character of the cause he prosecutes, but only for the manner in
which he conducts it."11 x7 "Any other conclusion would make
lawyers their clients' conscience-keepers, and require them to
prejudge a cause by declining to undertake it."" ' 8 The second
edition of Introduction to American Law was published in 1846.
Walker deleted section 7, placing some of his comments in that
section into a new and final section of the book (section 259),
which constituted a variation of his valedictory address and
possessed the same title.1 1 9 Walker wrote more expansively in
this section than in the valedictory address about a lawyer's moral
duties. Walker had apparently thought more deeply about the
issue of taking a client's "bad cause" since his 1839 address,
evidenced by the fact that he acknowledged "two classes of cases":
the first when the law was against the client; and the second "when
though the law may be with him, the abstract justice of the case
appears to be against him.' 20 Walker reiterated his conclusion
from 1839: "I have come to the conclusion, that no principle of
moral obligation prohibits me from prosecuting his cause. "121
Walker noted that the lawyer who prejudged a case might be
wrong, for he was not infallible; he was not the client's "conscience
keeper," and, most importantly, "[e]very man ...has a right to

have his case fairly presented before the court.' 1 22 1' This
did not
23
mean, however, "that every thing is fair in litigation.'
Others also rejected Hoffman's conclusions. In an 1843 essay,
Peleg W. Chandler, a young (he turned twenty-seven the month
the essay was published) lawyer trained at Harvard Law School
and founder and editor of the Boston-based Monthly Law
Reporter, asked: "[M]ust the lawyer, when thus applied to, first
117. Id.
118. Id. David Dudley Field published his contrary conclusion that "[t]he true
lawyer... never prostitutes ... to a bad cause" in the April 1844 issue of the United States
Magazine and Democratic Review-mere months prior to the publication of Walker's
address. The Study and Practiceof the Law, 14 U.S. MAG. & DEMOCRATIC REV. 345, 351
(1844).
119. See TIMOTHY WALKER, INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN LAW 661 (2d ed.
Cincinnati, Derby, Bradley & Co. 1846) (1837) (including in the 1846 edition section 259,
"Ways and Means of Professional Success").
120. Id. at 664.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 664-65.
123. Id. at 665.
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settle in his own mind, beyond the possibility of mistake, precisely
where the truth and equity of the cause lies?"' 12 4 Answering his
question in the negative, Chandler wrote, "We hold, not only that
a lawyer may honorably and honestly engage in a cause of
doubtful justice, but that,... he is bound fairly and fully to present
to the court and jury whatever of law or fact there may be
favorable to his client .... ,"25 Chandler was writing in response
to several articles in the New York Observer concerning the
morality of the practice of law. He defended the work of the
criminal defense lawyer and rejected the view that pleading the
statute of limitations was a "technical rule[] of law," asking, "what
right has a lawyer to set up his own scruples of conscience ' by
26
denying to a citizen the protection of one of these laws?'
Three years later, Chandler defended his earlier position, writing,
"The place to try causes is before the properly constituted
tribunals .... "127 Chandler's audience in the Monthly Law
Reporter was "workingmen of the profession,' 1 2 8 which accounts
in part for his rejection of Hoffman's gentlemanly approach.
Most well known, however, were the statements made by Judge
George Sharswood in his 1854 lectures to his law students at the
University of Pennsylvania.1 2 9 Sharswood rejected Hoffman's
124. Peleg Chandler, Legal Morality, 5 MONTHLY L. REP. 529,530 (1843).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 531.
127. Peleg Chandler, The Practiceof the Bar, 9 MONTHLY L. REP. 241, 242 (1846);
see also PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA 204 (1965) (quoting Peleg
Chandler's The Practice of the Bar without attribution). For background information on
Chandler, see H.W. Howard Knott, Chandler, Peleg Whitman, in 3 DICTIONARY OF
AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 615,615 (Allen Johnson ed., 1929).
128. Miscellany, 1 MONTHLY L. REP. 55 (1838); cf MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD,
AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1776-1876, at 142-44 (1976) (noting a
change in tone of lawyer's magazines beginning in the 1830s corresponding with a shift
away from "formal educational requirements"); WALTER THEODORE HITCHCOCK,
TIMOTHY WALKER: ANTEBELLUM LAWYER 109 (1990) (noting the Law Reporter viewed
itself as "'a practical journal of the law as it is'). The Western Law Journal was also
imbued with the spirit of reform of the law: "We trouble ourselves but little, perhaps too
little, upon theories as to what it should be." WALTER THEODORE HITCHCOCK,
TIMOTHY WALKER: ANTEBELLUM LAWYER 109 (1990).
129. The Department of Law of the University of Pennsylvania was revived in 1850
with the appointment of District Judge George Sharswood as the sole professor. See
Margaret Center Klingelsmith, History of the Department of Law, in UNIVERSITY OF
PENNSYLVANIA: OPENING OF THE NEW BUILDING OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LAW 213,
221 (1900) (describing Judge Sharswood's selection as professor of law). Sharswood's first
lecture was given on September 30, 1850, and by mid-1852, two other professors were
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argument that a lawyer should never plead the statute of
limitations. 130 Sharswood began with the positivist notion that
"[t]he party has a right to have his case decided upon the law and
the evidence, and to have every view presented to the minds of his
judges, which can legitimately bear upon that question.' 1 3 1 Using
"mere notions of justice" rather than law to decide cases would
lead to a discretion that "would constitute the most appalling of
despotisms.' 3 2 Thus, even though the lawyer "is an officer of the
court," and "not merely the agent of the party," "[t]he party has a
right to have his case decided on the law and the evidence.' 3 3
appointed. Id. at 221-22. On June 1, 1852, Sharswood was appointed Professor of the
Institutes of Law. Id.
130. See GEORGE SHARSWOOD, A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND
DUTIES OF THE PROFESSION OF THE LAW 25-26 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1854)
(arguing that because a "party has a right to have his case decided upon the law," a lawyer
"is not morally responsible" for arguing the statute of limitations as a defense); see also
GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (5th ed. 1907), reprintedin
32 A.B.A. REP. 1, 83 (1907) (same).
131. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND DUTIES

OF THE PROFESSION OF THE LAW 26 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1854). Sharswood
used slightly different language in the revised edition. See GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN
ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (5th ed. 1907), reprintedin 32 A.B.A. REP. 1, 82 (1907)
("Every case is to be decided, by the tribunal before which it is brought for adjudication,
upon the evidence, and upon the principles of law applicable to the facts as they appear
upon the evidence.").
132. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND DUTIES

OF THE PROFESSION OF THE LAW 25 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1854); GEORGE
SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (5th ed. 1907), reprinted in 32
A.B.A. REP. 1, 82

(1907); cf

JOHN T. BROOKE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: ITS MORAL

NATURE, AND PRACTICAL CONNECTION WITH CIVIL SOCIETY 16 (Cincinnati, H.W.
Derby & Co. 1849) ("Now, when a lawyer lends himself to a dishonest man, to plead the
statute of limitations, or take any similar advantage to bar or defeat a fair claim, what does
he, but willingly aid one of the crew of the great ship of state, to injure and defraud
another?"). Brooke was a longtime rector of Christ Church in Cincinnati, not a lawyer.
See id. at tit. p. (displaying the title Rector of Christ Church, Cincinnati under the author's
name).
133. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND DUTIES

OF THE PROFESSION OF THE LAW 26 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1854); GEORGE

SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (5th ed. 1907), reprinted in 32
A.B.A. REP. 1, 83 (1907). Sharswood's position was largely adopted by the legal
profession when the Canons of Ethics were adopted in 1908. See Legal Ethics, 19 GREEN
BAG 489, 489 (1907) (adopting the same view espoused by Sharswood in criticizing the
shortsightedness of those who argue that a lawyer should not plead the statute of
limitations); George P. Costigan, Jr., The Proposed American Code of Legal Ethics, 20
GREEN BAG 57, 63 (1908) (noting that legislative approval of the defense of statute of
limitations provides a "strong public policy" for lawyers to plead it). Costigan was the
editor of the first course book on American legal ethics. GEORGE P. COSTIGAN, JR.,
CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON LEGAL ETHICS (1917).
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The statute of limitations was a part of the law. As a matter of
moral sensibility, Sharswood concluded that "in foro conscientiae,
a defendant who knows that he honestly owes the debt sued for
and that the delay has been caused by indulgence or confidence 1on
34
the part of his creditor, ought not to plead the statute."'
Sharswood's understanding echoed the point made by
Philadelphia lawyer William Porter in 1849, in his address to the
Law Academy of Philadelphia.13 5 Porter, a vice-provost of the
Law Academy, gave a lecture on the legal profession that rejected
both Lord Brougham's understanding of the advocate's role and
(without citing him) Hoffman's claim that a lawyer is the sole
judge of his client's cause.' 3 6 For Sharswood, not only was the
lawyer not the judge of the client's cause, but a client's moral
37
sensibility--or lack thereof-was not the lawyer's concern.'
Consonant with Timothy Walker, Sharswood also concluded that a
lawyer "is not morally responsible for the act of the party in
of the court, if they
maintaining an unjust cause, nor for the1' error
38
fall into error, in deciding it in his favor.'

134. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND DUTIES

OF THE PROFESSION OF THE LAW 25-26 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1854);
GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (5th ed. 1907), reprinted in
32 A.B.A. REP. 1, 83 (1907); accord Thomas L. Shaffer & Robert F. Cochran, Jr.,

"Technical" Defenses: Ethics, Morals, and the Lawyer As Friend, 14 CLINICAL L. REV.
337, 341-42, 344-45 (2007) (discussing Sharswood's view on the moral obligations of
lawyers in their relationships with clients and citing his Essay on ProfessionalEthics).
135. See WILLIAM A. PORTER, THE INTRODUCTORY ADDRESS DELIVERED
BEFORE THE LAW ACADEMY OF PHILADELPHIA 19 (Philadelphia, Edmond Barrington
& Geo. D. Haswell 1849) (implying that lawyers recognize "when [they] are in the wrong"
while advocating on behalf of a client). On the history of the Law Academy of
Philadelphia, see generally GEORGE SHARSWOOD, THE ORIGIN, HISTORY, AND
OBJECTS OF THE LAW ACADEMY OF PHILADELPHIA (Philadelphia, Kay & Brother

1883).
136. See WILLIAM A. PORTER, THE INTRODUCTORY ADDRESS DELIVERED
BEFORE THE LAW ACADEMY

OF PHILADELPHIA

18-19 (Philadelphia,

Edmond

Barrington & Geo. D. Haswell 1849) (arguing that an advocate should not protect the
client "at all hazards and costs to all others," and that a lawyer holds power only "as a
trustee for others").
137. See GEORGE SHARSWOOD, A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND
DUTIES OF THE PROFESSION OF THE LAW 26 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1854)
(noting the importance of "hear[ing] and weigh[ing] both sides" of a matter, which imparts
on an attorney the duty to "have every view presented to the minds of [the] judges");
GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (5th ed. 1907), reprintedin

32 A.B.A. REP. 1, 83-84 (1907) (explaining that "[t]he court or jury ought certainly to hear
and weigh" all the evidence, and that it is the attorney's duty to present this evidence).
138. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND DUTIES

2008] AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS IN AN AGE OFANXIETY

371

Although Hoffman, Sharswood, and Field all noted a lawyer's
obligation to represent the client with zeal, they possessed
different understandings of "zeal" when addressing the issue of
representing a defendant in a criminal case.
The most client-centered statement of lawyerly zeal had been
uttered in England in 1820 by Lord Henry Brougham in defense of
Queen Caroline when King George IV sued for divorce:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in
all the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all
means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons,
and, amongst them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in
performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the
destruction which he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of
a patriot from that of an advocate, he must go on reckless of
consequences, though1 3 it9 should be his unhappy fate to involve his
country in confusion.

Field's 1844 essay rejected the "zeal" urged by Lord Brougham,
declaring that "a more revolting doctrine scarcely ever fell from
any man's lips. '"140 A similar sentiment was offered by New York
OF THE PROFESSION OF THE LAW 26 (Philadelphia, T.& J.W. Johnson
SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (5th ed. 1907),

1854); GEORGE
reprinted in 32

A.B.A. REP. 1, 83 (1907); see also Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing
Advocacy Ethics, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 4-8, 17-18 (2005) (assessing Chief Justice
John Bannister Gibson's opinion in Rush v. Cavenaugh, 2 Pa. 187 (1845), concerning the
extent of the lawyer's duty to the client's desires, and arguing that Chief Justice Gibson
was correct in asserting that a lawyer has a duty of fidelity to the court as well as the
client). In Rush, the court held that a lawyer was not required to pursue a claim contrary
to the lawyer's professional conscience. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green,
Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005) ("The key to the
case, therefore, was whether Rush had acted appropriately by dismissing the private
prosecution against his client's wishes ....
").Zacharias and Green conclude that Gibson's
understanding of professional conscience differed from Hoffman's view of conscience,
which focused on the lawyer's individual moral conscience. Cf id. at 4 (noting that Chief
Justice Gibson's view of ethics, rather than that of Brougham or Hoffman, spurred the
modern understanding of advocacy ethics). David Paul Brown, a Philadelphia lawyer
born in 1795 (a generation before Sharswood, born in 1810), adopted Gibson's view of the
lawyer's role in a memoir published in 1856, two years after Sharswood's lectures were
published. See 2 DAVID PAUL BROWN, THE FORUM; OR, FORTY YEARS FULL PRACTICE
AT THE PHILADELPHIA BAR 29-30 (Philadelphia, Robert H. Small 1856) ("But Chief
Justice Gibson places the obligation of counsel upon a much more honorable and
conscientious footing ....
").
139. 2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (New York, James Cockcroft & Co. 1874).
140. The Study and Practiceof the Law, 14 U.S. MAG. & DEMOCRATIC REV. 345, 348
(1844); cf 2 DAVID PAUL BROWN, THE FORUM; OR, FORTY YEARS FULL PRACTICE AT
THE PHILADELPHIA BAR 27-28 (Philadelphia, Robert H. Small 1856) (noting Brougham's
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lawyer Richard Kimball in 1853: "A more monstrous doctrine, I do
not hesitate to say, was never broached." 14 1
Although
acknowledging that the lawyer may represent a client he knows to
be guilty, Field cautioned: "He may not undertake to show him to
be innocent ....1142 The oath of attorneys in the 1850 Field Code
permitted a lawyer to maintain only legal and just actions, "except
the defence of a person charged with a public offence."' 143 The
note by Field following section 511 offers a slightly different view
of the lawyer's zeal in representing a client guilty of criminal
conduct: "If he have derived his belief from the confession of the
accused, he should pause in assuming his defence."1 44 But, as an
"intermediate minister," the lawyer was "justified if not bound to
enforce [the presumption of innocence] to the inconclusiveness of
the evidence of guilt."'1 45 The lawyer was also permitted to offer
extreme sense of zeal toward a client's cause as expressed in his speech to the House of
Lords while defending Queen Caroline). Before his arranged marriage to Queen
Caroline, King George IV had secretly "married" (it was not a lawful marriage) a Catholic
widow, Mrs. Fitzherbert, an act that, if publicly disclosed, would have made his position as
King untenable because he was also head of the Church of England. Brougham knew this,
and his statement suggested a willingness to use this information in the public defense of
his client. In addition to Field, other lawyers also rejected Brougham's view. See 2 DAVID
PAUL BROWN, THE FORUM; OR, FORTY YEARS FULL PRACTICE AT THE PHILADELPHIA

BAR 28 (Philadelphia, Robert H. Small 1856) (declaring that Brougham's view "can
certainly never be approved by any just or reasonable man"); WILLIAM A. PORTER, THE
INTRODUCTORY

ADDRESS

DELIVERED

BEFORE

THE

LAW

ACADEMY

OF

PHILADELPHIA 18 (Philadelphia, Edmond Barrington & Geo. D. Haswell 1849)
(proposing how the advocate should regulate his relationships with clients by ridiculing
Brougham's charge to "save that client by all expedient means").
141. RICHARD

B.

KIMBALL,

THE

LAWYER:

THE

DIGNITY,

DUTIES,

AND

RESPONSIBILITIES OF HIS PROFESSION 26-27 (New York, George P. Putnam & Co.
1853).
142. The Study and Practiceof the Law, 14 U.S. MAG. & DEMOCRATIC REV. 345, 348
(1844). Even when the Canons of Ethics were debated in 1908, the issue still rankled at
least some members of the profession. Regarding the debate concerning Canon 5, which
discussed defending and prosecuting crimes, one ABA member declared that if a man
confessed to him his guilt, he was morally bound to make the confession known to the
court. See Transactionsof the Thirty-first Annual Meeting of the American BarAssociation,
33 A.B.A. REP. 3, 59-60 (1908) (discussing the moral implications of defending criminals
who are guilty); cf.William H. Taft, Legal Ethics, 1 B.U. L. REV. 233,240 (1921) (stating in
a lecture to law students at Boston University Law School that a lawyer "is not justified in
rising and assuring the jury of the innocence of his client" in a criminal case when a lawyer
knows of his client's guilt).
143. COMM'RS ON PRACTICE & PLEADINGS, THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF

THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 204 (Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co. 1850).
144. Id. at 209.
145. Id.
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evidence of the circumstances of the case and anything that would
lessen the gravity of the client's guilt, "[b]ut here the advocate
should stop."' 4 6
Hoffman believed the zeal owed to a client by a lawyer in such a
situation is even more limited:
When employed to defend those charged with crimes of the
deepest dye, and the evidence against them, whether legal, or moral,
be such as to leave no just doubt of their guilt, I shall not hold myself
privileged, much less obliged, to use my endeavours to arrest, or to
impede the course of justice, by special resorts to ingenuity-to the
artifices of eloquence-to appeals to the morbid and fleeting
sympathies of weak juries, or of temporizing courts .... Persons of
atrocious character, who have violated the laws of God and man, are
entitled to no such special exertions from any member of our pure
and honourable profession; and indeed, to no intervention beyond
securing to them a fair and dispassionate investigation of the facts of
their cause .... 147
This quotation may be interpreted less restrictively than it
Hoffman believed that "[f]aw is a deep
initially appears.
science. "148 A lawyer who used his forensic talents to engineer
the acquittal of a guilty person betrayed the scientific basis of law.
Hoffman argued that "[a]ll reasoning should be regarded as a
philosophical process-its object being conviction, by certain
known and legitimate means.' 1 49 An advocate who used "loud
words," "sarcasm [and] invective" was the antithesis of a lawyer
learned in the science of the law.' 0 Instead, a lawyer drawing on
the "artifices of eloquence" was a common lawyer whose actions

146. Id.
147. 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 755-56 (2d ed. Baltimore,

Joseph Neal 1836).
148. Id. at 766. Other works have explained the meaning of law as a science in
antebellum legal education. See, e.g., WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE:
THE ORIGIN OF MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION 29-38 (1994) (discussing law
as a science of principles in antebellum legal education); PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF
THE MIND IN AMERICA 159 (1965) (crediting Hoffman with propounding "American law
as a science"). See generally Howard Schweber, The "Science" of Legal Science: The
Model of the Natural Sciences in Nineteenth-Century American Legal Education, 17 LAW
& HIST. REV. 421 (1999) (examining the history of American legal science).
149. 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 772 (2d ed. Baltimore,
Joseph Neal 1836).
150. See id. at 772-73 (asserting the difference between the law "as a philosophical
process" and the law when used as an "assumption of superior knowledge").
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failed to meet the standards of an honorable profession-the type
of lawyer Hoffman inveighed against in his Resolutions.15 1
Hoffman's view was intended to create limits on the lawyer's
conduct; however, it remained honorable for the lawyer to direct
the jury's attention to "a fair 5and
dispassionate investigation of the
2

facts of [the client's] cause.'

Hoffman's unwillingness to press legal claims that "ought not, to
be sustained ' 1 5 3 represented an ethical view that joins private and
public morality-an ethical view consistent with a person
comfortable with governance by an elite, including elite
lawyers.' 5 4 That view of lawyering was reshaped even as Hoffman
wrote it. Even the conservative position taken by David Dudley
Field partially modified Hoffman's conclusion. The third oath of
the 1850 Field Code modified the duty of the lawyer to maintain
only just causes by requiring the lawyer "[t]o counsel or maintain
such actions ... or defences, only as appear to him legal and just,
with a public offence.' 1 55

except the defence of a person charged
Sharswood's 1854 A Compend of Lectures concluded that zeal
required a lawyer to represent a criminally accused client and to
demand the client be convicted on the evidence, even when the
client had confessed his guilt to the lawyer.' 5 6 Sharswood also
151. See id. at 755 (criticizing lawyers who use eloquence in defending those whom
the lawyer knows are guilty of the crime charged).
152. Id. at 756.
153. Id. at 754.

154. Cf.Maxwell Bloomfield, David Hoffman and the Shaping of a Republican Legal
Culture, 38 MD. L. REV. 673, 684-85 (1979) (describing Hoffman's view that attorneys
should act within the bounds of conscience, strive for "substantial justice to all parties,"
and refrain from advocating solely with loyalty to the client). In an 1855 review of
Sharswood's A Compend of Lectures, the reviewer commended Sharswood for justifying
why a lawyer should not be the judge of his client's cause. See Sharswood's Professional
Ethics, 3 AM. L. REG. 193, 195 (1855) (reviewing GEORGE SHARSWOOD, A COMPEND OF
LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND DUTIES OF THE PROFESSION OF THE LAW (Philadelphia,
T. & J.W. Johnson 1854)) (praising Sharswood's focus on tenets of morality and honor).
The American Law Register was published in Philadelphia and was edited by Asa I. Fish
and Henry Wharton. See generally 3 AM. L. REG., at i (1855) (listing the editors and
location of publication).
155. COMM'RS ON PRACTICE & PLEADINGS, THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF
THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 204 (Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co. 1850).
156. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND DUTIES
OF THE PROFESSION OF THE LAW 31-33 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1854);
GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (5th ed. 1907), reprintedin
32 A.B.A. REP. 1, 90-92, 105-06 (1907); see also PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND
IN AMERICA 205-06 (1965) (noting an 1858 article in the Southern Literary Messenger

2008] AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS INANAGE OFANXIETY

375

accepted, in part, the distinction between public and private
morality, a distinction Hoffman rejected. While this distinction
can be traced from 1839 forward in statements made by Walker,
Field, and Chandler, the tipping point came around 1850. In
January 1850, a ten-year-old murder case in England became the
focal point concerning a lawyer's duty when his client confessed to
the lawyer his guilt to a crime. That discussion had barely
subsided when the most sensational murder case of the nineteenth
century was tried in Boston in March 1850. The conduct of the
defendant's lawyers raised again the issue of the zeal a lawyer
should give in the defense of a criminally accused person. More
broadly, lawyers, particularly northern lawyers, sensed a rising
anxiety concerning the rule of law and the legal profession in the
1850s-an anxiety that included Philadelphia lawyers.
D. Defending the Guilty Client
In discussing the lawyer's duty to defend a criminally accused
person, Sharswood focused on and spoke favorably about the
conduct of defense counsel Charles Phillips in the notorious 1840
Courvoisiercase in England. 157 The defendant, a servant accused
of killing his master, Lord William Russell, confessed his guilt to
Phillips shortly before the second day of a three-day trial but
refused to plead guilty. 5 8s
Phillips continued to defend
concluding a Christian lawyer who defends a criminal he knows is guilty "obeys 'the
cardinal rule of love to his neighbour, laid down specifically by the Saviour"'). As a judge,
Sharswood heard more civil than criminal cases. His eulogist, George W. Biddle, indicates
that he was well-read in criminal law. GEORGE W. BIDDLE, A SKETCH OF THE
PROFESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL CHARACTER OF THE LATE GEORGE SHARSWOOD 9

(Philadelphia, The Ass'n 1883). When Sharswood gave his lecture in 1854, Philadelphia
was in the process of moving from private to public prosecution of crimes. See generally
ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1989) (describing

this transition).
157. See GEORGE SHARSWOOD, A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND

DUTIES OF THE PROFESSION OF THE LAW 40-43 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1854)
(commending Phillips for continuing to defend a client who had confessed his guilt and
reiterating the notion that a person must be convicted based upon the evidence, not a
private confession); GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (5th

ed. 1907), reprintedin 32 A.B.A. REP. 1, 103-06 (1907) (same).
158. See DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 132-33 (1973)

(indicating Courvoisier asked Phillips to defend him despite his confession of guilt);
GEORGE SHARSWOOD, A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND DUTIES OF THE

PROFESSION OF THE LAW 40-41 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1854) (noting that the
defendant Courvoisier confessed his guilt to Phillips during the trial); GEORGE
SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (5th ed. 1907), reprinted in 32
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Courvoisier after informing one of the two trial judges of
Courvoisier's confession.' 5 9 Phillips later publicly stated that he

was urged by Baron Parke to defend Courvoisier to the best of his
ability, using "all fair arguments arising on the evidence."'

6°

But during a three-hour peroration after Courvoisier had
privately confessed his guilt, Phillips told the jury:
"And, even supposing him guilty of the murder, which indeed is
known to the Almighty God alone, and of which for the sake of his
eternal soul, I hope he is innocent, it is better far that in the dreadful
solitude of exile he should,... atone by lingering repentance for the
deed, than that he should now be sent in the dawning of his
manhood to an ignominious death.., where the truth is not clear. I
say that the proof adduced is not conclusive of murder ... "161
Sharswood emphatically defended Phillips's actions.' 6 2 One
difficulty with Sharswood's report of Phillips's conduct is that
Parke's quoted statement appears to have been a command about

how to act during the course of the trial, not an after-the-fact
commendation. 1 63 Further, had Phillips impermissibly stated his
A.B.A. REP. 1, 103 (1907) (same).
159. Cf DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 135-41 (1973)

("Charles Phillips had addressed the jury, his conscience burdened with the confidential
confession of Courvoisier's guilt .... "). Mellinkoff's book offers an excellent rumination
on Courvoisier.
160. See id. at 139-40 (citing the correspondence between Phillips and Warren in
which Phillips urges that Baron Parke encouraged him to represent Courvoisier despite
Courvoisier's admission of guilt); Samuel Warren, The Mystery of Murder, and Its
Defence, reprinted in 2 MISCELLANIES: CRITICAL, IMAGINATIVE, AND JURIDICAL 1, 27
(Edinburgh and London, William Blackwood & Sons 1855) (noting Phillips's report of
what Parke told him when representing Courvoisier, and reprinting the correspondence);
Professional Conduct-The Courvoisier Case, 12 MONTHLY L. REP. 433, 433-36 (1850)
(quoting the letter of Charles Phillips to Samuel Warren first published in the Times
(London) on November 20, 1849). Sharswood repeated Phillips's claim of Parke's
statement, but used all capital letters.
GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (5th ed. 1907), reprintedin 32 A.B.A. REP. 1,107 (1907).
161. DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 120 (1973); see also
DAVID J.A. CAIRNS, ADVOCACY AND THE MAKING OF THE ADVERSARIAL CRIMINAL
TRIAL, 1800-1865 app. 3, at 188, 200 (1998) (reprinting, in appendix 3, portions of
Phillips's statement to the jury in Courvoisier, taken from the June 22, 1840 issue of the
Times (London), which reported his statement in the third person).
162. See GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (5th ed.
1907), reprintedin 32 A.B.A. REP. 1,107 (1907) (arguing that Phillips had "no alternative"
except, "as Baron Parke has well expressed it, to use ALL FAIR ARGUMENTS
ARISING ON THE EVIDENCE").
163. Sharswood's report of Courvoisier is intended to exonerate Phillips from any
charges of immoral or unethical behavior. Cf GEORGE SHARSWOOD, A COMPEND OF
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belief in Courvoisier's innocence?
After Courvoisier was convicted, he began publicly to confess
his guilt, over and over again. In short order, it became known
that Courvoisier had confessed his guilt to Phillips before the trial
had ended (the timing of the confession was in dispute in
published reports). One initial news report opined that "with that
honourable zeal which always distinguishes [Phillips] for his
clients, he made the best of a very bad cause." 1 6 4 A letter to the
Times (London) published three days later argued that "he who
defends the guilty, knowing him to be so, forgets alike honour and
honesty.",1 65

Part of the controversy raged due to Phillips's

repeated questions on cross-examination of a maid, Sarah Mancer,
over whether she 1said
she saw her employer, Lord Russell,
"murdered" in bed. 6 6 Phillips repeatedly asked whether she had
said this. Flustered, Mancer denied saying so. This crossexamination was offered as evidence that Phillips had dishonorably attempted to place blame for Lord Russell's murder upon a
poor servant. Two problems complicated this attack on Phillips.
First, Sarah Mancer testified during the first day of trial, before
Courvoisier's sudden confession. 16 7 Second, as made clear by

LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND DUTIES OF THE PROFESSION OF THE LAW 40-44

(Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1854) (noting that attorneys in Phillips's situation have
"no alternative, then, but to perform [their] duty"); GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (5th ed. 1907), reprinted in 32 A.B.A. REP. 1, 103-07 (1907)
(same). He did not quote the statement of Baron Parke until the end of his discussion,
and he implied that Phillips used only the arguments based on the evidence. GEORGE
SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (5th ed. 1907), reprinted in 32

A.B.A. REP. 1, 107 (1907). But Sharswood knew that critics of Phillips had fastened on to
the speech given to the jury after the confession. He dismissed its importance by
concluding "[t]he language of counsel, on such occasions, during the excitement of the
trial, in the fervor of an address to the jury, is not to be calmly and nicely scanned in the
printed report." Id. at 104. Sharswood protested too much.
164. DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 141 (1973) (quoting

CHRONICLE (London), June 22, 1840). The case ended on Saturday, June 20, 1840. Id. at
101.
165. Id. at 142 (quoting TIMES (London), June 25, 1840); cf. id. at 193-94 (quoting
License of Counsel, CHRONICLE (London), June 25, 1840, which defended Phillips's
action and declared that any failure on Phillips's part to point out discrepancies,
contradictions, and omissions in evidence would have been a "gross violation of duty").
166. See id. at 73, 192-93 (reporting Ms. Mancer's signed statement that "[she] saw
his Lordship ... murdered in bed" and discussing the controversy surrounding Phillips's
vigorous cross-examination of Ms. Mancer on this point).
167. See DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 72-73 (1973)
(discussing Sarah Mancer's testimony in the chapter "Trial: Opening Day").
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David J.A. Cairns, Phillips's repeated questions of Mancer were a
consequence of the Prisoners' Counsel Act of 1836.168 Before the
Prisoners' Counsel Act, a person charged with a felony had no
right to counsel in England. 1 6 9 The Prisoners' Counsel Act also
gave to the defendant the right to a copy of any depositions of any
Sarah Mancer had given a
witnesses taken before trial? 7 0
deposition at the coroner's inquest, which she had signed. The
deposition included the statement, "I saw his Lordship dead
murdered in bed."1 '7 1 Phillips possessed a copy of that deposition,
and one goal of his cross-examination was to have Mancer
acknowledge the statement made in the deposition. At the very
least, if a servant said she saw Russell "murdered," that might cast
reasonable doubt on Courvoisier's guilt by shifting it to her or to
other servants.1 7 2 But Phillips's procedural difficulty was that he
had to obtain this admission from Mancer without referring to the
deposition. That was because, as Cairns notes, if Phillips referred
to the deposition during the prosecution's case-in-chief, defense
counsel gave up the "last word" pursuant to the Prisoners' Counsel
Act.1 7 3 The last word was the privilege of giving the final speech
to the jury, a right highly prized and rarely forfeited by English
defense counsel. 1 7 4 The result of this provision of the Act was
that "[t]he jury were treated to the browbeating of a confused
housemaid by an experienced criminal barrister, at the end of
168. DAVID J.A. CAIRNS, ADVOCACY AND THE MAKING OF THE ADVERSARIAL

CRIMINAL TRIAL, 1800-1865, at 120-24 (1998) (noting the ways in which Phillips used the

procedures allowed under the Prisoners' Counsel Act in cross-examining Sarah Mancer).
169. Cf id. at 120 (indicating that before the establishment of the Prisoners' Counsel
Act, prisoners "had a right to be present when the depositions were taken, and to question

the witnesses").
170. Id.
171. DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 73 (1973). "Dead" was

crossed out in the deposition. Id.
172. Cf id. at 191 ("If the peculiarity of Sarah Mancer's early morning responses to
the discovery of the corpse had passed unnoticed in Phillips's argument, . . . everyone in
the world ... would have thought the omissions strange."). In his speech to the jury, given
after Courvoisier's confession, Phillips informed the jury that his cross-examination of
Sarah Mancer should not be understood to "cast the crime upon either of the female
servants." DAVID J.A. CAIRNS, ADVOCACY AND THE MAKING OF THE ADVERSARIAL

CRIMINAL TRIAL, 1800-1865 app. 3, at 191 (1998) (reprinting as appendix 3 Phillips's

statement to the jury in Courvoisier). The other female servant was the cook Mary
Hannell.
173. DAVID J.A. CAIRNS, ADVOCACY AND THE MAKING OF THE ADVERSARIAL

CRIMINAL TRIAL, 1800-1865, at 121 (1998).
174. Id.
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which they did not have the benefit of either knowing what Sarah
Mancer had said before the coroner, or hearing her explanation of
'
it." 175
As the controversy raged in the press, Phillips, largely
vilified for his actions, remained silent.' 76
Although Courvoisier was tried and hung in 1840, the ethical
propriety of Phillips's conduct became the subject of renewed
interest in England in the late 1840s. In separate murder cases, the
press criticized the conduct of defense counsel in suggesting
responsibility for the crimes lay elsewhere, and the excessive zeal
of those lawyers was linked to Phillips's allegedly improper
behavior years earlier in Courvoisier.1 7 7 An editorial in the
Examiner in November 1849 first noted the conduct of defense
counsel Serjeant Wilkins in a recent murder trial; it then
excoriated Phillips for his actions in Courvoisier and the legal
profession for promoting Phillips to the bench. 7 8
Phillips
belatedly defended his conduct in a letter to the editor of the
Times (London) and in a published pamphlet of correspondence
with his friend, the barrister Samuel Warren. 17 9 Phillips's claims
defending his honor generated a controversy about the ethics of
lawyers that spread to the United States.
The attacks against Phillips were published in the United States
in the January 26, 1850 issue of Littell's Living Age, which

175. Id. at 123.
176. See ProfessionalConduct-The Courvoisier Case, 12 MONTHLY L. REP. 433, 435

(1850) (quoting the letter of Charles Phillips to Samuel Warren first published in the
Times (London) on November 20, 1849, in which Phillips noted "the contemptuous silence
with which for nine years [he] treated the calumnies" he received as a result of the
Courvoisiertrial).
177. See DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 193-203 (1973)

(recounting two post-Courvoisiercases in which the press, in criticizing defense counsel as
overzealous, attributed the conduct to Phillips in Courvoisier).
178. Id. at 199-203.
179. Id. at 203 (quoting EXAMINER (London), Nov. 3, 1849); see also id. at 193
(quoting EXAMINER (London), Nov. 24, 1849 and Dec. 8, 1849). Phillips's response was
the publication of correspondence in the Times with his friend and barrister Samuel
Warren, later printed in Sharswood's An Essay on Professional Ethics. Correspondence
between Charles Phillips & Samuel Warren, TIMES (London), Nov. 20, 1849, reprinted in
GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (5th ed. 1907), reprintedin

32 A.B.A. REP. 1 app. at 183-96 (1907); see also Samuel Warren, The Mystery of Murder,
and Its Defence, reprintedin 2 MISCELLANIES: CRITICAL, IMAGINATIVE, AND JURIDICAL

1, 1-2 (Edinburgh and London, William Blackwood & Sons 1855) (reprinting
correspondence between Phillips and Warren as published in the Times); Professional
Conduct-The Courvoisier Case, 12 MONTHLY L. REP. 433, 434-39 (1850) (same).
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reprinted articles from the Examiner.18 ° At the same time, the
Monthly Law Reporter, in its January 1850 issue, published a8an1
essay titled, Professional Conduct-The Courvoisier Case.
After averring, "Mr. Phillips, we are glad to say, has completely
vindicated himself,"' 82 the Monthly Law Reporter published the
exchange of letters between Warren and Phillips originally
published on November 20, 1849, in the Times (London).' 18 3 At
the end of the same issue, in its "Miscellaneous Intelligence," the
editor reprinted a defense of Phillips published in the London
Legal Observer.18 4 The next month's issue reversed course.
Monthly Law Reporter editor Stephen H. Phillips reprinted articles
from the Jurist and the Examiner, and while offering them so the
reader could make up his own mind, implied that Charles Phillips's
conduct was unprofessional.1 8 5 The March 1850 issue of the
Monthly Law Reporter continued to18 6 charge Phillips with
misconduct in his defense of Courvoisier.
In late March 1850, Dr. John Webster, a professor at the
Harvard Medical School, was tried and convicted of the murder of
George Parkman, a Boston Brahmin, and sentenced to die.' 8 7
180. See Lawyers, Clients, Witnesses, and the Public, LITrELL'S LIVING AGE, Jan. 26,
1850, at 179 (reproducing articles from the Examiner regarding Phillips's conduct in
Courvoisier). The February 2, 1850 issue of Littell's Living Age reproduced articles
dealing with Phillips's conduct in Courvoisierin What We Have Not Done, and What Mr.
Charles Phillips Has Done, LITTELL'S LIVING AGE, Feb. 2, 1850, at 230. A third article,
Lawyers, Clients, &c., LITrELL'S LIVING AGE, Feb. 16, 1850, at 306, reprinted an article
on Phillips which had been published in the Scottish Press. Phillips's conduct had been
reported in the United States as early as 1840. Peleg Chandler, Trial of CourvoisierLicense of Counsel, 3 MONTHLY L. REP. 194 (1840).
181. ProfessionalConduct-The Courvoisier Case, 12 MONTHLY L. REP. 433 (1850).
Stephen H. Phillips, the then-editor of the Monthly Law Reporter, later became attorney
general of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and was appointed to a similar position in
the territory of Hawaii in 1866. See The Hawaiian Islands and Their New Attorney
General, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1866, available at http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archivefree/pdf?_r=l&res=9407EFDC103DE53BBC4E52DFB767838D679FDE&oref=slogin.
182. Professional Conduct-The Courvoisier Case, 12 MONTHLY L. REP. 433, 434
(1850).
183. Id. at 434-39.
184. See Miscellaneous Intelligence, 12 MONTHLY L. REP. 479, 479-81 (1850) (noting
the "high commendation" with which the English press spoke of Charles Phillips).
185. Mr. CharlesPhillips and the CourvoisierCase, 12 MONTHLY L. REP. 553, 553-71
(1850) (reprinting articles from the Jurist and the Examiner critical of Phillips's conduct).
186. Id. at 553 (prompting the reader to decide "whether such severity [toward the
actions of Phillips] was wholly called for").
187. See SIMON SCHAMA, DEAD CERTAINTIES (UNWARRANTED SPECULATIONS)

71-318 (1991) (describing the case in novelistic form). See generally ROBERT SULLIVAN,

20081

AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS IN AN AGE OFANXIETY

381

The case may have been the most notorious murder case in
nineteenth century America. 188 Shortly before he disappeared on
November 23, 1849, Parkman visited Webster at the medical
school to demand payment of a large outstanding debt Webster
owed Parkman. The wealthy Parkman family offered a large
reward for information concerning his disappearance. The police
learned of Parkman's visit to Webster and arrested Webster after
they found dismembered parts of a body in Webster's laboratory.
The Commonwealth's star witness at the trial was the Harvard
Medical School janitor, Ephraim Littlefield. Littlefield told of an
argument between Webster and Parkman on November 23, and
also told of his belief that Webster had murdered Parkman as soon
as Parkman's disappearance was publicized. After Parkman's
disappearance, Littlefield began digging through a wall separating
his apartment at the medical school from Webster's laboratory.
He led police to a partially dismembered body found there, later
identified by experts at trial as that of George Parkman.' 8 9
Littlefield was poorly paid by Harvard Medical School and
supplemented his income as a body snatcher (called a
"resurrectionist" in Boston). Thus, one possible motive for
Littlefield's actions was the reward offered by Parkman's family,
which Littlefield later disclaimed on the witness stand. On crossexamination, Webster's lawyers failed miserably in attacking
Littlefield's credibility and wholly avoided, contrary to their
client's request, Littlefield's resurrectionist work.
The
prosecution, led by special counsel George Bemis, offered a host
of expert witnesses, including the first dental expert and an early
handwriting expert, whose testimony was fraught with holes, but
THE DISAPPEARANCE OF DR. PARKMAN (1971) (outlining the case's legal history);

HELEN THOMSON, MURDER AT HARVARD (1971) (offering popular history). A study of
the case is also found in Chapter 7, "Grand Guignol at Harvard Medical School," in
RICHARD B. MORRIS, FAIR TRIAL 156-203 (1953). In 2003, PBS aired a documentary on
the case, titled Murder at Harvard. Older accounts of the trial are cited in LEONARD W.
LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW 219 n.52 (1957).

188. Officials estimated that between 55,000 and 60,000 people attended the trial,
usually in ten-minute increments. Papers from the Middle Atlantic and Middle West
covered the trial, and letter writers from all over the country prayed the Governor set
aside Webster's execution.
189. There was, at this time, no reliable scientific manner to determine the identity of
a burned, dismembered body lacking a head, and expert testimony identifying the body as
Parkman's was criticized by legal commentators writing in the immediate aftermath of the
case.
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whose credibility again remained unsullied after crossexamination. The case was tried, as a matter of law, by the entire
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, including its chief justice,
Lemuel Shaw, whose prejudice against Webster was roundly
criticized by other lawyers.' 90
When at last the prosecution had completed its case, having
taken over a week, the defense rose to give its opening statement.
The cross-examination of the prosecution's witnesses had been
based on the defense that Webster had not murdered Parkman
(indeed, part of the defense was that the parts of the body found in
Webster's laboratory were not those of Parkman and that
Parkman might not be dead). The statement by defense lawyer
Edward Sohier began by claiming that Webster was being
railroaded due to public opinion. He then changed tack, giving the
jury a thorough legal statement of the distinction between murder
and manslaughter. This was a fatal error. To argue first that the
defendant had committed no murder, and then to argue the
difference between manslaughter and murder, was to offer
mutually inconsistent defenses. The latter suggested that Webster
might have killed Parkman, but had done so with less than malice
aforethought.
Webster, legally incompetent to testify in
Massachusetts, was so distraught at his counsel's conduct of the
case that he spent some time during his fifteen minute unsworn
statement to the jury attacking the competence of his lawyers. As
one anonymous lawyer-commentator concluded, "From the
moment we understood that Mr. Sohier was talking to the jury
about manslaughter, we gave over Dr. Webster's chance of
acquittal. So suicidal a policy was never known in a criminal
case."' 91 "A Member of the Legal Profession" offered the
190. See A MEMBER OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, A STATEMENT OF REASONS
SHOWING THE ILLEGALITY OF THAT VERDICT UPON WHICH SENTENCE OF DEATH HAS
BEEN PRONOUNCED AGAINST JOHN W. WEBSTER FOR THE ALLEGED MURDER OF

GEORGE PARKMAN 23-33 (New York, Stringer & Townsend 1850) (alleging that Shaw,
through his comments to the jury, effectively placed upon Webster the burden of proving
himself innocent beyond a reasonable doubt); The Webster Case, 13 MONTHLY L. REP. 1,
13-15 (1850) (describing how Justice Shaw suggested in his charge to the jury that Dr.
Parkman had been killed by chloroform even though no evidence to that effect had been
admitted); cf LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF
JUSTICE SHAW 218-27 (1957) (addressing the criticisms of Chief Justice Shaw).
191. ROBERT SULLIVAN, THE DISAPPEARANCE OF DR. PARKMAN 117 (1971)
(quoting A MEMBER OF THE NEW YORK BAR, A REVIEW OF THE WEBSTER CASE 16

(New York, J.S. Redfield 1850)).
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following comment on the conduct of Webster's lawyers:
For the defendant's counsel we feel that pity which forbids all bitter
reproof, all harsh denunciation; that pity which all naturally feel for
those who, rashly, though it may be with the purest motives,
of which they are utterly
undertake a duty, for the performance
1 92
unfitted either by natue or education.
The Webster trial began on March 19 and ended with Webster's
conviction just before the end of the month. The Monthly Law
Reporter was not published in April. In the May 1850 issue, the
first since editor Stephen H. Phillips's March 1850 attack on
barrister Charles Phillips's conduct in the Courvoisier case,
Stephen Phillips addressed the Webster case.1 9 3 Stephen Phillips
criticized the actions of the presiding judge, Chief Justice Lemuel
Shaw, the imputations of Attorney General Clifford against
Webster, the lack of reflection by the jury, and the performance of
the defense counsel: "The Counsel for the defence manifested
great embarrassment in the management of their cause."'1 9 4 But,

continued Stephen Phillips, the attacks on Webster's lawyers were
unjust and unfair. He noted, obliquely referring to Charles
Phillips's conduct in Courvoisier, "An unscrupulous advocate
might, perhaps, have raised a storm of indignation against
Littlefield, by perverting and distorting evidence, by stormy
ejaculations and protestations before 'the Omniscient God' of his
Stephen Phillips then argued more
client's innocence. '"195
forcefully against the proposition that criminal defense lawyers
may act as Charles Phillips did in Courvoisier: even had Webster's
lawyers done so and obtained Webster's acquittal (which Stephen
Phillips favored), "[f]or
the honor of our bar, we are glad that they
1 96
did no such thing."'
192. A MEMBER OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, A STATEMENT OF REASONS
SHOWING THE ILLEGALITY OF THAT VERDICT UPON WHICH SENTENCE OF DEATH HAS
BEEN PRONOUNCED AGAINST JOHN W. WEBSTER FOR THE ALLEGED MURDER OF

GEORGE PARKMAN 22 (New York, Stringer & Townsend 1850).

193. See generally The Webster Case, 13 MONTHLY L. REP. 1 (1850) (discussing his
opinions as to the Webster case).
194. Id. at 8, 13, 15.
195. Id. at 9.
196. Id. Writing in 1856, Philadelphia lawyer David Paul Brown noted the Webster
case and echoed Stephen Phillips's statement. After approving the decision of a lawyer
who knew of his client's guilt to defend on grounds of provocation but not on grounds that
the client had not committed the murder, he declared: "Which, allow us to say, with great
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Sharswood's defense of Charles Phillips's conduct in his A
Compend of Lectures four years later is, like much of A Compend,
hedged. Sharswood acknowledges that it would not have been
professional for Phillips to bring "down an unjust suspicion upon
an innocent person; or even to stand up and falsely pretend a
confidence in the truth and justice of his cause, which he did not
feel."' 9 7 But "[n]othing seems plainer than the proposition, that a
person accused of a crime is to be tried and convicted, if convicted
at all, upon evidence, and whether guilty or not guilty, if the
evidence is insufficient to convict him, he has a legal right to be
acquitted."' 198 The appendix to Sharswood's A Compend of
Lectures begins with Sharswood's summary of Courvoisier. He
offers a timeline of the trial and Courvoisier's confession, and then
oddly speculates that Courvoisier's thinking "was simply to
prepare his counsel against the forthcoming evidence."' 19 9
Sharswood notes (but does not include) the Examiner's attacks on
Phillips in November 1849, and reprints the November 1849
correspondence between Phillips and Warren. 2 0 0 Despite his
hedging, it appears Sharswood is convinced beyond a marrow of
the propriety of Phillips's conduct.
E. Sharswood, Lawyers and ProfessionalEthics in the 1850s
As noted by Perry Miller, in the 1850s "the effort to vindicate
respect for those who know more and think differently, would have been the only
available reliance for the unhappy Dr. Webster, charged with the murder of Dr. Parkman,
of Massachusetts." 2 DAVID PAUL BROWN, THE FORUM; OR, FORTY YEARS FULL
PRACTICE AT THE PHILADELPHIA BAR 45 (Philadelphia, Robert H. Small 1856).
197. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND DUTIES
OF THE PROFESSION OF THE LAW 42 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1854); GEORGE
SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (5th ed. 1907), reprinted in 32

A.B.A. REP. 1,105 (1907).
198. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND DUTIES
OF THE PROFESSION OF THE LAW 43 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1854); GEORGE
SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (5th ed. 1907), reprinted in 32
A.B.A. REP. 1,105-06 (1907).
199. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND DUTIES

OF THE PROFESSION OF THE LAW app. at 108 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1854);
GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (5th ed. 1907), reprintedin

32 A.B.A. REP. 1 app. at 185 (1907).
200. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND DUTIES

OF THE PROFESSION OF THE LAW app. at 109-19 (Philadelphia, T. & J.w. Johnson 1854);
GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (5th ed. 1907), reprintedin

32 A.B.A. REP. 1 app. at 185-96 (1907).
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the ethical conduct of lawyers takes on a concerted vigor, as
though to show that while the political situation was deteriorating
the lawyers needed some renewed assurances that they were
respectable." ' 2 0 1 Richard Kimball admitted in 1853 that the
actions of some "base advocates and base attorneys" had caused
the profession to be held in low repute, and that even though "the
true profession" was noble, some difficulties in human nature led
to the poor standing of lawyers.20 2 More portentous were the
words of the former Whig Congressman Bellamy Storer of
Cincinnati. In a February 20, 1856 speech on the legal profession
to law students at the University of Louisville, Storer noted, "We
live in perilous times. The passing events are at once startling and
terrific .... Disintegration, political, moral and religious, so far20as3
systems are concerned, mark with vivid distinctness our epoch."
Sharswood's lectures to his students on professional ethics were
given when the national political situation was deteriorating
rapidly, joined by dramatic regional (northern) and local
(Philadelphian) events providing an impetus, as Perry Miller
20 4
stated, "to vindicate the ethical conduct of lawyers."
Sharswood's October 2, 1854 lectures, which became A Compend
of Lectures, should be understood in light of this political
deterioration.
The Compromise of 1850, crafted by lawyer and Senator Henry
Clay, and shepherded through the Senate by lawyers Daniel
Webster and Stephen A. Douglas, had staved off for some time
secession and disunion. It had done so at a terrible price.
Webster's reputation was in tatters in parts of Massachusetts. 20 5
201. PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA 204 (1965); see also
MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1776-1876, at

136-90 (1976) (detailing antebellum efforts to upgrade the image of the legal profession);
Philip Gaines, The "True Lawyer" in America: Discursive Construction of the Legal
Profession in the Nineteenth Century, 45 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 132, 132 (2001) (asserting

that the professionalism movement was initiated in part by the advancing industrialism
and entrepreneurship of the period).
202. See RICHARD B. KIMBALL, THE LAWYER: THE DIGNITY, DUTIES, AND
RESPONSIBILITIES OF HIS PROFESSION 21-22 (New York, George P. Putnam & Co. 1853)
("[T]he higher and the more honorable the pursuit, the more despicable and degraded are
those who pervert and misuse it.").
203. BELLAMY STORER, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: AN ADDRESS DELIVERED
BEFORE THE LAW DEPARTMENT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY 16-

17 (Cincinnati, C. Clark & Co. 1856).
(1965).
205. For some southerners, the work of the lawyers such as Webster, Clay and others
204. PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA 204
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One of the compromises was the adoption of the Fugitive Slave
Act of 1850.206 The Act barred testimony from the alleged
fugitive, paid the commissioner hearing the matter ten dollars
when the commissioner found proof was sufficient that the person
was the claimed fugitive slave, and paid the commissioner five
dollars when the commissioner found the proof was
insufficient.20 7 It made no provision for a method of proof that
the person detained was not a fugitive slave. Almost immediately
after its adoption, slave catchers made their way to Boston to use
the law's provisions in the heart of the abolitionist movement. An
effort in early 1851 to use the rendition proceeding involving a
fugitive slave failed when Bostonians rushed the courtroom and
freed him.20 8 When alleged fugitives were captured, and when
escape was not possible, lawyers made lawyerly arguments
concerning the unconstitutionality of the Act. The arguments
were to no avail.20 9 When Thomas Sims's rendition proceeding in
1851 led literally to a ringing of the Boston courthouse in
chains,2 10 supporters of the Fugitive Slave Act rejoiced that the
supremacy of the law had been vindicated, while its opponents

in the Compromise of 1850 showed how lawyers protected the Union when others could
not: "When the danger comes again, who have we like this illustrious trio, to 'ride upon
the whirlwind and direct the storm?' we cannot specify the individual names that will
figure when the trial comes on; but we can confidently predict that in its dangers, its
labors, its disasters or its glories, the lawyer will have his full share." MAXWELL
BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1776-1876, at 155 (1976)
(quoting A.O.P. Nicholson, Address Delivered Before the Two Literary Societies of the
University of North-Carolina 28 (June 1, 1853)).
206. Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462.
207. Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, §§ 6, 8, 9 Stat. 462, 463-64. See generally
ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

176-77 (1975) (describing how abolitionist attorneys argued that the difference in fees
paid to the commissioner "denied due process to the alleged fugitive, as it made the
commissioner an interested party in the outcome").
208. See LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF

JUSTICE SHAW 89 (1957) ("But the rescuers had already escorted Shadrach [on trial as a
fugitive slave] out of the [courtroom], down the stairs, and into the streets ....[T]he mob

[was] cheering as they departed.").
209. See ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 176-77 (1975) (reporting that, despite seemingly valid arguments to
issue a writ of habeas corpus, an accused fugitive slave was returned "[b]y dint of military

might").
210. Id. at 176; see also LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH
AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW 92 (1957) (providing an account of Thomas Sims's rendition

proceeding).
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exploited the symbolism of Marshal Tukey's action.2"'
On May 30, 1854, Congress adopted the Kansas-Nebraska Act,
which was another attempt to defuse the slavery issue by calling
for a vote by the people on the issue.2 1 2 Six days before, an
alleged fugitive slave named Anthony Burns was arrested in
Boston. Burns's lawyer, Richard Henry Dana, Jr., refused to
countenance extralegal efforts to free Burns and accepted the
course of the Act, even though he believed it unconstitutional.21 3
The courthouse, where the rendition hearing of Burns took place,
was again ringed in chains. 2 14 The commissioner, Edward Loring,
issued the certificate of removal on June 2, 1854, despite appearing
to have grounds to refuse to issue the certificate.21 5 Burns's
return to slavery required a force of between 2,000 and 3,000 men
to escort him from the courthouse to the wharf.21 6 The rendition
of a fugitive slave from Boston was hailed as evidence of
adherence to the rule of law. 217 In March 1855, despite the
211. See LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF
JUSTICE SHAW 104 (1957) (noting that the headline in National Intelligencer after
rendition of Sims read: "SUPREMACY OF THE LAW SUSTAINED," while
recognizing that many in New England "cursed the affair" of the rendition).
212. See Kansas-Nebraska Act, ch. 59, § 14, 10 Stat. 277, 283 (1854) (stating that the
Act is not meant "to legislate slavery into any Territory or State, nor to exclude it
therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their
domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United
States").
213. See Samuel Shapiro, The Rendition of Anthony Burns, 44 J. NEGRO HIST. 34, 39,
42-43 (1959) ("Although he believed the Fugitive Slave law unconstitutional, principally
because it failed to provide for a jury trial, [Dana] was willing to accept the contrary
judgment of state and federal courts.").
214. Paul Finkelman, Legal Ethics and Fugitive Slaves: The Anthony Burns Case,
Judge Loring, and Abolitionist Attorneys, 17 CARDOzO L. REV. 1793, 1823 (1996); Samuel
Shapiro, The Rendition of Anthony Burns, 44 J.NEGRO HIST. 34, 39 (1959).
215. See Paul Finkelman, Legal Ethics and Fugitive Slaves: The Anthony Burns Case,
Judge Loring, and Abolitionist Attorneys, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1793, 1796 (1996)
("Despite factual inconsistencies undermining the claim on Burns, ... Commissioner
Loring declared Burns a fugitive slave and ordered him returned to his master."). See
generally ALBERT J.VON FRANK, THE TRIALS OF ANTHONY BURNS (1998) (describing
Burns's proceeding in detail from beginning to end); Samuel Shapiro, The Rendition of
Anthony Burns, 44 J. NEGRO HIST. 34 (1959) (noting several arguments made in defense
of Burns).
216. See ALBERT J. VON FRANK, THE TRIALS OF ANTHONY BURNS 198 (1998)
(listing the number of military personnel).
217. See Paul Finkelman, Legal Ethics and Fugitive Slaves: The Anthony Burns Case,
Judge Loring, and Abolitionist Attorneys, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1793, 1821 (1996)
(quoting a May 27, 1854 letter of United States District Attorney Benjamin Hallett to
President Franklin Pierce stating that the proceeding was necessary because "[t]he laws of
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testimony of Richard Dana, Loring was recommended for removal
from his office as probate judge in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts. The removal of Loring was offered as evidence
that the rule of law was slipping away in Massachusetts, for Loring
had not violated any law, but only "'ha[d] lost the public
21 8
confidence.'
On September 30, 1850, George Sharswood gave his first lecture
at the newly revived Department of Law of the University of
Pennsylania, and his subject was the legal profession. 219 Lecture
I
' 220
noted that "[p]eace and quiet are what we seek in society.
Both were in short supply nationally and locally in Philadelphia in
1850. The adoption of the Fugitive Slave Act just twelve days
before Sharswood's Lecture I was part of the desperate effort to
avoid the violence of disunion. Philadelphia itself remained a
violent city in 1850.221 The deadly anti-Catholic riots in 1844 and
the volunteer fire company riots of 1849 were but two
examples.2 22 Sharswood followed his statement on peace and
the land cannot be trampled upon"); Samuel Shapiro, The Rendition of Anthony Burns, 44
J. NEGRO HIST. 34, 49 (1959) (noting the return of Burns to Alexandria, Virginia met with
"a 100-gun salute... 'in honor of the triumph of the law').
218. The Removal of Judge Loring, 18 MONTHLY L. REP. 1, 2 (1855). Loring was not
actually removed from office until 1858. ALBERT J. VON FRANK, THE TRIALS OF
ANTHONY BURNS 241 (1998).
219. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, LECTURES INTRODUCTORY TO THE STUDY OF THE

LAW 37 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1870).
220. Id. at 17. I do not know whether Sharswood used this exact language in his
initial lecture in 1850, or whether some editing took place over the two decades between
the lecture and its publication. However, given the manner in which A Compend of
Lectures was revised between 1854 and his death in 1883, it seems likely that much of the
language remained the same over time.
221. See Charles R. Barker, Philadelphiain the Late 'Forties, 2 PHILA. HIST. 245, 262
(1931) (noting the "growing spirit of lawlessness" in the 1840s); Elizabeth M. Geffen,
Violence in Philadelphia in the 1840's and 1850's, 36 PA. HIST. 381, 383 (1969) ("The ...
violence grew steadily stronger, more deadly, and more frequently eruptive, during the
early part of the nineteenth century, reaching a horrifying climax of racial and religious
warfare in the 1840s.").
222. Cf Dennis Clark, Philadelphia1876: Celebrationand Illusion, in PHILADELPHIA
1776-2076: A THREE HUNDRED YEAR VIEW 41, 50, 58 (Dennis Clark ed., 1975) ("The
first half of the nineteenth century had been disruptive and riotous, but the effects were
limited."). On the riots in 1844, see MICHAEL FELDBERG, THE PHILADELPHIA RIOTS OF
1844 (1975). See also MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING
SOCIETY, 1776-1876, at 191-234 (1976) (describing Philadelphia's efforts at riot control).
On the fire company riots of 1849, see ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 147-48 (1989). Additional fire company riots occurred in 1852. Id. at
163-64 ("During 1852 there were sixty-nine fire riots.").
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order with a rejection of the right to disobey a "bad law":
"Obedience to [a bad law] is a sacrifice to a higher good.
Disobedience or evasion of a bad law, approved or connived at by
public opinion, opens the floodgates of wide desolation in the
community. Open resistance is treason."' 22 3 Sharswood explicitly
rejected the calls of abolitionists and anti-slavery supporters to
reject the Fugitive Slave Act in favor of a "higher law." The
positive law trumped claims to a higher law found in nature.
Sharswood was a devout Presbyterian, and his proclamation of a
religious duty to obey even bad laws was consonant with
Presbyterian sermons of the time. 22 4
The Burns rendition of 1854 was a further stark example in the
north of the divide between those who demanded enforcement of
the Fugitive Slave Act as a matter of the rule of law and those who
rejected it on higher law grounds. The adoption of the KansasNebraska Act created a national rule of law problem, for it made
slavery an issue of Jacksonian popular sovereignty, a vote in which
some people, slaves specifically, were excluded from the polls. As
a local matter, the city and county of Philadelphia were
consolidated on February 2, 1854, which resulted in the
consolidation of its police forces, an attempt in large part to curb
the violence in the city. In 1850, 72,312 persons, eighteen percent
of the total population of the County of Philadelphia, had been
born in Ireland.2 25 Forty percent of the workforce of 59,903
persons consisted of German and Irish immigrants, up from just
ten percent in 1836.226 The tumult in Philadelphia in the late
1840s and early 1850s led not only to a professionalized police
force in 1854, but also to such social controls as a "temperance
223. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, LECTURES INTRODUCTORY TO THE STUDY OF THE

LAW 17 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1870).
224. See generally JOHN C. LORD, "THE HIGHER LAW," IN ITS APPLICATION TO

THE FUGITIVE SLAVE BILL (New York, Union Safety Comm. 1851) (preaching at the
Central Presbyterian Church in Buffalo, New York on Thanksgiving Day of 1851);
SAMUEL T.

SPEAR,

THE

LAW-ABIDING

CONSCIENCE,

AND

THE

HIGHER

LAW

CONSCIENCE (New York, Lambert & Lane 1850) (preaching at the South Presbyterian
Church in Brooklyn, New York on December 12, 1850); ICHABOD S. SPENCER, FUGITIVE
SLAVE LAW: THE RELIGIOUS DUTY OF OBEDIENCE TO LAW (New York, M.W. Dodd

1850) (preaching a sermon at the Second Presbyterian Church in Brooklyn, New York on
November 24, 1850, and noting religious duty to obey law even if the law may be unwise
and unconstitutional).
225. DENNIS CLARK, THE IRISH IN PHILADELPHIA 29, 63 (1973).
226. ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 15 (1989).
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fever" that raged from 1851 through 1854227 and the creation of
homes for abandoned children (Catholic, Jewish, Negro, etc.)
between 1853 and 1856.228
In the midst of this uproar, on October 2, 1854, the forty-fouryear-old Sharswood, a lifelong resident of Philadelphia, opened
the academic year at the University of Pennsylvania Department
of Law with a lecture on legal ethics to his students.22 9 Sharswood
graduated from the University of Pennsylvania at eighteen, and he
was admitted to the practice of law in December 1831 after a
three-year apprenticeship. 23 0 He was appointed as an associate
judge of the district court in 1845, and in 1848 he became president
judge of the court. In 1851, all judges had to run for office after
the Pennsylvania Constitution was amended. Sharswood, running
as a Democrat, 2 3 ' won unchallenged with the support of all
parties, including Whigs and Democrats.23 2 In 1852, a faculty of
227. See id. at 18 (describing the period in which Philadelphia began to prosecute for
the sale of alcohol on Sundays). "In the local politics of 1851, no issue was bigger than
temperance." Id. at 157. A vote on prohibition in Pennsylvania failed at the ballot box in
1854, and the temperance movement soon thereafter tempered. Id. at 159.
228. Dennis Clark, Philadelphia 1876: Celebration and Illusion, in PHILADELPHIA
1776-2076: A THREE HUNDRED YEAR VIEW 41,54 (Dennis Clark ed., 1975).
229. See GEORGE SHARSWOOD, A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND

DUTIES OF THE PROFESSION OF THE LAW, at i (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1854)
(containing the subtitle Delivered Before the Law Class of the University of Pennsylvania);
GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (5th ed. 1907), reprintedin
32 A.B.A. REP. 1, 7 (1907) (noting that Sharswood read a portion of A Compend as he
lectured students on October 2, 1854); see also Edwin R. Keedy, George SharswoodProfessor of Law, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 685, 692 (1950) (describing the lecture and its
publication history).
230. Samuel Dickson, George Sharswood, in 6 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS 121,
129 (William Draper Lewis ed., 1909) (noting that Sharswood was born in 1810 and
graduated from the University of Pennsylvania in 1828, and indicating that Sharswood
became an attorney on December 15, 1831).
231. On Sharswood's political affiliation, see Gary B. Nash, The PhiladelphiaBench
and Bar, 1800-1861, 7 COMP. STUD. SOC'Y & HIST. 203, 208 (1965), describing Sharswood
as "[a] man of middle-class background and a Democrat in politics." See also Sidney
George Fisher, The Diary of Sidney George Fisher Covering the Years 1834-1871, in A
PHILADELPHIA PERSPECTIVE 1, 402 (Nicholas B. Wainwright ed., 1967) (characterizing
Sharswood as a Democrat on all party issues). In Samuel Dickson, George Sharswood, in
6 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS 121, 123 (William Draper. Lewis ed., 1909), Dickson's
biography of Sharswood, no mention of Sharswood's political affiliation is given,
apparently due to the attempt to de-politicize judges and judging in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries.
232. See Samuel Dickson, George Sharswood, in 6 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS
121, 132 (William Draper Lewis ed., 1909) (noting that Sharswood was nominated by all
parties and won the election unanimously); see also Francis S. Philbrick, Sharswood,
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law was instituted, and Sharswood was named dean and professor
of the Institutes of Law. 2 3 3 Unlike most elite Philadelphia lawyers
in the mid-nineteenth century, who were from the upper class,
Sharswood was a member of the middle class.234 Like many of
them, he was a Presbyterian, 2 35 and from all accounts devout.
Sharswood's lecture On the Aims and Duties of the Professionof
the Law began with the assertion that, due to the "pitfalls and
man-traps" found in the legal profession, a young lawyer must
learn that "[h]igh moral principle is his only safe guide; the only
torch to light his way amidst darkness and obstruction." '236 It
closed with the religious injunction, "Let us beware then of raising
these objects of ambition, wealth, learning, honor, and influence,
worthy though they be, into a factitious importance; nor in the too
ardent pursuit of what are only means, lose sight of the great end
of our being. "237
Sharswood's A Compend of Lectures declaimed that "[g]ood
men of all parties prefer to live in a country, in which justice

George, in

17 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 28 (Dumas Malone ed., 1943)
("In 1851 [Sharswood] was indorsed by five political parties .... ). On Sharswood's
political career, see generally GEORGE W. BIDDLE, A SKETCH OF THE PROFESSIONAL
AND JUDICIAL CHARACTER OF THE LATE GEORGE SHARSWOOD (Philadelphia, The

Ass'n 1883), reprinted in 102 PA. ST. REP. app. at 601 (1884).
233. Margaret Center Klingelsmith, History of the Department of Law, in
UNIVERSITY

OF

PENNSYLVANIA:

OPENING

OF

THE

NEW

BUILDING

OF

THE

DEPARTMENT OF LAW 213, 222 (1900); Edwin R. Keedy, George Sharswood-Professor
of Law, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 685, 687 (1950). The other two professorships were in
"Practice, Pleading and Evidence" and the law of "Real Estate, Conveyancing and Equity
Jurisprudence." Edwin R. Keedy, George Sharswood-Professor of Law, 98 U. PA. L.
REV. 685, 687 (1950).

234. Gary B. Nash, The Philadelphia Bench and Bar, 1800-1861, 7 COMP. STUD.
SoC'Y & HIST. 203, 207-08 (1965).
235. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER 59 (1981)
("George Sharswood ... was a Presbyterian Sunday-school teacher all during the most
turbulent and exciting years of the revival of 1840-57."); cf Gary B. Nash, The
Philadelphia Bench and Bar, 1800-1861, 7 COMP. STUD. SOC'Y & HIST. 203, 215 (1965)
(noting that lawyers in Philadelphia in both 1800-1805 and 1860-1861 were predominantly
"Protestants, and especially Presbyterians and Episcopalians").
236. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND DUTIES

OF THE PROFESSION OF THE LAW 9 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1854). The second
edition, published in 1860, revises the beginning, and these remarks are not present in that
edition.

GEORGE SHARSWOOD,

AN

ESSAY ON

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (2d

ed.

Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1860) (1854).
237. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND DUTIES

OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 106 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1854).
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according to law is impartially administered."2 '3 8 Like his 1850
statement declaiming the duty of Americans to obey a "bad law,"
this statement fit both the positivistic Democratic understanding of
law in the crucible of the 1850s and the professionalizing project of
lawyers of the time. As Sharswood stated more specifically in his
Lectures Introductory to the Study of the Law, the law was "the
embodiment of the will of the people." '2 39 Sharswood was also a
strong

defender

of property

rights, 2 40

a

topic pro-slavery

antebellum Democrats increasingly harped on in the 1850s. 2 4 1 His
politics were critically viewed in a September 2, 1861 diary entry
by one Philadelphia lawyer: "He is an able lawyer, of unquestioned integrity & long experienced ...but he is a Democrat and

on all party questions most intolerant & bigotted. He is supposed
to be unsound on the subject of the war and no doubt has fully
sympathized with the South."' 2 4 2 Although Sharswood urged
obedience to the positive law, not the higher law, he quoted the
English philosopher William Whewell that the law "'most
24 3
perpetually and slowly tends towards the idea of justice.'
Sharswood's hedging on the extent of zeal owed the client, and his
hedging on other issues of ethics, such as contingent fees,2 4 4
suggests a dividedness in Sharswood. As noted by Maxwell
238. Id. at 15.
239. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, LECTURES INTRODUCTORY TO THE STUDY OF THE

LAW 17 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W.Johnson & Co. 1870).
240. See GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (5th ed.
1907), reprinted in 32 A.B.A. REP. 1, 21-22 (1907) (noting preeminent importance of
protecting property rights); GEORGE SHARSWOOD, LECTURES INTRODUCTORY TO THE
STUDY OF THE LAW 24-27 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1870) (arguing that
the legislature should not have the power of eminent domain). Sharswood's views on
private property are more strongly evident in the revised editions of his Essay than in the
1854 A Compend of Lectures.
241. See Norman W. Spaulding, The Discourse of Law in Time of War: Politics and
Professionalism During the Civil War and Reconstruction, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2001,
2041 (2005) ("Pro-slavery Democrats ... insisted that Congress could not impinge the
property rights of citizens entering a territory from any state.").
242. Sidney George Fisher, The Diary of Sidney George Fisher Covering the Years
1834-1871, in A PHILADELPHIA PERSPECTIVE 1,402 (Nicholas B. Wainwright ed., 1967).
243. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, LECTURES INTRODUCTORY TO THE STUDY OF THE

LAW 20 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1870).
244. See GEORGE SHARSWOOD, A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND
DUTIES OF THE PROFESSION OF THE LAW 85-91 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1854)
(declaring contingent fees "indefensible, at least in all ordinary cases," and noting that he
was less interested in the lawfulness of contingent fees than in "the policy and morality of
the practice").
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Bloomfield, by the early 1850s, "Democrats of Philadelphia now
represented proslavery, proimmigrant, and Catholic interests,
while the Whigs and Nativists were identified as old-stock
Protestant and pro-Abolitionist." 24 5 Whigs gained some popular
strength in Philadelphia in mid-1854 by "campaigning against the
Kansas-Nebraska Act," allowing them to win the mayoralty that
year. 2 4 6 Sharswood remained a Democrat, but was "old-stock
Protestant." Sympathetic to the South, he had little in common
with abolitionists, and little in common with "Catholic interests."
He was allegedly on "all party questions intolerant & bigotted,"
but dedicated his A Compend of Lectures to his Whig preceptor
Joseph R. Ingersoll, for whom he held a great deal of reverence
and respect. As the title of his A Compend changed to An Essay
on ProfessionalEthics in the second edition published in 1860, he
remained wedded to the belief that a lawyer's personal honor and
character were central to his ethical practice of law.2 4 7 Two years
after Sharswood's 1854 lecture on professional ethics, his fellow
Pennsylvanian and Democrat James J. Buchanan was elected
President.
Substituting law for war made eminent sense for lawyers steeped
in a tradition of reason. 48 And some lawyers may have believed
that an adherence to proper conduct and the rule of law would
allow a peaceful and legal resolution of the issue of slavery.

245. MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY,

1776-1876, at 233 (1976).
246. Michael P. McCarthy, The Philadelphia Consolidation of 1854: A Reappraisal,
110 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 531, 538 (1986).
247. I agree with Professor Norman Spaulding that "Sharswood's endorsement of
moral activism is far more circumspect than Hoffman's." Norman W. Spaulding, The
Myth of Civic Republicanism: Interrogating the Ideology of Antebellum Legal Ethics, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 1397, 1423 (2003). I disagree with his conclusion that "Sharswood's
bifurcated scheme [providing for a different role for the lawyer in civil and criminal cases]
is internally inconsistent." Id. However, I am not convinced that Sharswood ever
"reconciled the lawyer's republican and adversarial roles by creating an ethical system
which valued both." Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal
Ethics Codes, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 257 (1992). In my view, Sharswood's A
Compend was not internally inconsistent as a matter of professional consensus, but his
understanding of Charles Phillips's defense of Courvoisier did not reconcile the lawyer's
dual roles.
248. See Norman W. Spaulding, The Discourse of Law in Time of War: Politics and
ProfessionalismDuring the Civil War and Reconstruction, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2001,
2040-42 (2005) (noting that the Civil War was not a "legal" cause even though the events
that led to the war represented "constitutional failure").
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President James J. Buchanan, also a lawyer, noted at his inaugural
address on March 4, 1857, the pending case of Dred Scott v.
Sandford.2 4 9 Buchanan urged on Americans their duty to obey
the law. Whether the people of a territory may decide the issue of
the legality of slavery was:
[H]appily, a matter of but little practical importance. Besides, it is a
judicial question, which legitimately belongs to the Supreme Court
of the United States, before whom it is now pending, and will, it is
understood, be speedily and finally settled. To their decision, in
common with all good citizens, I shall cheerfully submit, whatever
this may be.2 5 °
Buchanan was ready to submit cheerfully because he already
knew the result, which would be delivered publicly two days later,
and knew that the Court's decision would not upset his southern
Democratic supporters. Dred Scott did not settle the issue 2 5 1 and
law and lawyers could not save the nation from a civil war. It was
unclear to lawyers of the time whether it was the law or the
Supreme Court that failed in Dred Scott. But neither a devotion to
ethics nor the rule of law was enough to avoid massive bloodshed.
F.

David Dudley Field and ProfessionalHonor
As noted above, the ABA's Canons of Ethics were drawn
heavily from the 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics. 2 5 2 A side-by-side
comparison of the two, found in Gilded Age Legal Ethics,2 5 3
shows this reliance. For example, provision 8 of the Code of
Ethics required lawyers to "uphold the honor, maintain the
dignity, and promote the usefulness of the profession."-2 5 4 Canon
29 asked lawyers to "uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity
of the profession and to improve not only the law but the

249. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
250. DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE 313 (1978) (quoting 4
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 2962 (James D. Richardson ed., 1913)).
251. See BRIAN MCGINTY, LINCOLN AND THE COURT 59 (2008) (noting Lincoln's

willingness to allow a Supreme Court decision to serve as policy only when "fully settled"
and concluding that Dred Scott was not "fully settled").
252. James Altman argues that the ABA Canons were more heavily influenced by
the Alabama Code of Ethics than Sharswood's Essay. James M. Altman, Considering the
A.B.A. 's 1908 Canons of Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2395, 2430-33 (2003).
253. GILDED AGE LEGAL ETHICS: ESSAYS ON THOMAS GOODE JONES' 1887 CODE

app. 3, at 110-32 (Carol Rice Andrews et al. eds., 2003).
254. Id. at 116.
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administration of justice."2 5 5 Provision 18 of the Code and ABA

Canon 19, on the propriety of a lawyer testifying as a witness for
his client, are nearly identical in wording.25 6
In addition to the Canons, the ABA also adopted in 1908 the
Field Code's oath of attorneys, although it changed several
provisions in the oath.2 57 For example, the 1850 Field Code oath
spoke of the duty to maintain actions "only as appear to him legal
and just, except the defence of a person charged with a public
offence."'25 8 This provision of the oath was also found in an oath

of attorneys of the State of Washington, which was the version of
the Field Code oath the ABA Committee reprinted in 1907.259
The oath adopted by the ABA was framed in the negative ("I will
not counsel or maintain"), and the exception language was "except
such as I believe to be honestly debatable under the law of the
land."' 2 60

The ABA's amended oath explicitly distanced itself

from Hoffman's certainty as sole judge of law, acknowledging the
uncertainty of much of law. The fourth oath of attorneys
concerned the propriety of maintaining causes, which the Field
Code required be "consistent with truth."' 2 61

The ABA Canons

added additional duties to two of the Field Code oaths: In addition
to preserving confidences and secrets, the lawyer was not
permitted to obtain compensation for legal services to a client
without the client's "knowledge and approval," and a lawyer was

255. Canons of Ethics, 33 A.B.A. REP. 575, 583 (1908).
256. GILDED AGE LEGAL ETHICS: ESSAYS ON THOMAS GOODE JONES' 1887 CODE

app. 3, at 120 (Carol Rice Andrews et al.eds., 2003). For additional examples, see James
M. Altman, Considering the A.B.A. 's 1908 Canons of Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2395,
2453-60 (2003), which highlights the similarities between the Canons of Ethics and the
Alabama Code of Ethics.
257. See Canons of Ethics, 33 A.B.A. REP. 575, 584-85 (1908) (providing an oath of

admission).
258. COMM'RS ON PRACTICE & PLEADINGS, THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF

THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 204 (Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co. 1850).
259. See Report of the Committee on Code of Professional Ethics, 31 A.B.A. REP. 676

app. D, at 714-15 (reprinting the oath of attorneys of the State of Washington in appendix
D).
260. Canons of Ethics, 33 A.B.A. REP. 575, 585 (1908). The ABA Code amended
the Field Code oath to require attorneys to maintain actions only as "consistent with truth
and honor," an addition consonant with the views of southern lawyers prominent in the

drafting of the Canons. Id.
261. COMM'RS ON PRACTICE & PLEADINGS, THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF

THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 204 (Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co. 1850).
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prohibited from delaying "any man's cause for lucre or malice." 2 6 2
ABA Canon 30 declared that a lawyer who accepts an
engagement has a "duty to insist upon the judgment of the [c]ourt
as to the legal merits of his client's claim."'2 63 That appeared to
resolve the debate between Hoffman and Sharswood (and others)
on the permissibility of making ethically dubious but legally
available claims in civil matters. Similarly, ABA Canon 5, which
permitted the criminal defense lawyer to "present every defense
that the law of the land permits," 2 6 4 inclined to Sharswood's
position. On the whole, however, the remarkable aspect of the
ABA Canons was their consonance with mid-nineteenth century
views of legal ethics. 2 6 5
Whether lawyers in fact behaved in 1900 as they claimed to
behave in 1850 is in some doubt. In 1868, David Dudley Field
represented the robber barons Daniel Drew, Jay Gould, and
"Diamond" Jim Fisk in the battle with Cornelius Vanderbilt for
control of the Erie Railway.2 6 6 When the courtroom "dustup"
was settled, "[t]he forty-one lawyers who had defended the Erie
and its directors received fees totaling $334,416, of which Field's
firm of four lawyers received $48,289. ' ' 267 In mid-1869, Gould and
Fisk attempted to use the Erie Railway to gain control of the
262. Canons of Ethics, 33 A.B.A. REP. 575, 585 (1908). In addition, one of the Field
Code's oaths was absent from both the Washington oath and the ABA Code: the Field
Code lawyer swore "[n]ot to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of
an action or proceeding, from any motive of passion or interest." COMM'RS ON PRACTICE
& PLEADINGS, THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 205
(Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co. 1850). This was instead addressed by the ABA in Canon
18. See Canons of Ethics,33 A.B.A. REP. 575, 580 (1908) (discussing the limitations on the
conduct of attorneys and clients with regard to one another).
263. Canons of Ethics, 33 A.B.A. REP. 575, 583 (1908).
264. Id. at 576.
265. See Carol Rice Andrews, Standards of Conduct for Lawyers: An 800-Year
Evolution, 57 SMU L. REV. 1385, 1442 (2004) (stating that the ABA Canons were similar
to the 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics and largely conformed with the "substance [and]
form of the existing standards of conduct").
266. A popular history of the Erie takeover war is JOHN STEELE GORDON, THE
SCARLET WOMAN OF WALL STREET (1988). The classic and contemporaneous account,
written by Charles F. Adams, Jr., is found in The Erie Railroad Row, 3 AM. L. REV. 41
(1868) and Charles Francis Adams, A Chapter of Erie, 109 N. AM. REV. 30 (1869). A
Chapter of Erie and other articles, including an article by Henry Adams, The New York
Gold Conspiracy, were collected and published as CHARLES F. ADAMS, JR. & HENRY
ADAMS, CHAPTERS OF ERIE, AND OTHER ESSAYS (Boston, James R. Osgood & Co.
1871).
267. GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS 8 (1997).
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Albany and Susquehanna Railroad.2 6 8
In the fall, Gould
attempted to corner the gold market. 2 6 9 Field, continuing to act
as a lawyer to both (but not, as Field later defended himself, as
either the sole counsel or even official counsel in all instances),
was loudly condemned for his actions.2 7 °
In October 1870,
members of the Association of the Bar of the City of New Yorkcalled the "Committee of Seventy"-began their efforts to initiate
the prosecution of William "Boss" Tweed, the notorious leader of
Tammany Hall in New York. 2 7 1
Field privately offered to
represent the Committee of Seventy without charge. After being
rebuffed by the Committee, in part due to his tarnished reputation,
Field accepted Tweed's renewed request to represent him, a
decision that again made Field anathema.2 7 2
Shortly thereafter, Samuel Bowles, the editor of the Springfield
(Mass.) Republican, published an article criticizing Field's "avarice
and meanness" and noting his reputation as "'king of the
pettifoggers.' 2 7 3 When Field complained to Bowles about the
268. See generally An Erie Raid, 112 N. AM. REV. 241 (1871) (providing an account
of the events).
269. See generally Henry Adams, The New York Gold Conspiracy, in CHARLES F.
ADAMS, JR. & HENRY ADAMS, CHAPTERS OF ERIE 100, 100-34 (Boston, James R.

Osgood & Co. 1871) (providing an account of the New York gold conspiracy). This essay
was originally published in 1870 in the Westminster Review.
270. See, e.g., Michael Schudson, Public, Private, and Professional Lives: The
Correspondence of David Dudley Field and Samuel Bowles, 21 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 191,
196-97 (1977) (listing some criticisms, including that of Judge E. Darwin Smith, that Field
and Thomas Shearman engaged in conspiracy to elect directors by use and abuse of legal
process, and an editorial by the New York Times implying Field was not an honest
lawyer). Criticisms made at the time are cited below.
271. On Tweed, see generally KENNETH D. ACKERMAN, BOSS TWEED (2005). See
also GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS 65-66 (1997) (highlighting the actions of

the "Committee of Seventy" in their effort to oust Tweed).
272. GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS 66-67 (1997). Most of Tweed's
$1,000,000 bail was posted by Jay Gould, another notorious Field client. Id. at 65.
273. DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, DUDLEY FIELD & SAMUEL BOWLES, THE LAWYER

AND HIS CLIENT 1 (Springfield, (Mass.), Republican Office 1871); see also ANDREW L.
KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 424 (2d ed. Little, Brown &
Co. 1984) (reprinting the statement from the Springfield Republican which noted the
nickname given to Field by James T. Brady and discussing whether Field was "'avaricious'
or 'mean"'). The article was republished in the New York Times in December 1870. The
entire correspondence can be found at The Barand the Press,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1871, at
1, available at http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9C02E1DE173AE63
BBC4850DFB766838A669FDE.
See also Michael Schudson, Public, Private, and
Professional Lives: The Correspondence of David Dudley Field and Samuel Bowles, 21
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 191, 197 n.10 (1977) (noting that the New York Times published the

correspondence between Field and Bowles). Calling Field "king of the pettifoggers" was
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characterization, Bowles wrote back and included a copy of an
editorial in the paper accusing Field of "prostituting the law." 27' 4
Bowles had some history with one of Field's most famous clients,
Jim Fisk. Two years before Bowles attacked Field, Fisk had sued
Bowles for libel in New York. Waiting until after the courts were
closed, Fisk had Bowles, then visiting New York City, arrested and
sent to jail for the night.27 5 Although Field had not effected
Bowles's arrest and his son Dudley Field had assisted in Bowles's
release from jail, Bowles had personal reasons for his antipathy
toward Field.
Three points are most intriguing about the Field-Bowles debate,
later printed in pamphlet form in different versions by the
correspondents. 27 6 First, Field's debating points both attempt to
about as insulting as Bowles could be to someone who became a lawyer in the 1820s. See
Emory Washburn, On the Legal Profession in New England, 19 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 49,
52 (1838) (noting in 1838 the legal profession faced the choice between "an enlightened,
educated, independent body of men, or a host of self-constituted, noisy and narrowminded pettifoggers"); see also PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA

135-36 (1965) (noting the claim by elite lawyers in the 1830s that pettifoggers brought the
profession "into contempt by their avarice and incompetence"); GEORGE SHARSWOOD,
A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND DUTIES OF THE PROFESSION OF THE LAW

80 (Philadelphia, T.& J.W. Johnson 1854) ("A horde of pettifogging, barratrous, customseeking, money-making lawyers, is one of the greatest curses, with which any state or
community can be visited."); TIMOTHY WALKER, INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN LAW
662-63 (2d ed. Cincinnati, Derby, Bradley & Co. 1846) (1837) ("Were I to concentrate in a
single word whatever I can conceive of despicable in our profession, it would be
pettifogging.").
274. DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, DUDLEY FIELD & SAMUEL BOWLES, THE LAWYER

AND HIS CLIENT 2 (Springfield, (Mass.), Republican Office 1871); see also ANDREW L.
KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 425-26 (2d ed. Little, Brown
& Co. 1984) (reprinting the statement from the Springfield Republican); Michael

Schudson, Public, Private,and ProfessionalLives: The Correspondenceof David Dudley
Field and Samuel Bowles, 21 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 191, 197 (1977) (noting the article

published in the Republican that accused Field of "'prostituting the law"').
275. See JOHN STEELE GORDON, THE SCARLET WOMAN OF WALL STREET 221
(1988) ("When [Bowles's] friends attempted to make bail for him, not a judge could be
found, for they were all off at a party in honor of the newly elected Mayor of New York,
A. Oakey Hall, where Fisk as well was enjoying himself.").
276. DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, DUDLEY FIELD & SAMUEL BOWLES, THE LAWYER
AND HIS CLIENT (Springfield, (Mass.), Republican Office 1871). Bowles's version is
found at The Bar and the Press, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1871, at 1, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9CO2E1DE173AE63BBC485ODFB76
6838A669FDE. A version presented by Field was published in the February 4, 1871
edition of the Albany Law Journal. See generally ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 424-44 (2d ed. Little, Brown & Co. 1984) (reprinting an
edited version of the letters); The Duties and Rights of Counsel, 3 ALB. L.J. 81 (1871)
(publishing the correspondence between Field and Bowles).
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replicate his statement of professional duty in his 1844 essay The
Study and Practice of the Law and elide the limitations on a
lawyer's conduct given by Field in that essay. Field argued "[i]t is
lawful to advocate what it is lawful to do."'2 7 7 However, that did
not mean that "the lawyer should know nobody but his client,"
thus echoing his rejection in 1844 of Lord Brougham's ethic of
advocacy. 278 For Field, giving a client what lawfully was available
to him and "knowing" only your client were easily distinguished.
Relatedly, a point of contention between Field and Bowles was
whether a lawyer was responsible for the conduct of his client. For
Field, "the lawyer is responsible, not for his clients, nor for their
27 9
causes, but for the manner in which he conducts their causes."
This, of course, clearly differed from his view in 1844 that "[t]he
true lawyer.., never prostitutes [his knowledge and eloquence] to
a bad cause."' 28 0 In an apparent attempt to craft consistency in his

thought, Field asserted that the American lawyer took matters in a
manner similar to the English barrister. The English barrister took
matters through a "cab rank" system-a first-come, first-served
system of representation. Charles Phillips defended Courvoisier in
1840 against the charge of murder based on this cab rank system.
What made Courvoisier's case even more difficult for Phillips was
not only the solicitor-barrister method of handling cases (the brief
was prepared by the solicitor but tried by the barrister, who met
the client just before trial commenced), but also the fact that
defendants in felony cases had enjoyed a right to counsel only
277. DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, DUDLEY FIELD & SAMUEL BOWLES, THE LAWYER

AND His CLIENT 9 (Springfield, (Mass.), Republican Office 1871) (reprinting the letter of
David Dudley Field to Samuel Bowles dated January 5, 1871); see also ANDREW L.
KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 434 (2d ed. Little, Brown &
Co. 1984) (reprinting the letter of January 5, 1871, from David Dudley Field to Samuel
Bowles).
278. Compare DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, DUDLEY FIELD & SAMUEL BOWLES, THE

LAWYER AND His CLIENT 9 (Springfield, (Mass.), Republican Office 1871) (reprinting the
letter of David Dudley Field to Samuel Bowles dated January 5,1871, and including the
statement "I do not assent to the theory of BROUGHAM that the lawyer should know
nobody but his client"), with The Study and Practice of the Law, 14 U.S. MAG. &

DEMOCRATIC REV. 345, 347-48 (1844) ("[T]o our view a more revolting doctrine
[Brougham's view that the lawyer should know no one but his client] scarcely ever fell

from any man's lips. We think it unsound in theory and pernicious in practice.").
279. DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, DUDLEY FIELD & SAMUEL BOWLES, THE LAWYER

AND HIS CLIENT 9 (Springfield, (Mass.), Republican Office 1871).
280. The Study and Practiceof the Law, 14 U.S. MAG. & DEMOCRATIC REV. 345, 351

(1844).
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since the passage of the Prisoners' Counsel Act in 1836.281 Field
defended his representation of Fisk and Gould by declaring, "I
know no better general rule than this: that the lawyer, being
intrusted by government with the exclusive function of
representing litigants before the courts, is bound to represent any
person who has any rights to be asserted or defended. ' 282 In 1844,
Field wrote, "It has been said ...that a lawyer is not at liberty to
refuse any one his services, and that when engaged he may
properly do all he can for his client."'2 83 Field followed that
statement with a rejection of the latter proposition: the advocate
2 84
was forbidden "to overlook the moral aspects of the claim."
Bowles did not call out Field's misstatement of the lawyer's duty of
representation with regard to civil matters, though others did.
Instead, he responded by acknowledging that Field's "technical"
defense meant that "I will not undertake to say, even, that you
have violated any prescript of the code professional. ' 28 5 Bowles's
lack of expertise led most lawyers, as 2George
Martin notes, to
86
conclude that "Field won the exchange."
Second, the Field-Bowles debate was the beginning, not the end,
281. See DAVID J.A. CAIRNS, ADVOCACY AND THE MAKING OF THE
ADVERSARIAL CRIMINAL TRIAL, 1800-1865 app. at 181 (1998) (reprinting the Prisoners'

Counsel Act of 1836 in appendix 1.1).
282. ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 434

(2d ed. Little, Brown & Co. 1984) (reprinting the letter of January 5, 1871, from David
Dudley Field to Samuel Bowles).
283. The Study and Practiceof the Law, 14 U.S. MAG. & DEMOCRATIC REV. 345, 347
(1844). George Sharswood made the similar claim with regard to criminal defense in his
1854 A Compend of Lectures: "The courts are in the habit of assigning counsel to prisoners
who are destitute, and who request it; and counsel thus named by the court, cannot, with
professional propriety, decline the office." GEORGE SHARSWOOD, A COMPEND OF
LECTURES

ON THE

AIMS

AND DUTIES

OF THE

PROFESSION

OF THE

LAW

31

(Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1854).

284. The Study and Practiceof the Law, 14 U.S. MAG. & DEMOCRATIC REV. 345, 348
(1844).
285. DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, DUDLEY FIELD & SAMUEL BOWLES, THE LAWYER

AND HIS CLIENT 10 (Springfield, (Mass.), Republican Office 1871); see also ANDREW L.
KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 434 (2d ed. Little, Brown &
Co. 1984) (reprinting letter of January 10, 1871, from Samuel Bowles to David Dudley
Field).
286. GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS 56 (1997); see, e.g., Albert

Stickney, The Lawyer and His Clients, 112 N. AM. REV. 392, 396 (1871) ("And it must, it
would seem, be admitted that Mr. Bowles does not make a very strong case."); More
About Legal Morality, THE NATION, Feb. 2, 1871, at 70, 71 ("Mr. Bowles, being a layman,
and not conversant with the facts, is forced to fire at long range, or, in other words, deal
largely in generalities, and fall back on common reports as his authority.").
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of the charges against Field.
Shortly after the pamphlet
publication of the Field-Bowles debate, several lawyers and others
challenged Field's conduct as counsel for Gould and Fisk in widely
circulated publications. The Nation criticized Field's conduct in a
January 26, 1871 article.2 87 Francis Barlow, a thirty-six-year-old
lawyer, wrote three long letters printed in Horace Greeley's New
York Tribune from March 7-9, 1871, which were later published in
pamphlet form as Facts for Mr. David Dudley Field.2 88 Albert
Stickney, just twenty-eight years old, wrote a thirty-page article
published in the April 1871 North American Review critically
reviewing the published correspondence between Field and
Bowles, and strongly criticizing Field's professional conduct.28 9 In
a January 19, 1871 letter to Bowles, Field claimed that "[a]ll the
persons to whom I have shown the correspondence, and all the
letters I have received concerning it, give me the assurance, that
my course is approved. Please get, if you can, one respectable
lawyer or judge to say that I am wrong."'2 90 Barlow took up the
challenge. In his closely reasoned letters, he offered a number of
facts that suggested Field had engaged in fraudulent conduct on
behalf of his clients. In his third letter (written March 3, 1871 and
published March 9), Barlow also noted that published letters to the
editor "from writers on legal ethics" were written at a level of
abstraction that made them irrelevant to any conclusion regarding

287. Forensic Ethics, THE NATION, Jan. 26, 1871, at 56, 56 (examining the proper
roles and responsibilities of attorneys in the aftermath of the Erie Railroad scandal).
Additional articles in The Nation were published as More About Legal Morality, THE
NATION, Feb. 2, 1871, at 70, Bench and Bar of New York, THE NATION, Feb. 9, 1871, at
91, and Our "UprightJudiciary," THE NATION, Mar. 2, 1871, at 140. A response to these
articles, Some Facts for the Nation, was written by Field's co-counsel Thomas Shearman
and published in the March 10, 1871 issue of the Albany Law Journal. See generally T.G.
Shearman, Some Factsfor the Nation, 3 ALB. L.J. 217 (1871) (providing a response).
288. FRANCIS C. BARLOW, FACTS FOR MR. DAVID DUDLEY FIELD (Albany, Weed,

Parsons & Co. 1871). A subtitle was Supplement to Field's and Bowles' Correspondence.
Barlow was a major general in the Civil War. See GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND
CONFLICTS 57 (1997) (describing the letters written by Barlow, as well as his role as major

general during the Civil War).
289. See generally Albert Stickney, The Lawyer and His Clients, 112 N. AM. REV. 392
(1871) (providing a critical review of Field and his correspondence with Bowles). In the
same issue was Charles F. Adams's An Erie Raid. See generally An Erie Raid, 112 N. AM.
REV. 241 (1871) (providing an account of the Erie raid).
290. DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, DUDLEY FIELD & SAMUEL BOWLES, THE LAWYER

AND HIS CLIENT 18 (Springfield, (Mass.), Republican Office 1871).
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the propriety of Field's actions. 29 1 Field's lengthy response,
written on March 11, began with a defense of professional
consensus, claiming that "three counsel of unquestionable ability,
integrity and honor" had all agreed that Judge Smith's conclusion
that the parties in the Albany and Susquehanna litigation had
engaged in fraudulent conduct was "erroneous in every material
' 2 Field went so far as to suggest an
part, either in fact or in law." 29
expert on legal ethics validated his role, publishing a letter from
George Sharswood intended to justify his conduct.2 9 3 In May of
1871, George Ticknor Curtis published a defense of Field's
conduct. Curtis's lengthy (over 100 printed pages) and turgid
defense of all of Field's actions concerning the attempted takeover
of the Albany and Susquehanna led to his conclusion that "no just
imputation of professional impropriety rests upon [Field or his
partners] on account of any such act or advice."'2 9 4 Curtis initiated
his investigation after an April 10, 1871 request of "an intimate
friend of Mr. David Dudley Field." 29' 5 His introductory note to
the published defense is dated May 10, 1871. What is astonishing
about the Field-Barlow debate is that a sixty-five-year-old lawyer,
possessed of an extraordinary income and well regarded for his
professional acumen (if not his personal demeanor), would find it
necessary to defend himself from charges made by young lawyers
not by standing on his personal honor, but by justifying his actions
Field was well-known for
through professional consensus.
responding to any perceived slight, which was in part why he
corresponded with both Bowles and Barlow. But it wasn't
sufficient merely to respond; Field wanted professional
291. FRANCIS C. BARLOW, FACTS FOR MR. DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 24 (Albany,

Weed, Parsons & Co. 1871).
292. Id. at 34-35.
293. Cf.id. at 70 (noting the publication of the letter by George Sharswood, but not
providing its location or date). I have not found the published letter, and the reference by
Barlow does not indicate the extent to which Sharswood's letter exculpated Field.
294. GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, AN INQUIRY INTO THE ALBANY &
SUSQUEHANNA RAILROAD LITIGATIONS OF 1869, AND MR. DAVID DUDLEY FIELD'S

CONNECTION THEREWITH 101 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1871); see also GEORGE
MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS 60 (1997) (noting the almost "unreadable" article,
which was likely part of the point).
&
INQUIRY INTO THE ALBANY
AN
TICKNOR CURTIS,
295. GEORGE
SUSQUEHANNA RAILROAD LITIGATIONS OF 1869, AND MR. DAVID DUDLEY FIELD'S

CONNECTION THEREWITH 2 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1871). There is no
indication that Curtis was intentionally biased, see GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND
CONFLICTS 60 (1997), but all inferences made by Curtis favored Field.
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corroboration and vindication.
George Sharswood's 1854 A Compend of Lectures equated
personal honor with professional honor: "Let it be remembered
and treasured in the heart of every student, that no man can ever
be a truly great lawyer, who is not, in every sense of the word, a
good man. ''2 96 Field's defense of his actions was premised on a
division of personal honor and professional honor. Even if Field
was charged with not being a good man, he believed he met the
test of being a great lawyer because his actions met the standard of
professional honor, as evidenced by the clean bill given him by
Curtis and others. The Field-Barlow debate thus offers evidence
of a transformation in legal ethics from an issue of personal honor
to one of the peculiarities and particularities of professional duty.
As a matter of professional duty, it would no longer do to read
Hoffman's fifty "Resolutions in Regard to Professional
Deportment," and even George Sharswood's references to honor
were largely irrelevant.
The third important aspect of the debate about Field's conduct
is found near the close of the Field-Barlow exchange. Barlow
noted in a March 20, 1871 letter that "[a]s concerns Mr. Field, I
shall take care that his conduct is investigated before a body of
men who cannot be deceived by small tricks and petty
evasions."' 297 Field understood this to mean an investigation
before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.
Barlow apparently did complain of Field's conduct with the
committee of grievances, but, as George Martin notes, no record
of its action was made then.2 9 8 But Barlow and others persisted,
and in an extraordinary meeting of the Association in December
1872, Field demanded a hearing and then defended his conduct "in
what was one of the longest and certainly one of the liveliest
speeches ever heard at an Association meeting."'29 9 He defended
himself on two grounds: first, his accusers were both ignorant and
corrupt; second, his actions were justified as professionally proper

296. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND DUTIES
OF THE PROFESSION OF THE LAW 94 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1854).
297. FRANCIS C. BARLOW, FACTS FOR MR. DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 68 (Albany,

Weed, Parsons & Co. 1871).
298. GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS 91-92 (1997).

299. Id. at 92.
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by "twelve lawyers and judges." 3 ° After Field finally finished,
the chairman of the grievance committee noted that the opinions
of the lawyers and judges "were just worth what was paid for
them."3 0 1 Both sides demanded a report from the committee, and
in early 1873, the Association "exonerated Field."' 3 0 2 Just over a
decade later, the Association asserted the authority to investigate
the conduct of "all lawyers practicing30in3 New York City whether
members of [the Association] or not."
The effort to continue to "professionalize" 3 04 the legal
profession assisted the movement from personal to professional
honor. The adoption in 1887 by the Alabama State Bar
Association of the first code of ethics of an organized bar
association was an acknowledgment of that shift. The references
to Sharswood (and to a lesser extent Hoffman) in the Alabama
Code (and later in the ABA's Canons of Ethics) as the basis for
the rules of ethics also attempted to reflect as banal the dynamic
changes to the legal profession from the end of the Civil War.
Thomas Goode Jones, the draftsman of the Alabama Code, was an
attorney for the powerful Louisville & Nashville Railroad before
his political career. Railroads, powerful corporations that could
buy the best legal services available throughout the South, were a
type of client largely unknown to lawyers in the antebellum era.30 5
With admission standards to the practice of law exceptionally
modest in most states even in the 1880s, and with the opportunity
for some lawyers to make large incomes through counseling and
litigation on behalf of powerful interests, the professional elite
needed some manner to justify the power lawyers were exercising
in the United States during the last two decades of the nineteenth
century. A code of ethics, particularly one that asserted continuity
300. Id. at 92-95, 97.
301. Id. at 99.
302. Id. at 100. Martin notes that the body at the next meeting moved to re-open the
issue, and it took yet another meeting for the members to reverse themselves and put the
charges against Field to rest. GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS 100-01 (1997).
303. MICHAEL J. POWELL, FROM PATRICIAN TO PROFESSIONAL ELITE 144 (1988).
304. See generally Stephen Lilley, The Hard Work of "Hard Work": The Legal Elite's
Rhetoric of Diligence and the Professionalizationof the Law, 1850-1920,17 WIDENER L.J.
145 (2007) (discussing generally the "professionalization" of the practice of law in the
United States from 1850 to 1920).
305. See WILLIAM G. THOMAS, LAWYERING FOR THE RAILROAD 7-8 (1999)
(noting Jones's position and the rise of corporate railroad lawyering in the South in the
1880s).
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in the history of the profession, was one approach.
When the Alabama State Bar Association adopted its Code of
Ethics in 1887, it adopted in section 13 a variant of the cab rank
rule in criminal cases: "An attorney can not reject the defense of a
person accused of a criminal offense, because he knows or believes
him guilty. It is his duty by all fair and lawful means to present
such defenses as the law of the land permits .... "306 This was
asserted by Sharswood in 1854 as part of the duty of an honorable
attorney.3 ° 7 But when the 1908 Canons were adopted, Canon 5
stated: "It is the right of the lawyer to undertake the defense of a
person accused of crime, regardless of his personal opinion as to
the guilt of the accused; otherwise innocent persons, victims only
of suspicious circumstances, might be denied proper defense. ' 30 8
Within the space of twenty years, the lawyer's role in criminal
cases changed from a duty to defend even those the lawyer
believed or knew were guilty of a crime to a right of the lawyer to
represent an accused, apparently to avoid the conviction of the
Charles Phillips had no choice but to represent
innocent.
Courvoisier. Even if Field's 1871 defense of his actions by
analogizing to the cab rank policy was insincere, he may have
believed it might persuade the public. But though Alabama
draftsman Judge Thomas Goode Jones was a member of the ABA
Committee on Code of Professional Ethics, a significant
reinterpretation of the duty of the lawyer in criminal cases had
occurred by the early twentieth century. The focus of the ABA
was on the lawyer's right to decide whether to represent a person
accused of a crime, which obliterated the duty to represent the
criminally accused. Canon 5 re-framed the relationship between
lawyer and criminally accused client, and the unintended consequence was its impact on the concept of zealous representation.
Sharswood and the Alabama Code (and maybe Field) assumed
that zealous representation of a person charged with a crime was
undertaken as part of one's duty to a properly functioning legal

306. Thomas Goode Jones, Code of Ethics, in GILDED AGE LEGAL ETHICS: ESSAYS
ON THOMAS GOODE JONES' 1887 CODE 45,50-51 (Carol Rice Andrews et al. eds., 2003).
307. See GEORGE SHARSWOOD, A COMPEND OF LEcTrURES ON THE AIMS AND
DUTIES OF THE PROFESSION OF THE LAW 31, 44 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1854)
(noting the duty of an appointed lawyer to defend his client in criminal cases and offer "all
fair arguments arising on the evidence").
308. Canons of Ethics, 33 A.B.A. REP. 575,576 (1908).
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system. 30 9 The Canons accepted zealous representation of a client
after the lawyer chose to take that person on as a client. These
were two very different matters. The latter approach, making it
the lawyer's choice, more closely entwined lawyer and client, for if
a lawyer chose to represent a "bad man," he did so voluntarily.
The older foundation, based on duty, avoided that difficulty, which
may be why Field made such an effort to couch his representation
of Boss Tweed, Jay Gould, and other repellent characters as a
matter of duty, not of right.
Even as Field's understanding of the lawyer's duty to his client
("It is lawful to advocate what it is lawful to do") became
commonplace in the last half of the nineteenth century, complaints
about the shift of law from a profession to a business were
regularly published at the turn of the century. 3 10 A number of
lawyers writing at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the
twentieth centuries emphasized the duty of the lawyer to remain
independent of the client, which was a consequence of the lawyer's
status as an "officer of the court." 3'1 1 Additionally, a number of
lawyers wrote books and articles assailing the shift of law from a
profession to a business, and they looked toward a return to that
golden age.3 1 2 Despite the efforts of lawyers to claim a continued
professionalism from the end of the Civil War to the turn of the
century, the deepest cut was the statement attributed to Jay
Gould, Field's former client: "'[B]rains were the cheapest meat in
the market.' 3 1 3
The materialistic conduct of lawyers was
criticized in a June 1905 speech at Harvard University by President
Theodore Roosevelt 3 1 4 and by Louis D. Brandeis in a speech

309. Cf Forensic Ethics, THE NATION, Jan. 26, 1871, at 56, 56 (noting the duty of a
lawyer both to his client and to the administration of justice).
310. See generally George F. Shelton, Law As a Business, 10 YALE L.J. 275 (1901)

(detailing the perceived shift of the practice of law from a profession to a business).
311. See Michael Ariens, Know the Law: A History of Legal Specialization, 45 S.C. L.

REV. 1003, 1013 n.46 (1994) (citing sources indicating that a lawyer is an "officer of the
court").
312. See id. at 1022-25 (listing sources that present a shift of law from a profession to

a business).
313. George F. Shelton, Law As a Business, 10 YALE L.J. 275, 276 (1901) (quoting
Jay Gould).
314. See Theodore Roosevelt, Address at Harvard University (June 28, 1905), in 4
THEODORE ROOSEVELT, PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES AND STATE PAPERS 407, 419-20

(1910) (criticizing lawyers for aiding the wealthy at the expense of the public interest).
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given in May.3 15 Later that year, the life insurance scandal in New
York drew more unwanted attention to the conduct of lawyers.3 16
Outgoing ABA President Henry St. George Tucker's address in
August 1905 to the members used Roosevelt's speech to urge
creation of a code of ethics,31 7 and after the address a motion was
made and adopted to create a committee, chaired by Tucker, to
report on "the advisability and practicability of the adoption of a
code of professional ethics by this Association."' 3 18 In August
1906, the Committee reported that a code of ethics was advisable
and practical. 3 19 Two years later, the ABA had joined the bar
associations of ten states by crafting provisions
of ethics meeting
32 0
the profession's conscious need to justify itself.
III.

THE MARCH TO MODERNITY

Our canons of ethics for the most part are generalizations designed
for an earlier era.
32 1
Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar

315. See The Opportunity in the Law, 39 AM. L. REV. 555, 555-63 (1905) (publishing
a May 4, 1905 speech by Louis Brandeis to the Harvard Ethical Society that criticizes the
materialistic conduct of lawyers).
316. See MORTON KELLER, THE LIFE INSURANCE ENTERPRISE, 1885-1910, at 24564 (1963) (detailing the scandal, the ensuing investigation, and the legislative response).
The legal counsel for the Armstrong Committee investigating the scandal was Charles
Evans Hughes, later both an Associate Justice and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
On Hughes's assessment of the scandal, see THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF
CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 121-27 (David J. Danelski & Joseph S. Tulchin eds., 1973). As
George Martin notes, "The problem for the legal profession in this [scandal] was
exemplified by [Elihu] Root, who was a director of Mutual Life." GEORGE MARTIN,
CAUSES AND CONFLICTS 198 (1997).

317. Henry St. George Tucker, Address of the President,28 A.B.A. REP. 299, 383-88
(1905).
318. Transactions of the Twenty-eighth Annual Meeting of the American Bar
Association, 28 A.B.A. REP. 3, 132 (1905).
319. Report of the Committee on Code of Professional Ethics, 29 A.B.A. REP. 600,
600-04 (1906).
320. Canons of Ethics, 33 A.B.A. REP. 575, 575-85 (1908).
321. Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10 (1934);
see also K.N. Llewellyn, The Bar's Troubles, and Poultices-and Cures?, 5 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 104, 115 (1938) ("The canons of ethics on business-getting are still built
interms of a town of twenty-five thousand (or, much more dubiously, even fifty thousand)
..

.
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Justice Stone's criticism of the Canons in 1934 reflected a
popular sentiment of the time. A 1927 article in Harper's
Magazine noted a "popular lack of faith in the honesty and the
integrity of the legal profession ' 3 22 in part because the Canons
were "largely a manual of polite behavior for lawyers."'3 2 3 Lawyer

Morris Gisnet, in a critical survey of the legal profession published
in 1931, concluded, "As for the Canons of Ethics, they certainly
have no relation whatever to business and to the life of the
community within which the lawyer functions."' 3 2 4

Journalist

Alexander Schlosser noted that Canon 12, which required
attorneys to charge reasonable fees, "gives members of the bar all
the justification they require to charge almost any fee they
choose."' 3 2 5 The investigation by Samuel Seabury from 1930 to

1932 of the magistrates' courts in New York City and the attorneys
who practiced there indicated an extraordinarily corrupt system,
implicating police officers, bail bondsmen, lawyers and judges.3 26
The discontent was serious enough to prompt the following
statement in 1936 from the ABA's largely quiescent Standing
Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances: "It is our belief
that the Canons as a whole should be restudied. A few of them are
probably in need of substantial change; several need clarification.
Any changes, however, that may be made should have as their
purpose the more faithful reflection of the prevailing views among
322. Newman Levy, Lawyers and Morals, HARPER'S MONTHLY MAG., Feb. 1927, at

288, 288. Levy was a New York lawyer.
323. Id. at 289. Levy also argued that the Canons' "emphasis is on manners rather
than morals." Id.
324. MORRIS GISNET, A LAWYER TELLS THE TRUTH 125 (1931); see also Norman
Thomas, Introduction to MORRIS GISNET, A LAWYER TELLS THE TRUTH 14 (1931) ("I do

not know any profession, not excepting the Christian ministry, in which the gap between
its ethical canons and the practice of its members is so wide and hypocrisy so great.").
Thomas was a famous (or notorious) Socialist of this time.
325. ALEXANDER L. SCHLOSSER, "LAWYERS MUST EAT" 21 (1933); see also id. at

52 (citing that nearly half of complaints filed against attorneys by clients dealt with
financial issues).
326. See generally IN THE MATTER OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THE MAGISTRATES'
COURTS IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT AND THE MAGISTRATES THEREOF, AND
OF ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW PRACTICING IN SAID COURTS: FINAL REPORT OF SAMUEL

SEABURY, REFEREE (1932), reprinted in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA (Arno Press
1974) (detailing the investigation by Samuel Seabury). On Seabury and his investigations
of the magistrate's court, and of the Tammany Hall-supported District Attorney and
Mayor Jimmy Walker, see generally HERBERT MITGANG, THE MAN WHO RODE THE
TIGER: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE SAMUEL SEABURY (1963), which details the

largest political corruption investigation in American municipal history.
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32 7
right-thinking lawyers."

At the same time, the ABA's Special Committee on Canons of
Ethics, in recommending its own abolition, noted the
"substantially universal approval" '32 8 of the Canons within the
profession.
In 1937, with the adoption of Canon 47 and
amendments to a number of Canons, the Standing Committee
concluded: "The Canons of Ethics, now adopted in most of the
states but sometimes with32 9slight modifications, are generally
believed to be satisfactory."
This schizophrenic attitude regarding the Canons of Ethics and
legal professionalism was common within the legal profession
during the 1930s. The successful adoption of the Canons as of
1920 by most voluntary bar associations and state courts only
made more prominent the defects in the system of lawyer
regulation.
Newman Levy urged a return by lawyers to
professional ideals because a society's ethical standards could
"never rise above that of its lawyers."' 330 Gisnet and Schlosser
criticized corruption in the profession. Professors Karl Llewellyn
and Adolf Berle criticized the large law firm, deriding it as a law
33 1
factory that made a lawyer "the paid servant of his client."
Members of the ABA urged greater professionalism through the
327. Report of the Standing Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, 61
A.B.A. REP. 699, 703 (1936).
328. Report of the Special Committee on Canons of Ethics, 61 A.B.A. REP. 797, 799
(1936).
329. Report of the Standing Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, 62
A.B.A. REP. 754, 759 (1937) (recommending amendments to Canons 27, 34, and 43).
330. Newman Levy, Lawyers and Morals, HARPER'S MONTHLY MAG., Feb. 1927, at
288, 294. Levy's comment echoed a statement made by David Dudley Field in his 1844
essay The Study and Practice of the Law: "The most intimate relation, in fact, subsists
between the character of the community and the character of the bar. An unscrupulous
bar could not exist among an upright, high-minded community; and if you find anywhere a
corrupt legal profession, you find it in the midst of a corrupt and corrupting people." The
Study and Practice of the Law, 14 U.S. MAG. & DEMOCRATIC REV. 345, 346 (1844); see
also Orrin N. Carter, Ethics of the Legal Profession,9 ILL. L. REV. 297, 303 (1914) ("While
it may be true, as sometimes charged, that an unscrupulous bar cannot exist in a highminded community, and is only found in the midst of a corrupt people, proper ethical
standards for the legal profession are far more readily obtained if the bar is composed of
persons of high character."). Carter's three-part essay was published in book form under
the same title in 1915.
331. A.A. Berle, Jr., Modern Legal Profession, in 9 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 340, 343 (Edwin R.A. Seligman et al. eds., 1933); K.N. Llewellyn, The
Bar Specializes-With What Results?, 167 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 177, 178
(1933).
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teaching of legal ethics in law schools, 3 3 2 and recommended
that
333
states include legal ethics as a bar examination topic.
In 1920, applicants to the bar found relatively few hurdles to
licensure, and mandatory bar associations were nonexistent.
Alfred Z. Reed reported that, as of 1917, thirty-six of forty-nine
jurisdictions required some period of study before applying for
admission to the bar, with twenty-eight states requiring three years
of preparation. 3 34 The states, by requiring some years of study
before an applicant took the bar, had not resolved the problem of
the "superficial" bar examination given by most states. The bar
examination of the 1910s, in Reed's view, failed "to weed out
either the more poorly prepared applicants from good law schools
of any type, or applicants who are unfit to practice because they
have been prepared in bad law schools."' 33 5 And, once a member
of the bar, the absence of any mandatory bar associations in 1920
made difficult the process of disbarment.3 36 The ABA noted the
332. See Association's Work at Memphis Summarized, 15 A.B.A. J. 740, 740 (1929)
(reporting approval of proposal "making Professional Ethics part of compulsory course in
law schools"); Report of the Standing Committee on ProfessionalEthics and Grievances, 54
A.B.A. REP. 397, 397 (1929) (recommending legal ethics be a required law school course
but noting no agreement to such by the Association of American Law Schools); see also
SUSAN K. BOYD, THE ABA's FIRST SECTION: ASSURING A QUALIFIED BAR 41 (1993)

(noting that 79% of AALS schools offered some ethics instructions and that 85% of nonAALS schools offered some instruction in legal ethics by 1931). The call for the teaching
of legal ethics in law school was also made nearly two generations earlier. See Charles F.
Chamberlayne, The Soul of the Profession, 18 GREEN BAG 396, 401 (1906) ("With good
reason have repeated committees of the American Bar Association recommended that
legal ethics be made part of each law school curriculum."); Report of the Committee on
Legal Education and Admission to the Bar, 20 A.B.A. REP. 349, 377 (1897) ("[Yjour
Committee has under consideration the desirability of instruction in the legal and moral
duties of lawyers ....
");Teaching Legal Ethics in Law Schools, 2 AM. L. SCH. REV. 377,
377-78 (1910) (listing thirty-two law schools where legal ethics was taught as part of a
regular course of study and twenty-eight schools where legal ethics was taught in one or
more lectures). See generally Bernard C. Gavit, Legal Ethics and the Law Schools, 18
A.B.A. J. 326 (1932) (discussing the drive to make legal ethics a subject of instruction in
law schools).
333. See Proceedings of the Fifty-sixth Annual Meeting of American Bar Association,
58 A.B.A. REP. 41, 94 (1933) (urging bar examiners to make legal ethics a bar examination
topic). This topic, like the topic of teaching legal ethics in law schools, was also a subject
of debate a generation earlier. See generally Should Candidatesfor Admission to the Bar
Be Examined on the Subject of Legal Ethics and ProfessionalDeportment?, 2 AM. L. SCH.
REV. 251 (1909) (offering largely affirmative replies of well-known members of the bar).
334. ALFRED ZANTZINGER REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE
LAW 91-92 (1921).
335. Id. at 409.
336. The first mandatory bar association was formed in North Dakota in 1921. North
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difficulty of disbarring lawyers for violations of the Canons, and
suggested the dominant reason for the apparent increase in ethical
lapses by attorneys was "an economic one," due to the large
increase in the number of lawyers. 33 7 Ten years later, the
situation was largely unchanged. Columbia Law School Dean
Young B. Smith noted that from 1929 to 1930, "only 45 of the 100
part-time and mixed [law] schools required as much as two years
of college work," and that 43,989 students were in law schools in
1930, compared with 24,503 in 1920 and 19,498 in 1910.338
By 1924, the ABA's Standing Committee on Professional Ethics
and Grievances noted that the Canons of Ethics had been
"approved and adopted by almost all of the state and local bar
associations of the country, and have been approved or quoted
with approval by many of the courts having jurisdiction of
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers."' 3 3 9 Even so, it urged the
ABA leadership to appoint a special committee to investigate the

Dakota Bar Takes Lead, 5 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 15, 15 (1921). The American
Judicature Society ceaselessly proselytized for mandatory bar associations during its first
quarter-century. See, e.g., Brief Survey of the Bar Integration Movement, 20 J. AM.
JUDICATURE SOC'Y 202, 202 (1937) (listing seventeen states with mandatory bar
associations and another eighteen states where members of the bar were advocating
mandatory bar associations); see also M. LOUISE RUTHERFORD, THE INFLUENCE OF THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ON PUBLIC OPINION AND LEGISLATION 33 (2004)

(describing the incorporation of bar associations in several states). The ABA's Section on
Professional Ethics and Grievances sent a questionnaire to judges in 1919 concerning "the
ethical standards of the profession in the United States." Report of the Committee on
Professional Ethics and Grievances, 45 A.B.A. REP. 270, 275 (1920). The Committee
noted that in "discipline cases the Bench is divided into two classes": those reluctant to
discipline lawyers, and those, using the Canons, more willing to say what was proper and
what was not. Id. at 282.
337. Report of the Committee on ProfessionalEthics and Grievances, 45 A.B.A. REP.
270, 280 (1920). The absence of a disciplinary mechanism in the Canons was noted at its
creation. See Charles A. Boston, A Code of Legal Ethics, 20 GREEN BAG 224, 225 (1908)
("The one further thing noticeable about the Codes of the various [s]tate [b]ar
[aissociations, is their complete silence as to sanctions."). The Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, a private, exclusive bar organization, had been ceded disciplinary
authority by the New York courts over all New York City lawyers as early as 1884. See
MICHAEL

J.

POWELL,

FROM

PATRICIAN

TO

PROFESSIONAL

ELITE:

THE

TRANSFORMATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION 144 (1988) (outlining

this assertion of power).
338. Young B. Smith, Law Schools and Lawyers, 18 A.B.A. J. 480, 481 (1932).
339. Report of the Standing Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, 49
A.B.A. REP. 466, 467 (1924); see also Report of the Committee on ProfessionalEthics and
Grievances, 45 A.B.A. REP. 270, 280 (1920) (citing cases basing discipline of lawyers on
violations of the Canons).
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supplementation and amendment of the Canons of Ethics. 340 The
1924 call for amendments and supplements to the Canons of
Ethics led to the adoption by the ABA in 1928 of thirteen
additional Canons. 3 4 ' With the exception of Canon 37 concerning

the duty of lawyers to maintain the confidences of client, most
concerned issues of the economics of the profession, including the
use of partnership names (33), dividing fees (34), control of the
lawyer's work by a lay intermediary (35), accepting compensation
from others without the client's consent (38), and the impropriety
of a lawyer paying for the expenses of the litigation (42). The
ABA's supplemental Canons used ethical strictures to bar
particular business methods. These methods of obtaining business
were adopted more often by non-elite lawyers and law firms than
by the elite lawyers who comprised most of the ABA's
membership. Maintaining this sense of legal professionalism
required the adoption of Canons attacking any perceived
encroachments of business methods (not "business") in the
profession of the law.
Between 1928 and the call for a new Code of Ethics in 1964,
only two Canons were added to the Canons of Ethics by thenABA President Lewis F. Powell. In 1933, the ABA added Canon
46, titled "Notice to Local Lawyers," and amended several original
Canons.3 4 2 In 1937, Canon 47 was adopted, barring lawyers from
aiding others in the unauthorized practice of law, along with a
number of additional amendments to existing Canons.3 4 3 Other

340. Report of the Standing Committee on Legal Ethics and Grievances, 49 A.B.A.
REP. 466, 468 (1924).
341. See Proceedings of the Fifty-first Annual Meeting of American Bar Association,
53 A.B.A. REP. 29, 119-20 (1928) (proposing the adoption of thirteen supplemental
Canons); Report of the Special Committee on Supplements to the Canons of Professional
Ethics, 53 A.B.A. REP. 495, 495 (1928) (proposing fourteen supplemental Canons and
noting discussion of the first proposed supplementary Canon, "Bonding the Integrity of a
Lawyer," was deferred).
342. See Proceedingsof the Fifty-sixth Annual Meeting of American Bar Association,
58 A.B.A. REP. 41, 155-78 (1933) (reporting the debate and vote on amendments and
adoption of Canon 46); Report of the Special Committee on Canons of Ethics, 58 A.B.A.
REP. 428, 428-30 (1933) (listing recommended changes to the Canons of Ethics).
343. See Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 62 A.B.A. REP. 216, 352 (1937)
(adopting the "entire supplementary report of the Committee," which included the
addition of Canon 47); Supplementary Report of the Standing Committee on Professional
Ethics and Grievances, 62 A.B.A. REP. 761, 761-67 (1937) (listing amendments to the
Canons of Ethics and recommending the adoption of Canon 47).
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344
than repeated amendments of Canon 27 concerning "law lists,"
the ABA largely left alone the Canons of Ethics. Even though the
ABA left the Canons intact, debate about the ethical precepts of
the legal profession regularly arose from the 1930s through the
1960s. But if the Canons were an anachronism by the 1930s, how
did they last through the 1960s?
The profession's elite concluded that the reason why so many
lawyers in the 1930s behaved unprofessionally was not due to the
"anachronistic" Canons; it was because too many persons had
been allowed into the profession. Consequently, despite the call
by Justice Stone and others, it wasn't the Canons that needed to be
reformed; it was entry into the profession. Beginning in 1928, well
before the onset of the Great Depression, lawyers began
complaining about the "overcrowded" bar.3 4 5 In a 1932 speech to
the Alabama State Bar, Robert H. Jackson, the future Supreme
Court Justice, urged reformation of bar associations for the
betterment of society and the profession. The failure to do so, he
suggested, might lead to "economic demoralization" in the legal
profession: "It takes no delirious vision to see that increasing
numbers and decreasing income may produce such competition as
will overrule all ethical restraints as it has in some lines and in
some localities already."'3 46 The formation of the National
Conference of Bar Examiners (NCBE) in 1931 was intended in
part to use the bar examination to control "overcrowding" in the
profession.3 4 7 In the first issue of the Bar Examiner, a publication

344. See, e.g., Report of the Special Committee to Study the Matter of Amendment to
Canon27, 76 A.B.A. REP. 437, 437 (1951) (recommending the amendment of Canon 27).
345. See Lloyd K. Garrison, A Survey of the Wisconsin Bar, 10 WIS. L. REV. 131, 134

(1935) (noting the history of the claim).
346. Robert H. Jackson, An Organized American Bar, 18 A.B.A. J. 383, 386 (1932).

Jackson's allusion was particular to New York City, where lawyer Samuel Seabury's
investigations had made a major impact. In a 1954 study of American lawyers, Albert
Blaustein and Charles Porter noted the correlation between complaints of unethical
lawyer conduct and economic conditions.

ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & CHARLES 0.

PORTER, THE AMERICAN LAWYER 258 (1954). Blaustein and Porter compared the
number of complaints to the Chicago Bar Association in the 1920s with complaints in the
1930s and 1940s. Id. They found that complaints rose from an average of 375 in the 1920s
to a high of 952 during 1933 and 1934 and retreated to an average of 174 during 1942 to
1948. Id.
347. See Editorial, 1 B. EXAMINER 211, 211 (1932) ("The present situation
emphasizes the overcrowded condition of the bar."); Philip J. Wickser, Ideals and
Problemsfor a National Conference of Bar Examiners, 1 B. EXAMINER 4, 7 (1931) ("We

know, for instance, that the Bar, today, is overcrowded, and is becoming more so.");
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of the NCBE, an article arguing that an increase of 31% in the
number of lawyers between 1920 and 1930, compared with an
increase of just 16% of the population during the same time,
proved the bar was overcrowded. 34 8 In 1933, Professor Herschel
Arant, in his foreword to his Cases and Materials on the American
Bar and Its Ethics,3 49 wrote:
The editor has assumed that the legal profession is overcrowded and
is of the opinion that most of the problems which confront the
profession and most of the legitimate complaint against it result
from this fact. He also believes that the solution of the problem is a
decrease in the ratio of lawyers to population.3 50
Columbia Law School Dean Young B. Smith linked a lack of
ethical behavior of attorneys to the fact that "about twice as many
new lawyers [are] admitted annually as are needed. ' 351 When
University of Wisconsin Law School Dean Lloyd Garrison
suggested in 1935 that an empirical study of Wisconsin lawyers
indicated that the bar was not overcrowded, 2 the response of
several bar associations was to point to surveys suggesting
Editorial, Overcrowded Occupations, SAT. EVENING POST, July 15, 1933, reprinted in 2 B.
EXAMINER 267, 267-68 (1933) (lamenting the overcrowded legal profession); see also
SUSAN K. BOYD, THE ABA's FIRST SECTION: ASSURING A QUALIFIED BAR 38 (1993)
(quoting former chairman of NCBE that "the main emphasis of the bar [in 1931] was on
limitation, on overcrowding").
348. Some Random Thoughts About the Lawyer-Population Tables, 1 B. EXAMINER
255, 255 (1932).
349. HERSCHEL WHITFIELD ARANT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE AMERICAN

BAR AND ITS ETHICS (1933).

350. Id. at iii-iv. As noted in the Bar Examiner, the percentage of successful bar
examinees declined from 52.7% in 1928 to 46.4% in 1930. Will Shafroth, Bar Examiners
and Examinees, 1 B. EXAMINER 1, 4 (1931). By 1932, the overall passing rate nationwide
was down to 45%, which the author called "severe." Will Shafroth, The 1932 Bar
Examination Statistics, 2 B. EXAMINER 210, 210 (1933).
351. Young B. Smith, Law Schools and Lawyers, 18 A.B.A. J. 480, 481 (1932).
352. Lloyd K. Garrison, Results of the Wisconsin Bar Survey, 8 AM. L. SCH. REV. 116,
118 (1936); Lloyd K. Garrison, A Survey of the Wisconsin Bar, 10 WIS. L. REV. 131, 147
(1935) ("The general conclusion ... is that in Wisconsin since 1880 the volume of legal
business and the opportunities for lawyers have increased much more rapidly than the
increase either of the lawyers or of the population, and ... the need of the community for
his services is more favorable than at any time prior to 1932."). See generally Lloyd K.
Garrison, The Problem of Overcrowding: A Call for Imagination, Experimentation and
Organization,16 TENN. L. REV. 658 (1941) (detailing the conditions of the legal profession
at that time). Francis M. Shea wrote a trenchant analysis attacking the overcrowded thesis
on grounds of ethnic discrimination and as contrary to the democratization of the bar in
Francis M. Shea, Overcrowded?-The Price of Certain Remedies, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 191
(1939).
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35 3
overcrowding had caused lawyer income to fall precipitately.
The claim that the legal profession was overcrowded was the
trigger used to increase standards in legal education and
admissions to the bar. In 1929, the nationwide passing rate on the
bar examination was 51%.11 4 From 1930 through 1938, the
nationwide passing rate on the bar examination ranged from a low
of 45% (1932) to a high of 48% (four separate years). The
national passing rate finally reached more than half (51%) in
1939. 35 1 In New York, the state with by far the greatest number
of bar examinees, the passing rate during the 1930s ranged from a
low of 32% in 1932 to a high of 47% in 1939.356 Nationally, the
percentage of persons admitted to the bar through the diploma
privilege exceeded 10% only twice during the 1930s, and ordinarily
ranged from 5%_-9%.357 By successfully attacking the diploma
privilege and reducing the passing rate for bar examinees, the
annual absolute number of new members of the profession
declined from 9,860 in 1930 to 7,942 in 1940, even as the total
population increased by nearly nine million.35 8
During the same time, the route to eligibility to the bar
narrowed, as bar admission standards were transformed. By 1939,
nine states had abolished preparation for the bar through law

353. See Report of the Special Committee on the Economic Condition of the Bar, 62

A.B.A. REP. 869, 872 (1937) (repeating the conclusion of the 1936 report of the New York
County Lawyers Association that "[o]vercrowding is largely responsible for" the low pay
of lawyers). The Special Committee was initially chaired by Garrison, who sought to
create a survey manual to be used by local bar associations to determine the economic
situation of its lawyers. See id. at 869 (recommending that "the plan for preparing,
publishing and distributing a manual ... be approved"). Garrison left the Committee, and
by 1940 the Committee noted that its feeble efforts were indefinitely stalled by the
eruption of World War II.
354. Will Shafroth, Bar Examiners and Examinees, 1 B. EXAMINER 1, 4 (1931).

355. Percentages-1937to 1939, 9 B. EXAMINER 40, 40 (1940).
356. Id.; Recent Bar Examination Results, 1 B. EXAMINER 260, 260 (1932). Part of
the variation in bar passage rates may be attributed to varying degrees of discrimination
against Jews, who between 1930 and 1934 made up 80% of new bar admissions in New
York City, and made up 50% of new bar admissions for the remainder of the decade.
Robert W. Gordon, The American Legal Profession, 1870-2000, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE
HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 73, 78 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds.,
2008).
357. These data were assembled from annual reports on bar examination statistics
published in volumes 1-10 of the Bar Examiner.

358. These data were assembled from annual reports on bar examination statistics
published in volumes 1-10 of the BarExaminer.
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office study, 35 9 and in twenty-three jurisdictions, graduates of law
schools not approved by the ABA were ineligible to take the bar
examination.3 6 0 In 1925, just two states required an applicant to

the bar to possess a minimum of two years of college study before
entering law school. 3 6 1 By 1939, thirty-eight states, the District of
Columbia, and the territory of Hawaii had adopted laws requiring
applicants to the bar to have completed two years of college work
before entering law school.3 6 2 Eliminating the apprenticeship

system, declaring ineligible for the bar exam graduates of law
schools not approved by the ABA, and requiring two years of
college all raised the financial barriers to entry to the legal
profession and caused a substantial drop in student enrollment in
law schools. The total student enrollment in law schools in 1928
was 46,397. Of that total, 31,319 were part-time or evening
division law students. 3 6 3 By 1939, total enrollment in law schools

359. Progress in Admission Standards, 8 B. EXAMINER 15, 15 (1939); see also
RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 42 (1989) (noting forty-four jurisdictions
allowed applicants to the bar to prepare for the profession through law office study).
360. Progress in Admission Standards, 8 B. EXAMINER 15, 15 (1939). The states
lacking a requirement of college study were South Dakota, Oklahoma, Arkansas,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Kentucky, Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina.
Id. at 16
(showing map of states). Maryland adopted a two-year requirement later in 1939, which
was effective for students entering law school on June 1, 1941, or later. Id. at 57. By 1947,
only Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, and Louisiana did not require two years of pre-law
college work. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM
THE 1850S TO THE 1980S, at 217 n.9 (John D. Cushing et al. eds., 1983). At least fifteen
jurisdictions barred entry to the legal profession through an apprenticeship by 1947. Id.
361. See Alfred Z. Reed, Legal Education, 1925-1928, U.S. OFF. EDUC. BULL., No.
31 (1929), reprintedin 6 AM. L. SCH. REV. 765, 773 (1930) (noting two states required two
years of college work before entering law school in 1925 and five did so in 1928). The twoyear pre-law requirement was a proposal of the ABA's Root Committee in 1921. See
Report of the Special Committee to the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the
Bar of the American Bar Association, 46 A.B.A. REP. 679, 683 (1921) ("We ... advocate
requiring at least two years of study in a college."). An early proponent of the two-year
requirement was Northwestern University Law School Dean John H. Wigmore, as
apparent in John H. Wigmore, Should the Standard of Admission to the Bar Be Based on
Two Years or More of College-GradeEducation?It Should, 4 AM. L. SCH. REV. 30 (1915).
362. Progress in Admission Standards, 8 B. EXAMINER 15, 15-16 (1939); see, e.g.,
Maryland Is the Forty-First State, 8 B. EXAMINER 57, 57 (1939) (noting adoption by
Maryland of two years of study in college, or thirty-six credit hours, for students entering
law school on June 1, 1941, or later).
363. ALFRED Z. REED, CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
TEACHING, REVIEW OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA FOR
THE YEAR 1932, at 29 (1933). Alfred Z. Reed was also the author of Trainingfor the
Public Profession of the Law.
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was 34,539,364 a decline of over 25%. The decline in the number

of law students reflected in part the decline of the unapproved law
schools. In 1928, sixty-six law schools met the standards set forth
in 1921 by the ABA's Root Committee, just 38% of the total
number of law schools.365 In 1937, the majority of law students
were enrolled in ABA-approved schools.3 6 6 Six years earlier, just
44% of all law students had been enrolled in law schools that met
ABA standards.3 67 The number of law schools appears to have
peaked at 204 in 1934, of which eighty-eight met ABA
standards.36 8 In 1939, 180 law schools existed, of which 102 met
ABA standards. 36 9
Finally, by 1939, forty states had adopted the Root Committee
recommendation that training in law be three years of full-time
education. 370 The adoption of this standard for all applicants to
the bar negated any savings in time for those choosing to enter the
bar through an apprenticeship; concomitantly, it implicitly
suggested that those not attending law school were at a
disadvantage in terms of preparing for the bar examination. In
1938, Arthur Vanderbilt linked the increasing standards of legal
education and admission to the bar with the initial movement to
formulate the Canons of Ethics. 37 1 Both avenues increased legal
professionalism, and one could be used in place of the other to
achieve that professionalism.
364. ContinuedDecrease in Law School Enrollment, 10 B. EXAMINER 11, 11 (1941).
365. ALFRED

Z.

REED,

CARNEGIE

FOUND.

FOR

THE

ADVANCEMENT

OF

TEACHING, REVIEW OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA FOR
THE YEAR 1932, at 29 (1933).
366. James Grafton Rogers, Address of the Chairman of the Section on Legal
Education, 8 AM. L. SCH. REV. 919, 919 (1937) ("[T]he majority of law students in the
United States [are] in schools approved by the American Bar Association.").
367. ALFRED Z. REED, CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
TEACHING, REVIEW OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA FOR

THE YEAR 1932, at 29 (1933).
368. ANNUAL REVIEW OF LEGAL EDUCATION FOR 1935, at 31 (Will Shafroth ed.,
1935). The 1934 Annual Review listed 199 law schools, but the count by a different editor
a year later indicated five schools were inadvertently omitted. Id.
369. ANNUAL REVIEW OF LEGAL EDUCATION FOR 1938, at 11 (Supp. 1940).
370. John Kirkland Clark, Standards of Bar Admission, 8 B. EXAMINER 13, 14

(1939); see Report of the Special Committee to the Section of Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar of the American Bar Association, 46 A.B.A. REP. 679, 684 (1921)
("A three years full-time course, then, is the desideratum.").
371. Arthur T. Vanderbilt, The Chief Problems Confronting the Bar and the
Responsibilities of Our Law Schools with Respect Thereto, 8 AM. L. SCH. REV. 1031, 1033
(1938).
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The onset of American entry into World War II beginning in
early 1942 rapidly emptied American law schools of their students.
The ABA's Special Committee on the Economic Condition of the
Bar, created in January 1937 in response to the cry of
overcrowding,3 72 did very little after Dean Lloyd Garrison left the
Committee. It finally went out of business in 1945, because
lawyers no longer seriously claimed that the bar was
overcrowded.3 73 As of March 1, 1948, only 159 law schools were
in business, of which 111 were ABA-approved.3 7 4 Just 6,782
persons were admitted to the bar in the United States in 1947, and
while that number doubled to over 13,000 during the following
three years, the number of newly admitted attorneys fell below
10,000 by 1954. 3 7 5 Finally, fifteen jurisdictions prohibited law
office study to prepare for admission to the bar by 1947.376
IV.

FROM A GOLDEN AGE TO AN AGE OF ANXIETY

We locate this golden age in the period of the late 1950s and the
early 1960s--let us call it "circa 1960"-when big firms were
prosperous, stable, and untroubled.
MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY,
377
TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS

372. Summary of Proceedings of the Second Meeting of the House of Delegates, 62
A.B.A. REP. 1026, 1030 (1937).
373. House of Delegates Proceedings, 70 A.B.A. REP. 119, 119 (1945). As late as
August 1942, the Committee warned that "unless a solution can be found for the economic
problems of the bar, the leadership which this country should have will be seriously
imperiled." Report of the Special Committee on the Economic Condition of the Bar, 67
A.B.A. REP. 248, 250 (1942).
374. RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 278 tbl.21 (1989); SECTION OF
LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS'N, LAW SCHOOLS AND BAR
ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 26 (1948).
375. RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 278 tbl.21 (1989). The post-World
War II high was 13,641 in 1950. Id.
376. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE
1850S TO THE 1980s, at 217 n.9 (1983).
377. MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS 20 (1991).
Galanter and Palay were well aware of the shortcomings of the legal profession in 1960,
including the paucity of minority and female lawyers. Id. at 25; see also MARY ANN
GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 22 (1st paperback ed. 1996) (1994) (quoting
Galanter and Palay and agreeing with their "golden age" conclusion); RICHARD A.
POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 60 (1995) ("With the benefit of hindsight, 1960 can be
identified as the highwater mark of the American legal profession's cartel, and hence of
jurisprudence as a guild ideology.").
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A. Introduction

Not only were big law firms untroubled in 1960, the ordinary
American lawyer prospered despite complaints from lawyers then
that doctors earned substantially more money than lawyers. 37 8
Lawyers were confident that they had a leading role to play in
American society, and others told them SO. 3 7 9 The 1958 effort
creating Law Day was one example of this confidence, as was the
ABA's effort to create World Peace through Law. 3 80 Lawyers
dismissed critics of the legal profession as either misguided or
envious, and reacted with surprise at expressions of mistrust of the
profession by a minority of the public. The profession's sense of
role and status was comfortable and comforting.
"Between 1961, when [Ingrid] Beall became Baker, McKenzie's
first woman partner, and 1988, when the door of the inner sanctum
was slammed in her face, an entire network of professional
understandings had fallen apart."' 38 1 One of the things that fell
apart in the American legal profession was the role of codes of
Internally, the
ethics, both internally and externally.
understanding of an ethics code shifted from an expression of
ethical norms based on a moral tradition to one of regulatory
378. See, e.g., John C. Satterfield, The American Bar Association Takes a Look at the
Economic Status of the Legal Profession, 44 A.B.A. J. 156, 156 (1958) ("The alarming
failure of the legal profession to maintain an economic status comparable to that of other
professions ...has caused President Charles S. Rhyne to appoint a Special Committee to
study the economic condition of the Bar in the United States and the business phases of
").
the practice of law ....
379. See TALCOTr PARSONS, A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession, in ESSAYS
IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 371 (3d ed. 1963) (reprinting a paper given at the University
of Chicago Law School symposium on December 4, 1952). Parsons's essay was a largely
favorable assessment of the profession. Id. at 371-72.
380. The first Law Day was May 1, 1958, pursuant to a Presidential Proclamation
dated February 3, 1958, by Dwight D. Eisenhower at the behest of ABA President Charles
S. Rhyne. Jason Krause, Charlie Rhyne's Big Idea, A.B.A. J., May 2008, at 65; The
President's Proclamation, 44 A.B.A. J. 343, 343 (1958). Law Day became law in 1961.
Pub. L. No. 87-20, 75 Stat. 43 (1961) (codified as amended at 36 U.S.C. § 113 (1998)). See
generally Charles S. Rhyne, World Peace Through Law, 83 A.B.A. REP. 624 (1958)
(printing President Rhyne's annual address espousing world peace through law). The
Special Committee on World Peace Through Law was created by ABA President Rhyne
that year. Nearly two decades later, Rhyne was still involved in this movement, although
it no longer was a special committee of the ABA. See generally Charles S. Rhyne, World
Peace Through Law: What's Happening, 63 A.B.A. J. 224 (1977) (discussing the World
Peace Through Law Center's activities).
381. MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 24 (1st paperback ed.
1996) (1994).
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prohibitions inscribed in law or a law-like manner. Externally, the
legal profession abandoned its effort to use a code of legal ethics
as a bulwark against charges of mercenary and materialist
behavior. This section assesses the changes in the legal profession
from the late 1940s through the late 1980s that contributed to this
transformation.
B. The Golden Age
Harold Hyman's magisterial biography of the Houston law firm
of Vinson and Elkins (V&E) 38 2 offers insight into the history of
promotion to partner path in the firm. Founding partner "Judge"
James Elkins controlled who became a partner and when from
V&E's creation in 1917 to the early 1960s. Although the
partnership "track" averaged about ten years during Elkins's
reign, some associates waited more than two decades for the call,
and in the late 1950s Elkins halted the promotion of associates to
partner.3 8 3 It was not until after a showdown with Elkins in 1965
that the senior partners managed to promote longstanding
associates to partner. By 1970, V&E had moved to a seven-year
partnership track.38 4 In other cities the length of time to
partnership in large law firms was about ten years during the
1950s, but shortened to about seven years by the end of the
1960s. 385 Robert Nelson's study of Chicago lawyers found that
the partnership track lessened in the postwar era. He found the
length of time to partner ranged from 7.5 years during the 1950s to
5.64 years in the late 1970s, although that shorter time frame may
be a bit misleading. Chicago law firms, more so than most other
large law firms, had adopted a dual partnership track by 1980,
meaning lawyers spent two to three years as non-equity partners
before obtaining an ownership percentage in the firm.3 86 Bar
admissions reached 13,641 in 1950, but declined to 10,976 in 1953.
382. HAROLD M. HYMAN, CRAFTSMANSHIP AND CHARACTER: A HISTORY OF THE
VINSON & ELKINS LAW FIRM OF HOUSTON, 1917-1997 (1998).

383. Id. at 290-93.
384. See id. at 346 (noting the long-awaited 1965 promotions of associates to partners,
and indicating that the "'class of '63' became partners within seven years... by 1970").
385. MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS 27 (1991)

(citing ERWIN SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER 79 (1964)).
386. See ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER 141 (1988) (noting both the
length of time necessary to make partner in Chicago law firms and the dual partnership
structure started in the 1980s).

2008] AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS IN ANA GE OFANXIETY

421

It wasn't until 1964 that more persons were admitted to the bar.3 8 7
A study in 1965 indicated that billable hours for associates ranged
from 1400 to 1600 and billable hours for partners ranged from 1200
to 1400.388

The golden age for lawyers ran for about a quarter-century,
roughly from shortly after the end of World War II to the early
1970s. 3 8 9 During this time, the demand for the work lawyers
performed outstripped supply. 390 In the 1940s, the demand for
legal services increased 86%, while supply increased 12%.391 In
the 1950s, demand increased by 76% and supply by 35%.392
Lawyer income rose.3 9 3 Economist B. Peter Pashigian, while
noting the limitations of historical data, concluded that actual
earnings of lawyers in the 1960s and early 1970s significantly
exceeded his calculation for equilibrium earnings.39 4 There is
some evidence that, as earnings rose, the number of hours billed
by lawyers declined during the 1960s through the early 1970s.3 9 5
By the mid-1970s, however, a slowing economy and a rapidly
increasing supply of lawyers reduced the surplus capital held by
lawyers.3 9 6 Partner income stalled, with one survey indicating
387. RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 278-79 (1989) (indicating the
number of bar admissions for 1931-1986 in table 21).
388. WILLIAM G. Ross, THE HONEST HOUR 2-3 (1996).
389. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 160 (1989) (discussing the history
of the economic status of American lawyers).
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id. B. Peter Pashigian suggests that the number of lawyers in the 1950s was
"close to long-run equilibrium," and that as a result, the real income of lawyers did not
substantially exceed the equilibrium income during that time. B. Peter Pashigian, The
Number and Earnings of Lawyers: Some Recent Findings,1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 51,
73. Pashigian concluded that demand outstripped supply in the 1960s. See id. (comparing
three independent tests for legal earning, depreciation rates and numbers of lawyers over
time).
393. RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 160 (1989).

394. B. Peter Pashigian, The Number and Earnings of Lawyers: Some Recent
Findings, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 51, 62-63, 67.
395. MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS 56 (1991)
(citing PAUL HOFFMAN, LIONS IN THE STREET: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE GREAT

WALL STREET FIRMS 130-31 (1973)).

396. See Thomas D. Morgan, Economic Reality Facing 21st Century Lawyers, 69
WASH. L. REV. 625, 628 (1994) (updating Pashigian's data and suggesting excess supply of
lawyers was not found until the late 1980s); see also Thomas D. Morgan, Creating a Life
As a Lawyer, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 37, 42 (2003) (estimating an excess supply of lawyers of
20%); Thomas D. Morgan, Real World Pressureson Professionalism,23 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L. REV. 409, 410 (2001) (suggesting an oversupply of lawyers of 15% by 2000).
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that, although large law firm partners earned 78% more in 1986
than in 1976, inflation rose 93% during that time.39 7 Partners also
billed more hours just to maintain their income.3 98 A 1995 survey
reported that associates in fifteen metropolitan areas billed an
average of between 1649 and 1907 hours, and partners averaged
from a range of 1513 hours in Indianapolis to 1847 hours in
Houston. 3 9 9 A 1985 survey of 150 medium and large law firms

indicated that the length of time to partner increased by 20% since
1975.400 The percentage of lawyers in large law firms who made
partner decreased beginning in the late 1970s, and by the end of
the 1980s, further decreases in the percentage of associates
becoming partner were predicted by large law firm partners.40 1
As noted in a 1982 article in Fortune magazine, "margins in the
' 40 2
legal business are under severe pressure.

The drafting of the Code of Professional Responsibility during
the mid-1960s occurred at a time when the American legal
profession remained largely unbuffeted by competitive pressures,
allowing it to draft a code that included both what was prohibited,
and a code expressing a "morality of aspiration."'4

3

The fatal flaw

of the Code was that it framed as ethical issues several minor
threats to the economics of the profession, making the Code
vulnerable to an attack as protecting lawyers rather than the
public. When the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct
were drafted in the late 1970s, the competition for lawyer services
had increased, leading to a legal ethics code premised on a very
different structure. As noted by Professor Murray L. Schwartz
397. See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS 52-53

(1991) (citing Rita Henley Jensen, Partners Work Harderto Stay Even, NAT'L L.J., Aug.
10, 1987, at 12) (according to research by Altman & Weil, partners billed 8% more hours
than they billed ten years earlier).
398. Id. at 52.
399. WILLIAM G. ROSS, THE HONEST HOUR 3 (1996).
400. RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 195 (1989).
401. See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS 63-64

(1991) (noting lower promotion rates among Chicago law firms in the 1980s and predicting
that fewer incoming associates were expected to make partner).
402. Peter W. Bernstein, Profit Pressures on the Big Law Firms, FORTUNE, Apr. 19,
1982, at 84, 86. Bernstein also noted that gross income at twelve large New York law firms
"adjusted for inflation, grew by only 12% over the five years ending in 1980." Id.
403. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 3 (rev. ed. Yale Univ. Press 1969)
(noting two moralities: "the morality of aspiration and the morality of duty"). See
generally ROBERTS. SUMMERS, LON L. FULLER 10 (1984) (discussing Fuller's approach to
the two moralities).
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when the Model Rules were still in draft phase, "As a whole, the
Model Rules deliberately eschew references to ethics; they are at
least in form more a set of detailed requirements for a regulated
industry than a set of ethical principles.",4 1 4 The drafting of the
Code, then, was a lost opportunity for the profession; the golden
age, like Camelot, was gone, and seen only in the mists of time.
C. Surveying the Legal Profession
In 1946, the ABA approved a Survey of the Legal Profession, a
wide-ranging effort studying "the functioning of lawyers in a free
society."'4 °5 The Survey included approximately 175 reports
concerning six major areas of inquiry: professional services by
lawyers; public service by lawyers; judicial service; professional
competence and integrity, which included legal education,
admission to the bar and professional ethics; economics of the
profession; and the organized bar.4 0 6 The reports on professional
ethics were ten in number by September 1949.407 One Survey
report on professional ethics, published in 1951 in the Virginia
Law Review, evaluated responses to a questionnaire about the
adherence to the Canons by lawyers.40 8 It concluded: "The very
definite impression made upon the mind of one reading the replies
to these questionnaires is that the Bar of the United States, with
comparatively rare exceptions, maintains a strict observance of the
ethical standards set forth in the Canons." 40

9

The author, a

404. Murray L. Schwartz, The Death and Regeneration of Ethics, 1980 AM. B.

FOUND. RES. J. 953, 953 (commenting on the January 30, 1980 discussion draft of the
Model Rules).
405. Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 71 A.B.A. REP. 310, 310 (1946). The

initial Survey was approved by the ABA in 1944 and was limited to the "study of legal
education and admissions to the bar." Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 69 A.B.A.
REP. 456, 456 (1944); see also Reginald Heber Smith, Survey of the Legal Profession: Its

Scope, Methods and Objectives, 39 A.B.A. J. 548, 548 (1953) (recognizing the limitations
on the scope of the initial survey). Although the ABA funded the Survey in part, the
regular progress reports emphasized the independence of the Council from the ABA.
Reginald Heber Smith, Survey of the Legal Profession:Its Scope, Methods and Objectives,
39 A.B.A. J. 548, 548 (1953).
406. See Reginald Heber Smith, Survey of the Legal Profession: Its Scope, Methods
and Objectives, 39 A.B.A. J. 548, 549-50 (1953) (evaluating more than 150 reports).
407. Id. at 550.
408. Robert T. McCracken, Report on Observance by the Bar of Stated Professional
Standards, 37 VA. L. REV. 399, 399 (1951).

409. Id. at 425. McCracken also noted, "[m]ost of the Canons here dealt with seem
to be faithfully observed by an overwhelming majority of the lawyers of the United
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practicing lawyer for over forty years, believed that the number of
violations of the Canons was less than fifty or even twenty-five
years earlier. 4 1 0 The Survey also fostered a 1952 book, Conduct of
Judges and Lawyers: A Study of Professional Ethics, by Orie
Phillips and Philbrick McCoy. 41 1 Phillips and McCoy cautiously
urged a re-examination of the "Canons to determine whether they
adequately define for the benefit of the bar and the public alike
the duties which both the lawyer and the judge owe to the
commonwealth.
Perhaps the time has come for a public
reaffirmation of the standards of the4 12profession with more
adequate emphasis on their significance."
Unrelated to the Survey was the publication in 1953 of Henry S.
Drinker's book Legal Ethics.4 1 3 Drinker was a longtime chairman
of the ABA's Standing Committee on Professional Ethics and
Grievances, and Legal Ethics was trumpeted as the first book on
legal ethics since Sharswood's 1854 A Compend of Lectures.4 1 4
Legal Ethics did not call for the restructuring of the Canons of
Ethics. Although new problems in legal ethics might require
amendments and supplements to the Canons, "the basic standards
of professional conduct which [the Canons] embody have never

States." Id. at 400. Chapter 5 of Phillips and McCoy's Conduct of Judges and Lawyers
restates McCracken's conclusions. ORIE L. PHILLIPS & PHILBRICK MCCOY, CONDUCT
OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS 59-84 (1952); see also ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & CHARLES 0.
PORTER, THE AMERICAN LAWYER 240-80 (1954) (reviewing the data and accepting the
conclusions of McCracken, Phillips and McCoy).
410. Robert T. McCracken, Report on Observance by the Bar of Stated Professional
Standards, 37 VA. L. REV. 399, 423 (1951) ("It is doubtful if [violations of the Canons] are
as prevalent today as they were a half century, or even a quarter of a century, ago.").
411. ORIE L. PHILLIPS & PHILBRICK MCCOY, CONDUCT OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS

59-84 (1952). A second book, Reginald Heber Smith's Complaints Against Lawyers, was
to be published in revised form (first published in mimeograph form in 1949) by Little,
Brown in 1953 according to a 1953 report of the Survey. I have been unable to find that
work.
412. Id. at 20.
413. John W. Davis, Foreword to HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS, at vii, vii-viii
(1953). The book was published under the auspices of the William Nelson Cromwell
Foundation. Id.
414. See id. at vii (noting that at the time, Judge Sharswood's published lectures were
among the few available works on the subject of legal ethics). Davis ignored George
Warvelle's Legal Ethics, Orrin Carter's Ethics in the Legal Profession, and casebooks on
the subject by George Costigan, Jr., Eliot Cheatham, Frederic Hicks and Herschel Arant.
Drinker was aware of these books. See HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS, at ix (1953)
(observing that the available books and treatises on the subject of legal ethics did not
address important Canon amendments).
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been materially relaxed or the essential provisions altered; nor
need they be."' 4 15 Finally, a summary of the work of the Survey
was published by the University of Chicago Press in 1954, titled
The American Lawyer.4 16 This summary echoed Phillips and
McCoy, and like them, quoted Harlan Fiske Stone's 1934
complaint that the Canons were "generalizations designed for an
17
4
earlier era."

In May 1956, a special committee of the American Bar
Foundation was asked to study the Canons of Ethics. 41 8 The
Foundation created this Special Committee at the behest of the
ABA, and its chairman was Philbrick McCoy, the author of the
1952 Survey book suggesting a general revision of the Canons.4 1 9
The final report of the Special Committee was issued on June 30,
1958.42 o
The report concluded that "the present Canons of
Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association do not
provide adequate standards of professional conduct for members
of the Bar,' 421 and recommended a sweeping revision of the
Canons.4 22 The American Bar Foundation Report was not widely
distributed. It was not reported in the ABA Journal during either
1958 or 1959, and was neither discussed nor mentioned in the
annual Report of the American Bar Association for either of those
years.
The membership in the American Bar Foundation
Committee was listed in the ABA's annual Report in 1957; the
Committee disappeared in the 1958 edition.4 23 It is unclear why
415. HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 3 (1953).
416. ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & CHARLES 0. PORTER, THE AMERICAN LAWYER 251

(1954).
417. Id. (quoting Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV.
1, 10 (1934)).
418. Philbrick McCoy, The Canons of Ethics:A Reappraisalby the OrganizedBar, 43

A.B.A. J. 38, 38 (1957). The American Bar Foundation Special Committee was initially
charged in early 1955 to prepare a plan of study of the Canons. Id.
419. Id. (noting alterations in the legal profession in light of modern circumstances
that suggested a need for Canon revision).
420. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION

ON CANONS OF ETHICS, at ix (June 30, 1958).

421. Id. at 96.
422. See id. at 97 (recommending six areas for revision of the Canons).
423. See Other Groups and Organizations,83 A.B.A. REP. 96, 96-98 (1958) (listing
all special committees of the American Bar Foundation, which does not include a

committee on Canons of Ethics); Other Groups and Organizations,82 A.B.A. REP. 90, 91
(1957) (listing members of the American Bar Foundation Special Committee on Canons
of Ethics). The publication of the Special Committee's Report in June 1958 is likely the
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the Special Committee's Report was largely buried by the ABA.
James Shepherd suggested in a private December 31, 1959 letter
that nothing came of the Special Committee's Report because the
project ran out of money and the Special Committee reached an
impasse over Canon 35.424
As will be noted below, the
proscription of the use of "intermediaries" (such as unions) to
arrange legal services for its members found in Canon 35
continued to haunt the ABA during the drafting of the Code of
Professional Responsibility during the 1960s. In addition to the
Canon 35 problem, another reason for the disappearance of the
American Bar Foundation's Report may be the release two weeks
later of the Report of the Joint Conference on Professional
Responsibility.4 2 5
D. Joint Conference on ProfessionalResponsibility
The Joint Conference Report, released on July 14, 1958, and
published in the December 1958 issue of the ABA Journal,4 2 6 is
written in a tone wholly dissimilar to Drinker, Phillips and McCoy,
and the American Bar Foundation Special Committee's Report.
As noted by Professor Robert Lawry, the Report, while
"inadequate in many ways," formed "the best single expression" of
the "central moral tradition within which American lawyers ought
to live and dwell." 4'2 7 The Joint Conference Report mentions the
Canons briefly at the beginning, only to inform the reader that a
lawyer "must realize that a letter-bound observance of the Canons
'4 2 8
is not equivalent to the practice of professional responsibility."
reason why the committee was disbanded.
424. Letter from Ja[me]s L. Shepherd, Jr., Chairman, Standing Comm. on Prof'l
Ethics, to William P. Roberts (Dec. 31, 1959), in A. James Casner Papers, Box 3, Folder 8,
Harvard Law School Library (on file with author).
425. Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, ProfessionalResponsibility: A Statement, 11
S.C. L.Q. 306, 306 (1959) (reporting that the statement "was released on July 14, 1958").

The Report was first published in the December 1958 issue of the ABA Journal. See Lon
L. Fuller & John D. Randall, ProfessionalResponsibility: Report of the Joint Conference,

44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1159 (1958) (reporting on the Joint Conference on Professional
Responsibility of th American Bar Association and the Association of American Law
Schools).

426. Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, ProfessionalResponsibility: Report of the Joint
Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159 (1958). itwas also published as Lon L. Fuller & John D.
Randall, Professional Responsibility:A Statement, 11 S.C. L.Q. 306 (1959).

427. Robert P. Lawry, The Central Moral Tradition of Lawyering, 19 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 311,311 (1990).
428. Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, ProfessionalResponsibility: Report of the Joint
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Professionalism requires that the lawyer "cannot rest content with
the faithful discharge of duties assigned to him by others. His
work must find its direction within a larger frame."' 4 2 9 To practice
law in the 1950s, given the increasing importance of the lawyer's
role in American society, a lawyer must understand not just the
"established standards of professional conduct, but the reasons
underlying these standards."'4 30 The Joint Conference Report
then divided the lawyer's role into three areas: (1) as advocate and
counselor; (2) as designer of a framework giving direction and
form to collaborative effort; and (3) as servant to the public.43 1
Not only was the Joint Conference Report different in tone from
other reports, its origins were seemingly quite modest: the Joint
Conference was an undertaking suggested in early 1952 by the
ABA's Standing Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of the
Law. John D. Randall, an Iowa lawyer and, since 1946, chairman
of the Unauthorized Practice of the Law Committee, recommended the ABA's House of Delegates approve the committee's
recommendation to form a joint conference with the Association
of American Law Schools (AALS) on the topic of professional
responsibility.4 32 The Joint Conference was not related to the
ABA's ongoing Survey of the Legal Profession and was not
connected to the later American Bar Foundation study of the
Canons. It had no wide-ranging authority to consider the roles of
the American lawyer and was portrayed as a minor effort by the
ABA to lessen the perceived tension between the practicing bar
and the law professorate. But its proponents were consummate
ABA insiders. In addition to serving as chairman of the
Unauthorized Practice Committee, Randall had served as the Iowa
delegate to the ABA since 1948, and eventually served as ABA
president in 1959-1960. 433 The other powerful ABA insider was
Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1159 (1958).
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 1160.
432. See Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 77 A.B.A. REP. 425, 437 (1952)
(approving recommendations of the Standing Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the
Law to form a joint conference on professional responsibility with the Association of
American Law Schools); see also Report of the Standing Committee on Unauthorized
Practice of the Law, 77 A.B.A. REP. 567, 567 (1952) (outlining the recommendations that
were adopted by the House of Delegates at the mid-year meeting).
433. See State Delegates, 73 A.B.A. REP. 13, 13 (1948) (listing Randall as a state
delegate from Iowa). Each state then had one ABA delegate. One interested in
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Harvard Law School Professor A. James Casner, who joined the
Unauthorized Practice Committee in 1949 and was a member of
the Joint Conference. 43 4 Randall served as co-chairman of the
ABA half of the Joint Conference. Five members representing the
AALS were appointed to the Joint Conference, joining the five
ABA members. The first co-chairman was Joseph Rarick, who

served for three years.

In 1955, Lon L. Fuller, professor at

Harvard Law School, replaced Rarick as co-chairman.4 35
The initial draft statement of the professional responsibilities of
the lawyer was written in late September 1953 by Elliott

Cheatham, a Columbia Law School professor known for his work
on legal ethics. 4 36 Fuller looked at Cheatham's draft and began
anew. 43 7 His "second revised draft," dated August 5, 1954, was an
incomplete draft but similar in many ways to the finished product
published in 1958.438 One important statement of the second
revised draft that survived through the finished product was

Fuller's explanation of the value of representing "unpopular
causes." 4 3 9 This draft was sent to the members of the Joint
Conference shortly after the conclusion of the Senator Joseph
becoming president of the ABA began his campaign as a delegate, for the delegates
determined who became president. Delegates served three-year terms, but they could
serve more than one term.
434. See Standing Committees of the Association, 77 A.B.A. REP. 27, 41 (1952) (listing
Casner as one of five members appointed by the ABA to the Joint Conference); Standing
Committees of the Association, 74 A.B.A. REP. 27, 38 (1949) (listing Casner as member of
the Standing Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law).
435. See Other Groups and Organizations,80 A.B.A. REP. 90, 93 (1955) (listing
Fuller as co-chairman and listing Rarick as a member of the Joint Conference). Rarick
was a professor of Indian, property, and water law at the University of Oklahoma from
1953 to 1989. David L. Swank, Preface to 43 OKLA. L. REV., at x, x-xi (1990).
436. See Letter from Elliott E. Cheatham, Professor, Columbia Law Sch., to Lon L.
Fuller, Professor, Harvard Law Sch. & Harry W. Jones, Professor, Columbia Law Sch.
(Sept. 21, 1953), in Lon L. Fuller Papers, Box 2, Folder 8, Harvard Law School Library (on
file with author) (submitting an incomplete draft of a Statement of Professional
Responsibility to the Joint Conference). Cheatham was not a member of the Joint
Conference, although his Columbia colleague Harry Jones was.
437. Letter from Elliott E. Cheatham, Professor, Columbia Law Sch., to Lon L.
Fuller, Professor, Harvard Law Sch. & Harry W. Jones, Professor, Columbia Law Sch.
(Sept. 21, 1953), in Lon L. Fuller Papers, Box 1, Folder 1, Harvard Law School Library (on
file with author) (asking Fuller to review his draft and then "tear it up or re-write it").
438. Lon L. Fuller, Professional Responsibility: A Statement (Aug. 5, 1954), in Lon
L. Fuller Papers, Box 1, Folder 1, Harvard Law School Library (on file with author)
(second revised draft).
439. Id. at 16; Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report
of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1216 (1958).
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McCarthy-led hearings investigating alleged protection of communists in the Army, hearings at which the protection by lawyers of
the rights and reputations of witnesses and others subject to
vicious and scurrilous attacks became publicly prominent.4 40
Fuller's second revised draft explained that, even when a cause
was unpopular for a good reason, "[i]t is essential for a sound and
wholesome development of public opinion that the disfavored
cause have its full day in court, which includes, of necessity,
representation by competent counsel."'4 4 1 Otherwise, "confidence
44 2
in the fundamental processes of government is diminished."
Fuller additionally explained that zeal as a courtroom advocate on
behalf of clients' interests was necessary because "partisan
advocacy is essential to the integrity of the adjudicative process
itself."' 443 It was4 "an indispensable part of a larger ordering of
' 44
human affairs.
On May 2, 1955, Fuller's proposed final draft was sent to the

440. See 2 WILLIAM MANCHESTER, THE GLORY AND THE DREAM: A NARRATIVE
HISTORY OF AMERICA, 1932-1972, at 700-16, 868, 877 (1975) (offering popular history of
the Army-McCarthy hearings). The Army's counsel, Joseph Welch of the Boston firm of
Hale and Dorr, was shocked into reprimanding McCarthy after McCarthy publicly alleged
that a young lawyer in Welch's firm might have ties to the Communist Party. Id. at 70016. Welch concluded his statement, "Let us not assassinate this lad further, Senator. You
have done enough. Have you no sense of decency, sir, at long last? Have you no sense of
decency?" Id. at 877.
441. Lon L. Fuller, Professional Responsibility: A Statement (Aug. 5, 1954), in Lon
L. Fuller Papers, Box 1, Folder 1, at 17-18, Harvard Law School Library (on file with
author) (second revised draft). The language is identical to the published version. Lon L.
Fuller & John D. Randall, ProfessionalResponsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44
A.B.A. J.1159, 1216 (1958).
442. Lon L. Fuller, Professional Responsibility: A Statement (Aug. 5, 1954), in Lon
L. Fuller Papers, Box 1, Folder 1, at 18, Harvard Law School Library (on file with author)
(second revised draft); Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility:
Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1216 (1958).
443. See Lon L. Fuller, Professional Responsibility: A Statement (Aug. 5, 1954), in
Lon L. Fuller Papers, Box 1, Folder 1, at 4-5, Harvard Law School Library (on file with
author) (second revised draft) (positing that a successful adjudication system requires
interested parties). This language was rephrased in the published version as, "[i]n a very
real sense it may be said that the integrity of the adjudicative process itself depends upon
the participation of the advocate." Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional
Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160 (1958).
444. Lon L. Fuller, Professional Responsibility: A Statement (Aug. 5, 1954), in Lon
L. Fuller Papers, Box 1, Folder 1, at 6, Harvard Law School Library (on file with author)
(second revised draft); see Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, ProfessionalResponsibility:
Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1161 (1958) (using identical language to
that employed in the second revised draft).
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members of the Joint Conference.44 5 Unlike Fuller's second
revised draft, the proposed final draft mentioned the Canons of
Ethics, including the language that a lawyer "must realize that a
letter-bound observance of the Canons is not equivalent to the
practice of professional responsibility.

' 4 46

The demands of

modern legal practice required the lawyer to understand "not
merely the established standards of professional conduct, but the
reasons that lie back of these standards."'4 4 7 The proposed final

draft then explained the reasons behind the obligations attendant
to the profession of law.
With the exception of an expanded explanation of "The
Lawyer's Role as Advocate in Open Court,"' 4 4 8 the proposed final
draft of May 2, 1955 is nearly identical to the second proposed
final draft of October 1, 1957, which became the published Joint
Conference Report in 1958. The reason for the extensive delay in
completing the work of the Joint Conference lay at the feet of
Homer Crotty, a lawyer with the Los Angeles law firm of Gibson,
Dunn & Crutcher, and the only dissenter to Fuller's proposed final
draft.4 49 Crotty had both valid and odd suggestions on the issue of
445. Lon L. Fuller, Professional Responsibility: A Statement (May 2, 1955), in A.
James Casner Papers, Box 37, Folder 5, at 1, Harvard Law School Library (on file with
author) (proposed final draft).
446. Id.
447. Id. at 2; Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, ProfessionalResponsibility: Report of
the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1159 (1958).
448. Compare Lon L. Fuller, Professional Responsibility: A Statement (May 2, 1955),
in A. James Casner Papers, Box 37, Folder 5, at 3-5, Harvard Law School Library (on file
with author) (proposed final draft) (outlining the limitations on the scope of a lawyer's
function as an advocate in open court), with Lon L. Fuller, Professional Responsibility: A
Statement (Oct. 1, 1957), in Lon L. Fuller Papers, Box 1, Folder 1, at 3-8, Harvard Law
School Library (on file with author) (second proposed final draft) (setting forth an
expansive interpretation of the role of the attorney as an advocate in the second proposed
final draft of October 1, 1957, as compared to the proposed final draft of May 2, 1955).
The only other significant difference between the two drafts is that Fuller added two
paragraphs on the role of the lawyer as legislator to the second proposed final draft,
absent from the proposed final draft. See Lon L. Fuller, Professional Responsibility: A
Statement (Oct. 1, 1957), in Lon L. Fuller Papers, Box 1, Folder 1, at 23-24, Harvard Law
School Library (on file with author) (second proposed final draft) (discussing special
fiduciary obligations by which an attorney who is also a legislator is bound).
449. JANE WILSON, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LAWYERS 26-28 (1990); see

Letter from Homer Crotty to L.L. Fuller, Co-Chairman, Joint Conference on Prof'l
Responsibility (May 20, 1955), in A. James Casner Papers, Box 37, Folder 9, Harvard Law
School Library (on file with author) (dissenting from the proposed final draft in a ten page
letter); see also Letter from Lon L. Fuller, Co-Chairman, Joint Conference on Prof'l
Responsibility, to Maurice T. Van Hecke (Oct. 10, 1956), in Lon L. Fuller Papers, Box 8,
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professional responsibility, which led to a two-year delay in
obtaining an agreement of the Joint Conference. 45 °
The Report suggested a re-orientation of the approach to issues
of professional responsibility: Instead of endless debates on the
particularities of the Canons, such as Canon 35, on the role of
intermediaries, or labor unions hiring counsel for their members,
more effort should be spent on understanding the varied and
various roles played by the lawyer in the administrative regulatory
state. The Report also drew attention to the relationship between
the lawyer and society, argued through both reason and passion of
the morality of the adversarial system, and, as noted above,
reflected on the importance of defending an unpopular cause even
when "unfavorable public opinion of the client's cause is in fact
justified."' 45 1 In discussing the importance of representing a client
whose cause was "infact unjustified," Fuller noted that the English
cab rank system was not available to remove the possible taint of
association for an American lawyer. Thus, a lawyer's decision to
Folder 7, Harvard Law School Library (on file with author) ("[The] draft I sent you
represents about the fourth revision, and it was accepted by everyone except Homer
Crotty."). Crotty was orphaned as a teen and spent his years while attending the
University of California as the "custodian" at the Chabot Observatory. See JANE
WILSON,

GIBSON, DUNN

& CRUTCHER LAWYERS 426 (1990)

(noting that Crotty

personally marked out the word "janitor" in favor of the word "custodian" to describe his
position). He spent a year at Harvard as a graduate law student before joining the firm in
1923. See id. at 425-28 (discussing Crotty's background).
450. See Homer Crotty, Proposed Objects for the Joint Conference on Professional
Responsibility (Jan. 28, 1953), in A. James Casner Papers, Box 37, Folder 1, at 4, Harvard
Law School Library (on file with author) (urging better disciplinary measures and greater
continuing legal education, as well as "eliminat[ing] bad moral risks" in part through
fingerprinting law students). In Crotty's May 20, 1955 letter to Lon Fuller, he noted that
Fuller's draft "gives the impression that in partisan activity 'no holds are barred,"' to
which Crotty objected. Letter from Homer Crotty to L.L. Fuller, Co-Chairman, Joint
Conference on Prof'l Responsibility (May 20, 1955), in A. James Casner Papers, Box 37,
Folder 9, Harvard Law School Library (on file with author). In the published Report, this
Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional
paragraph is modestly edited.
Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1161 (1958); Lon L.
Fuller, Professional Responsibility: A Statement (May 2, 1955), in A. James Casner
Papers, Box 37, Folder 5, at 6-7, Harvard Law School Library (on file with author)
(proposed final draft).
451. See Lon L. Full er & John D. Randall, ProfessionalResponsibility: Report of the
Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1216 (1958) ("The legal profession has, therefore, a
clear moral obligation to see to it that those already handicapped do not suffer the
cumulative disadvantage of being without proper legal representation, for it is obvious
that adjudication can neither be effective nor fair where only one side is represented by
counsel.").
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represent a client with an unpopular cause remained "a matter for
individual conscience." ' 452 But the legal profession as a whole pos4 53
sessed "a clear moral obligation with respect to this problem."
As noted by Professor John DiPippa, "we see Fuller's concern
for process and the morality embodied in it" 4 5 4 throughout the
Report. Fuller's distinction between a morality of duty and a
morality of aspiration, later made famous in his 1963 Storrs
Lectures at Yale Law School,45 5 is also prominent in the Report.
Shortly after the proposed final draft was sent to the other
members of the Joint Conference, Fuller gave a speech to the
American Institute of Electrical Engineers on The Philosophy of
Codes of Ethics.4 5 6 Fuller noted that a code of ethics required
both "an understanding of those general principles of social
organization that must be observed in order that men may live in
harmony" and "an understanding of the peculiar function which
the profession in question performs in the total processes of
society."'457 A necessary but not sufficient condition of a code of
ethics was a "sense of mission"; it was just as important for a code
of ethics to "set forth in detail those conditions-including social
arrangements and standards of individual behavior-that must be
respected if these goals are to be achieved."'4 58 In addition, a code
452. Id.
453. Id. at 1217.
454. John M.A. DiPippa, Lon Fuller, the Model Code, and the Model Rules, 37 S.
TEX. L. REV. 303,328 (1996).
455. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 5 (rev. ed. Yale Univ. Press 1969)
("Where the morality of aspiration starts at the top of human achievement, the morality of
duty starts at the bottom.").
456. L.L. Fuller, The Philosophy of Codes of Ethics, 74 ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING
916, 916 (1955). The speech was given on June 27, 1955, about seven weeks after he
completed the proposed final draft (May 2, 1955), and was published in the October 1955
issue of the journal Electrical Engineering. At this time Fuller was also working on his
essay The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, which concerned the broad issue of social
ordering. See generally Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 353 (1978) (discussing "adjudication in the very broadest sense"). Although Fuller
was working on The Forms at this time, it was only published posthumously. Fuller
presented parts of The Forms in 1957. See ROBERT S.SUMMERS, LON L. FULLER 10
(1984) ("Fuller worked on drafts of his most important single essay dealing with the
process of social ordering-'The Forms and Limits of Adjudication."'). Echoes of The
Forms course throughout the 1955 proposed final draft and the 1957 second proposed final
draft which became the 1958 Report.
457. L.L. Fuller, The Philosophy of Codes of Ethics, 74 ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING
916, 916 (1955).
458. Id. at 917.
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had to avoid totalizing ethics, or face the banality of declaring a
"mush of platitudes."4 '5 9
After drawing the attention of delegates to the Report at the
1958 annual meeting of the ABA, John Randall proposed that the
House of Delegates approve the Joint Conference Report at the
mid-year meeting of the ABA in February 1959, over Fuller's
objections. 46 0 It did so. 46 1 The Joint Conference Report offered
an alternate perspective on the structure of a code of ethics. It was
the last word on professional responsibility until the ABA began
to draft a code of professional responsibility in 1964.
E. The Code of ProfessionalResponsibility
But the fact remains that legal ethics centers about a problem of
how to secure a larger income for lawyers.
Felix S. Cohen, Modern Ethics and the Law

462

In mid-1964 ABA President Lewis F. Powell appointed the
Special Committee on the Evaluation of Ethical Standards
("Wright Committee") to draft rules intended to replace the
Canons.4 6 3 The reasons for the call remain elusive. One reason
459. See id. ("A code that attempts to take the whole of right and wrong for its
province breaks down inevitably into a mush of platitudes.").
460. See Letter from Lon L. Fuller, Co-Chairman, Joint Conference on Prof'l
Responsibility, to John D. Randall, Co-Chairman, Joint Conference on Prof'l
Responsibility (July 10, 1958), in A. James Casner Papers, Box 37, Folder 10, Harvard
Law School Library (on file with author) (objecting to the ABA's adoption of the Report);
Letter from Lon L. Fuller, Co-Chairman, Joint Conference on Prof'l Responsibility, to A.
James Casner, Member, Joint Conference on Prof'l Responsibility (Oct. 15, 1958), in A.
James Casner Papers, Box 37, Folder 10, Harvard Law School Library (on file with
author) (stating opposition to the ABA adoption of the Report).
461. Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 84 A.B.A. REP. 541, 542 (1959) (noting
that Mr. Randall moved "[t]hat the House of Delegates approve the final draft of the
report of the Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility" and that this report was
adopted without debate). Randall became president-elect of the ABA in August 1958 and
its president in August 1959.
462. FELIX S. COHEN, Modern Ethics and the Law, in THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE 17,
18 (Lucy Kramer Cohen ed., 1960).
463. See Proceedingsof the House of Delegates, 89 A.B.A. REP. 365, 381-83 (1964)
(noting appointment of the Special Committee on the Evaluation of Ethical Standards);
see also JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL 195 (1994) (noting Powell

"called for comprehensive reform of legal ethics" in his incoming address on August 14,
1964). The Wright Committee's initial charge was to report "on the adequacy and
effectiveness of the present Canons of Professional Ethics." Report of the Board of
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may have been the drafting of amendments in 1962 to the Code of
Trial Conduct of the American College of Trial Lawyers, of which
Powell was a member and later its president.4 64 A second reason
may have been the insular world of elite practitioners at the time.
John Randall, the co-chairman of the Joint Conference with Lon
Fuller, was a member of the committee that drafted amendments
to the Code of Trial Conduct. 465 Randall considered but did not
act on a suggestion that he focus on ethics in his term as ABA
president. Sherman Welpton,46 6 the chief draftsman of the
original Code of Trial Conduct and the chairman of the committee
proposing amendments to it, was a partner at Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher with Homer Crotty, who had been a member of the Joint
Conference. A. James Casner was a colleague of Fuller's at

Governors, 89 A.B.A. REP. 414, 421 (1964). Powell initially declared, "There is certainly
no thought of starting out to rewrite de novo the ethical standards of the legal profession."
A study of Wall Street lawyers published that same year suggested that the increase in
large firm lawyers would lead to the question of "whether the canons of ethics designed
for a different day are adequate for the current and the future practice of the law."
ERWIN 0. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER 353 (1964). Smigel's book was written

before Powell's president's address, but I have not found any evidence that Powell's call
was influenced by Smigel's book.
464. The American College of Trial Lawyers adopted a Code of Trial Conduct in
August 1956, and amendments to the Code were adopted in early 1963. See Sherman S.
Welpton, Jr., Genesis of the Code of Trial Conduct, 58 A.B.A. J. 709, 709 (1972) (noting
that the Code of Trial Conduct was adopted in 1956 and amendments "which explained
and revised the original code" were adopted in 1963); see also Interview by Olavi Maru
with Sherman S. Welpton, Jr., in L.A., Cal. (Nov. 3, 1976), in American Bar Foundation
Program on Oral History 8 (on file with author) (noting that Lewis Powell became
president of the ABA in 1964).
465. See Interview by Olavi Maru with Sherman S. Welpton, Jr., in L.A., Cal. (Nov. 3,
1976), in American Bar Foundation Program on Oral History 7 (on file with author)
(acknowledging Randall's presence on the committee).
466. Welpton graduated from the University of Nebraska College of Law in 1931.
See Interview by Olavi Maru with Sherman S. Welpton, Jr., in L.A., Cal. (Nov. 3, 1976), in
American Bar Foundation Program on Oral History 1 (on file with author) (outlining
Welpton's education and background). Before being named as a member of the Special
Committee, Welpton had helped draft the initial Code of Trial Conduct for the American
College of Trial Lawyers in the late 1950s. See id. at 3 ("I just moved ahead in connection
with it and turned out drafts of various provisions and rules that I thought would be good
for the conduct of trial lawyers. And in due course that code was adopted."); Sherman S.
Welpton, Jr., Genesis of the Code of Trial Conduct, 58 A.B.A. J. 709, 709 (1972)
(discussing his role in the drafting of the Code of Trial Conduct); see also Scarlet: For the
Record (Feb. 7, 2002), http://www.unl.edu/scarlet/vl2n04/vl2n04record.html (online
edition of University of Nebraska School of Law Scarlet alumni publication) (noting that
Welpton helped draft the Code of Trial Conduct for the American College of Trial
Lawyers).
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Harvard Law School and the only person to serve on both the
Joint Conference and the Wright Committee. In 1960, he was a
member of the ABA Standing Committee on Professional
Ethics. 4 67 The chairman of that committee, James L. Shepherd,
Jr., noted that the American Bar Foundation was then considering
a revision of the Canons. 4 68 The interconnectedness of many of
the lawyers who played major roles in the development by the
ABA of the rules of ethics may have made the issue one that was
"in the air." A third reason may have been, as noted by President
Powell in his comments to the House of Delegates, "The recent
events in Dallas, familiar to all of us, have stimulated a new and
intense interest in the Canons, particularly those designed to
prevent prejudicial publicity and to ensure a fair trial."'4 69 Finally,
the decision of the Supreme Court in Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar,4 7 ° issued four
months before Powell's call, may have been the catalyst for
Powell's decision.
The Brotherhood aided injured railroad
workers and their families by recommending lawyers who would
sue the railroad for damages. It did so through its department of
legal counsel. 4 7 1 The Brotherhood was, in ABA parlance, an
"intermediary," and the ABA, through Canon 35, looked with
trepidation at the possibility that an intermediary might influence
the lawyer-client relationship. The Virginia state bar urged a state
court to enjoin this practice as the unauthorized practice of law in
Virginia. It did. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
Black, held the injunction violated the First Amendment rights of

467. Standing Committees of the Association, 85 A.B.A. REP. 20, 30 (1960).

468. See Letter from Ja[me]s L. Shepherd, Jr., Chairman, ABA Standing Comm. on
Prof'l Ethics, to William P. Roberts (Dec. 31, 1959), in A. James Casner Papers, Box 3,
Folder 8, Harvard Law School Library (on file with author) (noting the American Bar
Foundation "will possibly attempt a complete rewriting of the two sets of canons").
469. Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 89 A.B.A. REP. 365, 381 (1964).

The

events in Dallas included the assassination in late November 1963 of President John F.
Kennedy and the murder of his assassin Lee Harvey Oswald. Powell was somewhat
fixated on the issue of prejudicial pretrial publicity. See Letter from Lewis F. Powell,
President, Am. Bar Ass'n, to Edward L. Wright, Chairman, Special Comm. on Evaluation
of Ethical Standards (Sept. 9, 1964), in A. James Casner Papers, Box 25, Folder 1, Harvard
Law School Library (on file with author) (offering a "thinking out loud" letter suggesting
the Committee assess the "fair trial-free press" issue).
470. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964). The
opinion was released on April 20, 1964. Id.
471. Id. at 2.
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the Brotherhood.4 7 2 It did not help Virginia's cause that it had
been taken to task a year earlier by the Court for using its
unauthorized practice of law statute and regulations barring
members of the legal profession from soliciting legal business to
attempt to restrict the litigation activities of the NAACP, part of
its "massive resistance" against the civil rights movement.47 3
Powell, then a lawyer practicing in Richmond, would have been
well aware of the Virginia state bar's actions and the response of
the Supreme Court.
Even as the members of the Wright Committee, chaired by
Arkansas lawyer Edward Wright, met to discuss how to approach
their task, they worried about the Court's Brotherhood decision,
none more so than A. James Casner. Casner was a former
member of the ABA's Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of
Law and was appointed in 1960 to the ABA's Standing Committee
on Professional Ethics. He was a strong believer in a robust use of
unauthorized practice statutes to protect the business of lawyers
and was the prime mover behind ABA Ethics Opinion 297, issued
on February 24, 1961 by the Standing Committee on Professional
Opinion 297 prohibited a lawyer-accountant from
Ethics.4 7 4
practicing both law and accountancy, on the ground that holding
oneself out as qualified to practice both was an impermissible form
of "self-touting." The ABA then dug a deeper hole when it issued
Opinion 305 the next year, justifying Formal Opinion 297 but
allowing a lawyer-accountant to perform all tasks related to
For Casner, maintaining the divide between
accounting. 4 7 5
lawyers and accountants and lawyers and trust officers was
important and needed to be reflected in the Code.4 7 6 Indeed, one
472. Id. at 8.
473. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 416-18 (1963); see LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE
WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 219 (2000) ("[I]t strains credulity to believe
that in the Virginia of 'Massive Resistance' the state was really concerned about
protecting African-American litigants from the overbearing NAACP.").
474. ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 297 (1961).
475. See ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 305
(1962) ("[Opinion 297] was not intended to preclude certified public accountants who are
also lawyers but are holding themselves out only as accountants from engaging in activities
permitted under the Statement of Principles.").
476. See Meeting of Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, American
Bar Association (Dec. 3-4, 1964), in A. James Casner Papers, Box 102, at 5, Harvard Law
School Library (on file with author) (reporting in a transcript letter of A. James Casner to
John F. Sutton, Jr. of November 29, 1965).
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of the nine axiomatic principles of the completed Code, Canon 3,
was "[a] Lawyer Should Assist in Preventing the Unauthorized
Practice of Law." To his credit, Casner was also a prime mover to
frame a code of ethics in a positive fashion, away from the "thoushalt-not" character of the Canons.4 77
Members of the twelve-man Wright Committee agreed at their
organizational meeting on October 15, 1964 to present their ideas
to revise the Canons. Glenn Coulter, Sherman Welpton, and A.
James Casner all presented lengthy detailed proposals in
Casner's particular approach was to
November 1964.478
restructure the Canons by dividing them in ten parts, from fortyseven Canons of Ethics. By October 1965, the "second draft" of
Reporter John F. Sutton, Jr. contained twelve Canons,4 7 9 which
were subsequently whittled to ten. At that time, Edward Wright,
the chairman of the Wright Committee, concluded:
I simply was not going to be a party to the remarks that could be
made by critics of the Code that the Twelve Apostles came out with
the Ten Commandments. So I said, if we can without sacrificing
substance, let's cut this down to nine or expand it back up to 11. We
compressed it to nine.480
477. See Memorandum Regarding Work of Special Committee on Evaluation of
Ethical Standards (Nov. 16, 1964), in A. James Casner Papers, Box 25, Folder 1, at 3-4,
Harvard Law School Library (on file with author) ("The present Canons produce a heavy
negative effect. Thou shall not do this and thou shall not do that."). Casner went on to
argue: "Is not there a need in the standards of conduct set up for members of the legal
profession of a more positive responsibility to reach out and act in an affirmative manner
with respect to matters of general public interest and concern?" Id.
478. Id. at 2-5; see also Interview by Olavi Maru with John Floyd Sutton, Jr., in
Houston, Tex. (Dec. 20, 1976), in American Bar Foundation Program on Oral History 3
(on file with author) (noting that after Wright Committee members sent in their
suggestions they realized they needed "professional help," at which point he became
involved). The members of the Special Committee were also inundated with letters from
interested practitioners. Id.
479. See Interview by Olavi Maru with John Floyd Sutton, Jr., in Houston, Tex. (Dec.
20, 1976), in American Bar Foundation Program on Oral History 5 (on file with author)
("The second form I prepared, which was the one I preferred, began with the short
canons-at that time I had 12 in number-followed by what is now labeled the ethical
considerations.").
480. Interview by Olavi Maru with Edward L. Wright, in Little Rock, Ark. (Oct. 28,
1976), in American Bar Foundation Program on Oral History 8 (on file with author); see
also Interview by Olavi Maru with Sherman S. Welpton, Jr., in L.A., Cal. (Nov. 3, 1976), in
American Bar Foundation Program on Oral History 13 (on file with author) (noting the
Special Committee decided in late 1968 that ten Canons seemed too much like the Ten
Commandments and so combined two Canons to make nine).
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Those Canons served as the basis for the Code. They would
eventually be joined by the aspirational Ethical Considerations
and the mandatory Disciplinary Rules, creating a three-tiered
structure of professional ethics.
The proposals by members of the Wright Committee were made
before the appointment of University of Texas Law School
Professor John F. Sutton, Jr., in early 1965.481 Their enthusiasms
were tempered after a letter was sent by Geoffrey Hazard,4 8 2 then
executive director of the American Bar Foundation, to Wright
indicating that the Special Committee's "role vis-a-vis the
Reporter is to provide commentary and guide lines for his research
effort which in turn will be used to illuminate the Committee's
deliberations.

'48 3

After that, Sutton presented drafts, which the

Special Committee then discussed and amended in great detail.
Working, at the behest of Wright, largely out of sight,4 84 the
Wright Committee first presented a tentative draft in October
1968 to a select group of 550 lawyers, and a preliminary draft on
January 15, 1969 to 20,000 lawyers. 485 After receiving "hundreds"
of comments, a final draft, altered in some respects from the
preliminary draft, was presented on July 1, 1969. The ABA
481. See Letter from Edward L. Wright, Chairman, Special Comm. on Evaluation of
Ethical Standards, to All Committee Members (Jan. 5, 1965), in A. James Casner Papers,
Box 25, Folder 2, Harvard Law School Library (on file with author) (identifying Professor
John F. Sutton, Jr. as the reporter for the committee).
482. Hazard was also at this time a professor of law at the University of Chicago. He
is well known for his work in legal ethics, including his work as the reporter for the Kutak
Commission, which replaced the Code of Professional Responsibility with the ABA's
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
483. Letter from Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Executive Dir., Am. Bar Found., to
Edward L. Wright, Chairman, Special Comm. on Evaluation of Ethical Standards (Feb.
26, 1965), in A. James Casner Papers, Box 25, Folder 3, at 2, Harvard Law School Library
(on file with author).
484. Accord Interview by Olavi Maru with Sherman S. Welpton, Jr., in L.A., Cal.
(Nov. 3, 1976), in American Bar Foundation Program on Oral History 16 (on file with
author) (discussing Wright's refusal to release parts of the draft until the preliminary draft
was complete); see Interview by Olavi Maru with Edward L. Wright, Chairman, Special
Comm. on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, in Little Rock, Ark. (Oct. 28, 1976), in
American Bar Foundation Program on Oral History 10 (on file with author) (explaining
the reason Wright convinced the committee to delay the distribution of parts of the draft
until the preliminary draft was complete).
485. Report of the Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, 94 A.B.A.
REP. 728, 728 (1969); see also Judith L. Maute, Changing Conceptions of Lawyers' Pro
Bono Responsibilities: From Chance Noblesse Oblige to Stated Expectations, 77 TUL. L.
REV. 91, 118 n.151 (2002) (listing the different drafts worked on by the members of the
Wright Committee).
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adopted the proposed Code of Professional Responsibility without
amendment at its meeting in 1969, supplanting the Canons.4 8 6
The Code of Professional Responsibility was deeply influenced
by the Joint Conference Report. It cited the Joint Conference
Report twenty times. Echoing the Joint Conference Report, the
Code's preamble stated, "The Code of Professional Responsibility
points the way to the aspiring and provides standards by which to
judge the transgressor."4 8 7 The Code was divided into three parts
in the following order: "axiomatic" Canons, ethical considerations
"aspirational in character," and disciplinary rules "mandatory in
character." 48' 8 Including in the Code both aspirational and
mandatory elements embodied Fuller's understanding of the dual
understanding of the morality of duty and the morality of
aspiration. 48 9 Avoidance of a stress upon "peremptory rules" as
486. See Report of the Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, 94
A.B.A. REP. 728, 728 (1969) (recommending the proposed Code of Professional
Responsibility be adopted by the House of Delegates); see also Proceedings of the 1969
Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 94 A.B.A. REP. 378, 389-92 (1969) (approving
adoption of the Code).
487. Report of the Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards,Preamble to
Code of Professional Responsibility, 94 A.B.A. REP. 729, 731 (1969); see also Letter from
John F. Sutton, Jr., Reporter, Am. Bar Found., to Wright Committee Members (Oct. 14,
1965), in A. James Casner Papers, Box 25, Folder 5, at 2, Harvard Law School Library (on
file with author) (commending the members of the Joint Conference Report).
488. See Report of the Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards,
Preamble to Code of Professional Responsibility, 94 A.B.A. REP. 729, 731-32 (1969)
(explaining the division of the code into three parts). After the black-letter disciplinary
rules were footnotes offering support for the propositions in the ethical considerations and
disciplinary rules.
489. See Interview by Olavi Maru with John Floyd Sutton, Jr., Reporter, Am. Bar
Found., in Houston, Tex. (Dec. 20, 1976), in American Bar Foundation Program on Oral
History 4 (on file with author) (describing the tripartite format communicated to the
Wright Committee shortly after appointment and not mentioning Fuller); see also John
M.A. DiPippa, Lon Fuller, the Model Code, and the Model Rules, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 303,
333 (1996) (stating that the law needed both aspirational ideals and disciplinary
minimums). It is unclear but unlikely that Fuller played any direct role in the Code. He
was not a member of the Wright Committee, although his Harvard Law School colleague
Casner was. David Warrington, Director of Special Collections at Harvard Law School,
informed me that Fuller's office, on the ground floor, and Casner's office, on the second
floor, were directly above and below one another and immediately adjacent to a stairwell.
See E-mail from David Warrington, Dir. of Special Collections, Harvard Law Sch., to
Michael S. Ariens, Professor of Law, St. Mary's Univ. Sch. of Law (May 30, 2008, 10:37
AM) (on file with author) (stating that Casner's office was directly above Fuller's). Thus,
private conversations between the two could have taken place on a regular basis. Id. No
correspondence between the two on the Code exists in either's papers, and I found no
evidence in their papers through other letters or materials that they discussed the
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"the truly ethical level" in favor of placing first the "indicative
principles" was urged by Reporter John F. Sutton, Jr. when he sent
the members the second draft. 4 9 0 However, the committee voted
in 1967 to eliminate the "Ethical Considerations" from the Code
of Professional Responsibility, but agreed to allow Sutton to
continue to work on "Ethical Considerations" to be printed as a
separate document.4 9 1 It was this draft of the Code that was sent
to approximately 550 lawyers in October 1968, along with a
separate document called "Ethical Considerations Underlying the
Code of Professional Responsibility." The response from those
lawyers was that "it was awkward to have the two parts
separated," and the "Ethical Considerations" were returned to the
Code by a unanimous vote of the Wright Committee by the end of
the year.492
The specific idea for including the "Ethical
Considerations"
as part of the Code may have been Sherman
493
Welpton's.

proposed Code at any time. Professor William Simon suggests that Fuller created the
categorical restrictions of the Code. William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1091 n.23 (1988). This is highly unlikely based on my review of
the Fuller Papers, the Casner Papers, and the American Bar Foundation oral history
interviews of members of the Special Committee, including Wright, Casner, Welpton and
Gambrell.
490. Letter from John' F. Sutton, Jr., Reporter, Am. Bar Found., to Wright
Committee Members (Oct. 14, 1965), in A. James Casner Papers, Box 25, Folder 5, at 2,
Harvard Law School Library (on file with author); see also Interview by Olavi Maru with
John Floyd Sutton, Jr., Reporter, Am. Bar Found., in Houston, Tex. (Dec. 20, 1976), in
American Bar Foundation Program on Oral History 4 (on file with author) (noting the
tripartite format was suggested by him at the first meeting with the Wright Committee in
early 1965).
491. See Interview by Olavi Maru with John Floyd Sutton, Jr., Reporter, Am. Bar
Found., in Houston, Tex. (Dec. 20, 1976), in American Bar Foundation Program on Oral
History 13 (explaining that the committee voted against including "Ethical
Considerations" but allowed Sutton to continue working on them in a separate
document).
492. Id. at 14.
493. See Interview by Olavi Maru with Sherman S. Welpton, Jr., Special Comm. on
Evaluation of Ethical Standards, in L.A., Cal. (Nov. 3, 1976), in American Bar Foundation
Program on Oral History 13-14 (on file with author) ("I recall that Ed Wright and John
Sutton were all in favor, initially, of putting in the ethical considerations over into a
separate document ....I was very much in favor of putting the whole thing into one
composite picture because I thought if you took the ethical considerations away and just
had the disciplinary rules alone it just wouldn't be a good format at all."); cf Interview by
Olavi Maru with John Floyd Sutton, Jr., Reporter, Am. Bar Found., in Houston, Tex.
(Dec. 20, 1976), in American Bar Foundation Program on Oral History 4 (on file with
author) ("My third point was that the Code should not be reduced to a mere set of
criminal rules, but it should contain ethical guidance for the lawyer ....Those statements
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In justifying placing first the ten or twelve indicative principles
of ethics, Sutton quoted federal Judge Charles Breitel that "[i]n
short, as happens so often in every area of the law, if one probes a
problem deeply enough it becomes one in jurisprudence ....494
The Joint Conference Report was heavily cited in Canon 7: "A
Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously [w]ithin the Bounds
of the Law." Ethical Consideration 7-1 stated in part, "In our
government of law, and not of men, each member of our society is
entitled to have his conduct judged and regulated in accordance
with the law."' 4 9 5 The drafters then cited the Joint Conference
Report, and particularly noted the safeguards for resolving any
controversy in a "truly informed and dispassionate" manner would
be unavailing if "the man with an unpopular cause is unable4 96to find
a competent lawyer courageous enough to represent him."
The Code made clear the connection between the rule of law
and the actions of lawyers. As noted in the Joint Conference
Report, a government of laws and not of men could not prosper
without lawyers accepting, most importantly, the unpopular cause
"where the unfavorable public opinion of the client's cause is in
fact justified."'4 97 As the Report noted, "For the lawyer the
insidious dangers contained in the notion that 'the end justifies the
means' is not a matter of abstract philosophic conviction, but of
direct professional experience." 4 98 Canon 7 of the 1969 Code of
Professional Responsibility also reflected an understanding of
zealousness traceable to Timothy Walker's 1839 address to his law
students. The duty of zeal allowed a lawyer to advocate a client's
bad cause because "a lawyer is not accountable for the moral
ought to be completely separated from, and not be any part of, the enforceable penal
provisions.").
494. Letter from John F. Sutton, Jr., Reporter, Am. Bar Found., to Wright
Committee Members (Oct. 14, 1965), in A. James Casner Papers, Box 25, Folder 5, at 3,
Harvard Law School Library (on file with author).
495. Report of the Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, 94 A.B.A.
REP. 729, 774 (1969) (discussing the value of representing clients zealously within the
bounds of the law in Ethical Consideration 7-1 of the proposed Code of Professional
Responsibility).
496. Id. at 774 n.5 (quoting Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint
Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1216 (1959)).
497. See Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, ProfessionalResponsibility: Report of the
Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1216 (1959) (stating that it is essential that lawyers
represent clients with unfavorable causes).
498. Id.
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character of the cause he prosecutes, but only for the manner in
which he conducts it."'4 9 9 That view was adopted successively by
Sharswood and, following Sharswood, in Canon 10 of the 1887
Code of Ethics of the Alabama State Bar Association and thence
to Canon 15 of the ABA's 1908 Canons of Ethics.
The Code of Professional Responsibility was adopted rapidly
and nearly universally by states and state bar associations. By
1972, forty-three states and the District of Columbia had adopted
all or most of the Code as law. In four other states, the bar
association of that state had adopted the Code as applicable to its
members; only three states had not adopted it.5 0 0 Just five years
later, ABA President William B. Spann, Jr. created a special
commission to assess "all facets of legal ethics."' 50 1 By 1979, even
Wright Committee Reporter John Sutton, noting "[t]he adoption
process [of the Code] was essentially a political one," 50 2 urged "a
substantial review and revision of the Code ....
"503
What
happened?
Sutton noted the Code's inadequacy stemmed from the
"reluctance of lawyers to depart from old, familiar standards."'5 0 4
The Court's decision in Brotherhood was just the first of many
perceived threats to the economics of the profession during the
1960s, and despite the growing influence and affluence of lawyers
during this time, the Code was used in part to protect the
profession's economic interests. It wasn't simply reiterating the
ban on advertising found in the Canons of Ethics that was a missed
opportunity. The preliminary draft of the Code attempted "to
recognize the existence of and to regulate group legal services,"
but the objections of lawyers commenting on the draft led the
Special Committee to make "a lateral pass of the problem to the
499. See Timothy Walker, Ways and Means of Professional Success: Being the
Substance of a Valedictory Address to the Graduatesof the Law Class, in the Cincinnati

College, 1 W. L.J. 542, 547 (1844) (stating that a lawyer should zealously represent clients
regardless of the moral character of the clients' causes).
500. Report of the Special Committee to Secure Adoption of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, 97 A.B.A. REP. 740, 741 (1972).
501. Ted Schneyer, ProfessionalismAs Politics: The Making of Modern Legal Ethics
Code, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 677, 677 (1989) (quoting William B. Spann, Jr., The Legal
Profession Needs a New Code of Ethics, B. LEADER, Nov.-Dec. 1977, at 2, 3).
502. John F. Sutton, Jr., How Vulnerable Is the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility?,
57 N.C. L. REv. 497, 497 (1979).

503. Id. at 500.
504. Id. at 497.
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Canon 2 stated the principle

that "A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession [in] Fulfilling
Its Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available." But, as Judith Maute
noted, "In ironic contrast to Canon 2's titular focus on access to
counsel, most of its disciplinary rules restricted permissible
communications between lawyers and their prospective clients and
group legal services."'5 °6

This disjunction was known and

understood by Sutton 50 7 and other members of the Wright
Committee, but the final draft capitulated to the perceived selfinterest of the bar. Even as the Code was widely adopted, its
shortcomings became more evident. Joined by a lessening of
authority accorded lawyers between 1968 and 1975,508 not only

did the criticism of the Code increase, so too did economic and
social pressure on the profession.
One event may symbolize the beginning of the end of the golden
age. On Law Day 1969, as the Wright Committee put its final
touches on a Code that was unwilling to "depart from old, familiar
standards," a group of "185 young lawyers picketed outside a New
50 9
York criminal court demanding reforms in the court system."
To picket on Law Day was a statement of a belief in the power of
the rule of law. The 185 young New York lawyers believed their
actions could aid in changing the system of administration of
justice, a belief in what was possible that would dissipate within a
505. John F. Sutton, Jr., The American Bar Association Code of Professional
Responsibility: An Introduction, 48 TEX. L. REV. 255, 262 (1970); see also R.W. Nahstoll,
Limitations on Group Legal Services Arrangements Under the Code of Professional
Responsibility, DR 2-103(D)(5): Stale Wine in New Bottles, 48 TEX. L. REV. 334, 334
(1970) (noting the flaws in the new Code of Professional Responsibility with regard to the
regulation of group legal services). The subtitle indicates the author's perception of the
Code's regressive position on group legal services. R.W. Nahstoll, Limitations on Group
Legal Services Arrangements Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, DR
2-103(D) (5): Stale Wine in New Bottles, 48 TEX. L. REV. 334, 334 (1970).
506. Judith L. Maute, Changing Conceptions of Lawyers' Pro Bono Responsibilities:
From Chance Noblesse Oblige to Stated Expectations, 77 TUL. L. REV. 91,123-24 (2002).
507. See Interview by Olavi Maru with John Floyd Sutton, Jr., Reporter, Am. Bar
Found., in Houston, Tex. (Dec. 20, 1976), in American Bar Foundation Program on Oral
History 7 (on file with author) ("We did the worst job in the Code on Canon 2 .... I think
Canon 2 is more flawed than all the rest of the Code put together.").
508. See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA, at xii (paper ed. Oxford Univ. Press 1977) (1976) (noting
the "legitimate authority [that] was stripped from one institution after another," including
courts and the law).
509. Donald T. Weckstein, Maintaining the Integrity and Competence of the Legal
Profession,48 TEX. L. REV. 267, 267 (1970).
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handful of years. The call to the legal profession by some of its
members to reject complacency and look to improve the system of
justice was an unrequited cry of the heart.
F. Anxiety and the Model Rules
A legal historian writing in 1975 of an earlier era called the
period 1968-1974 "terrible years" and a "'coming apart"' of
legitimate authority in American institutions, including law and
the legal profession. 510 The first of the Watergate burglars was
tried in early 1973, and for the rest of that year and through the
first half of 1974, the public was treated to the spectacle of lawyers
attempting to defend their conduct in a wholly unappealing
fashion. 5 11 The Department of Justice filed an antitrust suit
against the ABA over several provisions in the Code.512 In 1973,
ABA-approved law schools had, for the first time, filled all their
seats for incoming students.5 1 3 That merely intensified the fear
that the legal profession was again becoming overcrowded. In
early 1972, the ABA created a Task Force on Professional
Utilization as a result of concerns over "the increase in the number
of new entrants into the profession."' 514 In a special report on
education, Business Week claimed that "the outlook for lawyers is
grim," and, noting a Labor Department forecast, predicted an
510. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE

IN MODERN AMERICA, at xii (paper ed. Oxford Univ. Press 1977) (1976). These
statements are taken from the preface written in 1975. Id. Coming Apart was the title of
an instant history of the 1960s by William L. O'Neill. WILLIAM L. O'NEILL, COMING
APART: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF AMERICA IN THE 1960s (paper ed. Quadrangle
Books 1971).
511. See David R. Brink, Who Will Regulate the Bar?, 61 A.B.A. J. 936, 937 (1975)
("[I]f Watergate has not tarnished the image of lawyers, at least it has acutely intensified
public consciousness of questions of legal ethics and professional accountability."); see also
JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR 35 (1978) ("More than twenty-five lawyers
were formally named as defendants or co-conspirators in Watergate and related criminal
proceedings.").
512. See Justice Departmentand Other Views on PrepaidLegal Services Plans Get an
Airing Before the Tunney Subcommittee, 60 A.B.A. J. 791, 792-93 (1974) (discussing the
premise that provisions of the Code could be held to violate antitrust laws); Justice
Department Continues Its Contentions That the Houston Amendments Raise Serious
Antitrust Problems, 60 A.B.A. J. 1410, 1410-14 (1974) (discussing the premise that
provisions of the Code could be held to violate antitrust laws).
513. James P. White, Is That Burgeoning Law School Enrollment Ending?, 61 A.B.A.
J. 202, 202 (1975).
514. See Report of the Task Force on Professional Utilization, 97 A.B.A. REP. 818,
819 (1972) (quoting the ABA Board of Governors charge to the Task Force).
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oversupply of 200,000 lawyers by 1985.515 The Department of
Labor predicted that there would be about 14,500 jobs awaiting
the additional 30,000 lawyers graduating in 1974.516 The Task
Force reiterated this prediction and noted the fact that the
increase in the number of lawyers between 1966 and 1970 was
12%, while the increase in population was only 3.2%.517
Although the Task Force opposed any "attempt to arbitrarily limit
or restrict the number of individuals permitted to enter the
profession," it suggested that "the expansion of existing law school
capacities and the creation of new law schools should be
undertaken cautiously." 1 8 In 1975, minimum fee schedules were
held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. 5 19 The Department
of Justice shortly thereafter filed an antitrust complaint against the
ABA concerning its ban on advertising, 52 0 and in late June 1977,
the Supreme Court held that a ban on all lawyer advertising was a
violation of the Free Speech Clause.5 2 1 In December 1977, the
Federal Trade Commission announced an investigation into the
legal profession.5 2 2 One critic writing in 1978 noted, "Since 1973,
American lawyers have taken an awful beating."'5 2 3 In economic
terms, Richard Posner noted, "[T]he price of legal services fell (in
real, that is, inflation-adjusted, terms), rather than . . . rose[]
"
between 1970 and 1985.7524
515. Special Report, The Job Gap for College Graduatesin the '70s, BUS. WK., Sept.
23, 1972, at 48, 51.
516. See Norman Dorsen & Stephen Gillers, We Need More Lawyers!, 2 JURIs DR. 7,
7 (1972) (noting the projection that in 1974 the number of first-year students was twice as
high as the number of jobs that would be available to them upon graduation); see also
Special Report, The Job Gap for College Graduatesin the '70s, Bus. WK., Sept. 23, 1972, at
48, 51 (noting that in 1974 there were 10,000 more new lawyers than jobs available for
them); Report of the Task Force on Professional Utilization, 97 A.B.A. REP. 818, 835
(1972) (quoting a comment on the Department of Labor estimate).
517. Report of the Task Force on Professional Utilization, 97 A.B.A. REP. 818, 826
(1972).
518. Id. at 835.
519. See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 784 (1975) (striking county bar
association schedules on Commerce Clause grounds).
520. See Lawrence Walsh, The Annual Report of the President of the American Bar
Association, 62 A.B.A. J. 1119, 1120 (1976) (noting the filing of antitrust case by the

Department of Justice).
521. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977).
522. See F.T.C. Goes Public on Lawyer Probe, 64 A.B.A. J. 959, 959 (1978)

(discussing the Federal Trade Commission's investigation of lawyers).
523. JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR 35 (1978).

524. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 67 (1995).
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Criticism of the Code of Professional Responsibility came from
several political perspectives. On the left, such criticism was
usually leavened with some praise for the Code.
Jerold
Auerbach's critical history of the American legal profession,
including the ABA, noted that the Code "tried to balance the
economic self-interest of the bar against the undisputed existence
of a vast neglected public for whom legal services were
unavailable,"525 but that balance ended up favoring the bar's
economic interests. Auerbach concluded, "Like the Canons it
replaced, [the Code] concentrated its energies upon the
preservation of a professional monopoly, not the provision of legal
services." 5 2 6 In a book edited by Ralph Nader and Mark Green,
one contributor concluded that the Code was a "monument to the
profession's imagined self-interest." 5 2 7
Jethro Lieberman
concluded in 1978 that the change from the Canons to the Code
''was more of form than of substance," and urged the drafting of a
new code of ethics by an independent body rather than the selfinterested ABA.5 2 8 In the ABA Journal itself, an article titled
The Myth of Legal Ethics disapprovingly concluded, "The Code of
Professional Responsibility, as the Canons of Professional
Ethics
52 9
before it, is a treasure trove of moral platitudes."
A nuanced article by Professor Thomas Morgan published in the
February 1977 issue of the Harvard Law Review concluded that
the Code, while "usually relevant, strikingly consistent, and not
consciously conspiratorial" was "repeatedly biased in the ordering
of its priorities.",5 30 One area of misplaced priorities was found in
Canon 7, concerning zealous representation. Harkening back to
525. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE

IN MODERN AMERICA 286 (paper ed. Oxford Univ. Press 1977) (1976).

526. Id. at 288.
527. Jay M. Smyser, In-House Corporate Counsek The Erosion of Independence, in
VERDICTS ON LAWYERS 208, 215 (Ralph Nader & Mark Green eds., 1976). Other

commentators in this volume expressed more mixed feelings toward the Code. See, e.g.,
Martin Garbus & Joel Seligman, Sanctions and Disbarment: They Sit in Judgment, in
VERDICTS ON LAWYERS 47, 50 (Ralph Nader & Mark Green eds., 1976) ("Although

several of the Disciplinary Rules have been criticized as mere subterfuge to fortify the
position of the most prominent law firms-such as those prohibiting advertising and
soliciting clients-they are generally rigorous, designed 'to avoid even the appearance of
impropriety."').
528. JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS ATTHE BAR 65,216-17 (1978).
529. Eric Schnapper, The Myth of Legal Ethics, 64 A.B.A. J. 202, 203 (1978).
530. Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90
HARV. L. REV. 702, 704 (1977).
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the cab rank rule, Morgan noted that the Code permitted a lawyer
to refuse to handle a matter for any reason.53 1 This understanding
was not consonant with either the Joint Conference Report or the
1887 Alabama Code of Ethics; it was, however, one of the defining
differences between the Alabama Code and the ABA's Canons of
Ethics. In addition, Morgan criticized the Code's preference for
to
the client's interest in delay, zealousness and client confidences
532
the public's interest in "just and expeditious results."
Not all criticisms were so nuanced. In the May 1977 issue of the
ABA Journal, Emory University Law School Dean L. Ray
Patterson began an article, "The time has come to renounce
completely the fiction that ethical problems for lawyers are
matters of ethics rather than law. The fiction pervades the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is its major shortcoming. ' 533 In
Patterson's view, the Code of Professional Responsibility was a
"transitional document" that suffered "from a defect common to
the adolescent stage of growth": "It is rigid and simplistic, complex
and contradictory, and difficult to read."5' 3 4 Professor Geoffrey
Hazard reported anonymously the comments of large firm
practicing lawyers and others who participated in a legal ethics
conference. The participants criticized the Code as enshrining the
ethics of "downstate Illinois in the 1860s," "never applicable in the
Others criticized the
real world," and a "hodgepodge." '5 35
litigation-centric focus of the Code, 5 3 6 a limitation that both the
531. See id. at 735 (citing EC 2-25 and noting in an accompanying footnote the
contrast with the English system of cab rank).
532. Id.
533. L. Ray Patterson, Wanted: A New Code of Professional Responsibility, 63
A.B.A. J. 639, 639 (1977); see also Robert J. Kutak, The Law of Lawyering, 22
WASHBURN L.J. 413, 413 (1983) ("What lawyers ... have failed to appreciate is that ethics
is not what the Model Rules concern; the Model Rules are about the law of lawyering.").
Kutak was the chairman of the Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards,
which drafted the Model Rules.
534. L. Ray Patterson, Wanted: A New Code of Professional Responsibility, 63
A.B.A. J. 639, 639 (1977).
535. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 7 (1978).

Karl

Llewellyn made the same complaint in the 1930s in discussing the Canons of Ethics: "The
canons of ethics on business-getting are still built in terms of a town of twenty-five
K.N. Llewellyn, The Bar's
thousand (or, much more dubiously, even fifty thousand) ....
Troubles, and Poultices-andCures?, 5 LAW& CONTEMP. PROBS. 104, 115 (1938).
536. See W. William Hodes, The Code of Professional Responsibility, the Kutak
Rules, and the Trial Lawyer's Code: Surprisingly, Three Peas in a Pod, 35 U. MIAMI L.

REV. 739, 745 (1981) (noting criticism that the Code "overemphasized litigation"); see also
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Joint Conference Report and the American Bar Foundation's
Special Committee had taken pains to avoid.
The Code, as Morgan noted, had a number of faults. However,
the conclusion that the Code was an "adolescent" document valid
only for those in the legally-primitive "downstate Illinois" of a
hundred years earlier is an unfair and misleading characterization.
Hazard became the reporter of the Model Rules; Patterson was
one of the commission's consultants.5 3 7
The attack by the left was undertaken in an effort to make the
profession live up to its stated ideals. Morgan's criticism was
premised in part on the belief that the Code was too self-serving,
and that changes in ethics codes reflecting the public profession of
The attack by
the law were both valuable and inevitable.
Patterson and Hazard reflected the effort to transform the
profession's understanding of its ethics code. The imperfect effort
of the Joint Conference Report to capture the "central moral
tradition" of lawyering5 3 8 in America was not of interest to the
ABA commission that crafted the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. The Model Rules were to be understood as a type of
law, and a type of law that would bind Holmes's "bad man"; 5 3 9 the
moral tradition of lawyering was dead. The Code had, pursuant to
Casner's request, stated its axiomatic Canons in the affirmative, in
contrast with the "thou shalt nots" of the Canons. The Model
Rules reverted to the negative.
The distancing of the Model Rules from the golden age is
exemplified by the dispensing of the Joint Conference Report. It
was cited in the references exactly one time in the Model Rules'
Discussion Draft.54 0 The Model Rules, eventually adopted by the
Theodore J. Schneyer, The Model Rules and Problems of Code Interpretation and
Enforcement, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 939, 940 (noting the Discussion Draft specified

lawyer's duties in a number of roles, unlike the Code).
537. See ABA Comm. on Evaluation of Prof'l Standards, MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT (Discussion Draft 1980) (listing participants of commission).
538. Robert P. Lawry, The Central Moral Tradition of Lawyering, 19 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 311, 311 (1990).

539. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,
459 (1897) ("If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad
man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to
predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or
outside it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.").
540. See ABA Comm. on Evaluation of Prof'l Standards, MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT, at 54 (Discussion Draft 1980) (citing the Report after comment to section 2.1,
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ABA in 1983541 after significant revision (including a tightening of
the reasons permitting a lawyer to disclose a client confidence),
was a legal document. At the early 1982 mid-year meeting of the
ABA, the Kutak Commission's recommendation that the Model
Rules follow a "restatement" format was debated by the House of
Delegates.5 4 2 Robert Kutak explained that the Code "did not
fully meet the needs of the individual lawyer," and "had created
In addition to "eliminating
considerable confusion."'5 4 3
confusion," a restatement format "would prevent the ad hoc development of new rules."'5 4 4 The ensuing discussion was spirited, and
a substitute retaining the format of the Code was offered.5 4 5 It
failed, and the House of Delegates approved, without further
debate, the Commission's recommendation. 5 4 6 Even the official
name of the Kutak Commission reflected this bias in favor of law:
it was called the Commission on Evaluation of Professional
Standards. The Wright Committee that created the Code was
named the Special Committee on the Evaluation of Ethical
Standards. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct were rules
about a type of professionalism. Ethics had nothing to do with it.
As noted in an analysis of the January 1980 Discussion Draft,
"[t]he Model Rules were more of a black-letter criminal law style
code than had ever been proposed before, but at the same time
they were written in language that softened the commands
considerably, and made them subject to a rule of reason."'54 7 This
difficulty was not ameliorated in the adopted Model Rules. For
example, Model Rule 1.5 declared, "A lawyer's fee shall be
reasonable." A lawyer thus violated Model Rule 1.5 if the lawyer's
Determining whether a fee was
fee was not "reasonable."
reasonable required an assessment of some or all of the eight
"Independence and Candor").
541. See Proceedings of the 1983 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 108
A.B.A. REP. 763, 778 (1983). The recommendation is found in the Report of the
Commission on Evaluation of ProfessionalStandards, 107 A.B.A. REP. 408, 408 (1982).
542. House of Delegates Proceedings,107 A.B.A. REP. 298, 298 (1982).
543. Id.
544. Id. at 298-99.
545. See id. at 299 (noting William R. Moller's motion to use the format of the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility).
546. See id. at 301 (approving Commission's restatement format).
547. W. William Hodes, The Code of Professional Responsibility, the Kutak Rules,
and the Trial Lawyer's Code: Surprisingly, Three Peas in a Pod, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 739,
741 (1981).
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factors listed in the rule.5 4 8
As it did with the Code, the ABA created a committee to
encourage states to adopt the Model Rules. This time, the going
was slower, although over half the states adopted some version of
the Model Rules within five years.5 4 9 Unlike the Code, the
adoption by states of the Model Rules occurred only after
significant amendments. The Model Rules were not a "last word"
on American legal ethics but a starting point. In 1997, however,
the ABA created an Ethics 2000 Commission to evaluate and
amend the Model Rules.5 5 ° No "overhaul" was undertaken, but
none was intended. Instead, the effort was premised on the ABA
maintaining its position as the authoritative source of the law of
legal ethics in response to the challenge of the Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers of the American Law
Institute (ALI). The recommendations made by the Ethics 2000
Commission were largely rejected until the Enron fiasco left the
ABA scrambling to stay ahead of Congress and federal
regulators.5 5 1 But the beat went on: The focus of the ABA was
548. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a) (2003) (listing the eight
factors to consider whether a fee is reasonable). This rule was amended shortly after the
turn of the century to read: "A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect
an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses." Id. The eight factors
remain. Id.
549. See Informational Report of the Adjunct Committee on Implementation of the
Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct, 113 A.B.A. REP. 64, 64 (1988) (noting adoption of
the Model Rules by twenty-five states, with another nine considering adoption);
InformationalReport of the Adjunct Committee on Implementation of the Model Rules of
ProfessionalConduct, 112 A.B.A. REP. 79, 79 (1987) (noting that all but eight jurisdictions
had adopted or considered adoption of Model Rules); InformationalReport of the Special
Committee on Implementation of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 111 A.B.A.
REP. 343, 343 (1986) (noting the adoption of the Model Rules by thirteen states and
consideration in twenty-four more). As of mid-2008, forty-nine jurisdictions had adopted
some form of the Model Rules. See Am. Bar Ass'n, Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct:
Dates of Adoption, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/chron-states.html (last visited Nov. 10,
2008) (listing adoption in chronological order).
550. E. Norman Veasey, Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct ("Ethics 2000"): Chair's Introduction (Aug. 2002), http://www.abanet.
org/cpr/mrpc/e2k chairintro.html; see also Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Summary of the Work of Ethics 2000, 15 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 441, 441 (2002) (summarizing the work of the Ethics 2000 Commission).
551. See Mark Hansen, Model Rules Rehab: House Tackles Tough Issues as Ethics
Debate Begins, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2001, at 80, 80 ("The Ethics 2000 commission won a few
rounds and lost a few others when its proposed overhaul of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct finally came up for debate by the association's House of
Delegates."). The face-off between the ABA and the federal government over the

2008] AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS IN ANAGE OFANXIETY

451

the law of lawyering, 55 2 and the continued fine-tuning of that law
was the order of the day and decade. 5 5 3 Joining the ABA in
drafting a restatement of the law of ethics was the inventor of the
restatement, the ALI, which adopted its Restatement (Third) of
the Law Governing Lawyers in 2000 after studying the issue for
much of the 1990s. But the anxiety within the profession did not
dissipate.
V.

CONCLUSION

To the fervent cry for the bread of moral life a stone of formalism
and negation ... has apparently been given. The American lawyer
has a fondness for codes ....
55 4
Charles F. Chamberlayne, Legal Idealism
Chamberlayne's century-old lament still resonates. The retreat
to law in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct was intended to
avoid the difficulty of choosing a particular moral and ethical path
for lawyers as the golden age of lawyering receded into history. Of
course, emphasizing the legal part of legal ethics doesn't resolve
the demands of professionalism. Instead, the fondness for codes
leads to evermore particularistic amendments. Changes at the
margin of the Model Rules must be expected, for the pace of
change in the legal profession continues to necessitate

regulation of lawyers in the aftermath of Enron is the subject of a forthcoming article.
Michael Ariens, "Playing Chicken": An Instant History of the Battle Over Exceptions to
Client Confidentiality,33 J. LEGAL PROF. (forthcoming 2009).
552. See generally GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF

LAWYERING (3d ed. Aspen Law & Bus. 2006) (1985) (referencing the law of lawyering as
the focus of the ABA).
553. See John S. Dzienkowski, Preface to PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES, at iii, iii (2007-2008 ed.) (noting changes and including
both the 2007 and 2001 versions of Model Rules of Professional Conduct); see also
Michael Ariens, The Ethics of CopyrightingEthics Rules, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 235, 235 n.1
(2005) (listing sources concerning ABA action on Ethics 2000 Commission). The ABA's
House of Delegates adopted several of the Ethics 2000 proposed amendments between

2002 and 2003. See John S. Dzienkowski, Preface to PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES at iii, iii (2007-2008 ed.) (noting the adoption of the
proposed amendments). This work continues; in February 2008, the ABA amended
Model Rule 3.8, concerning the ethical duties of prosecutors to disclose evidence when a
criminal defendant might have been erroneously convicted. James Podgers, Righting
Wrongs, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2008, at 32, 32.
554. Charles F. Chamberlayne, Legal Idealism, 21 GREEN BAG 436, 436 (1909).
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amendments, modifications and supplements to those rules. But
lost in this fetish for particularity is purpose. The drive to add
more law to American legal ethics is unlikely to reduce the anxiety
in the profession. Do lawyers remain part of a purposive and
Much of the late nineteenth and early
public profession?
twentieth century criticism of the American legal profession was
generated because the client-centered justifications of the lawyer's
actions, by David Dudley Field and others, was rejected as
insufficient to justify the exercise of power by lawyers. The 1958
Joint Conference Report warned the profession that rules were
incapable of preserving the mediating role of lawyers in a
democratic society, a role given lawyers because they were
constrained in the exercise of power by their professional duties.
Anxiety in the American legal profession in the past three decades
has continued to increase. The response by the profession seems
simply to repeat that lawyers remain part of the public profession
of law. As noted by Professor Debra Lyn Bassett, "[T]he
Preamble to the Model Rules uses the word 'public' ten times,
repeatedly referring to lawyers as 'public' citizens and to the ideals
of 'public' service."'5 55 But actions still speak louder than words:

"Despite the historical and Model Rule references, neither the
general practice of law nor the Model Rules are geared toward law
as a public profession. "556
There is no going back to any golden age. The time for the Joint
Conference Report and the Code of Professional Responsibility is
gone, and anxious times in the legal profession are not likely to
dissipate any time soon. Lawyers must accept that the anxiety
concerning their status and their economic prospects is not going
away. However, the turn to a nearly complete client-centered
ethic has not served the long-term interests of those clients, much
less the public.
In an 1871 essay on the ethics of lawyers, including the lawyers
representing the Erie Railroad, the editors of The Nation patiently
explained why lawyers asked for "certain exemptions," on "purely
utilitarian grounds," "to the ethical canons which govern men in
the ordinary dealings of life."'5 5 7 "He is not simply the counsel of
555. Debra Lyn Bassett, Redefining the "Public" Profession, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 721,

722 (2005).
556. Id. at 723.
557. Forensic Ethics, THE NATION, Jan. 26, 1871, at 56, 56.
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one of the parties; he is an officer charged by the government with
the task of assisting in the administration of justice. When he
appears in court, it is not simply as the representative of one of the
litigants, but as the guardian of the general interests of the
community."' 55 8 This double-duty, as noted by The Nation, is not
easily accomplished. The public disbelieves lawyers engage in it,
and some lawyers do so as well. But, the editors note, the "special
exemptions" were of necessity paired with "special restrictions" on
lawyers, for their honest and honorable conduct was essential to
the operation of justice. The lawyer as Janus-like was accepted as
late as the Joint Conference Report and the Code; it is largely
absent from the Model Rules. But the future of the profession
may lie in its past.

558. Id.
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